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with the sword at their throat they have become 
members of what is facetiously called the 
'Brotherhood’ of Nations!
William Hunter, an "Old Resident" of the foreign 
factories in Canton, 1825-1842
The 'Fan Kwae’ at Canton: Before Treaty Days 
(London, 1882; reprint, Shanghai, China: Oriental 
Affairs, 1938), 95.
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ABSTRACT
"Palmerston, Parliament and Peking" is a revisionist 
work designed to challenge the prevailing economic 
interpretations of the first Opium War, 1839-1842.
Orthodox historiography considers early nineteenth-century 
Britain as a modern, industrial society and argues that its 
Government needed to respond violently to the Chinese 
authorities' suppression of the opium trade in order to 
protect and expand a lucrative endeavor. Indian opium 
sales generated revenue for the British-run government in 
Bengal and paid for Chinese tea, a highly prized commodity 
in Great Britain. British industrialists demanded war to 
end the Chinese Government's restrictions on trade, known 
as the Canton system, thus opening China's market to goods 
produced by Britain's expanding industrial economy.
During the mid-1970s a new interpretation of British 
society began to emerge which challenges the centrality of 
modernization to the experience of life in early 
nineteenth-century Britain. Viewing Britain in the 1830s 
as a predominantly traditional society, these historians 
argue that the landed aristocracy remained the dominant 
order economically, socially and politically. Although 
Northern industrialists launched their challenge to this
viii
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aristocratie order in this period, the limited scope of 
industrial growth inhibited their ability to win approval 
for middle-class initiatives at the highest levels of 
government.
By revising the interpretation of the British 
Cabinet's decision to wage war on China, this dissertation 
supports these new interpretations of early nineteenth- 
century British society. Lord Melbourne's Whig Ministry 
(1835-1841) did not respond immediately to calls for a 
violent response to events in China. Several Ministers 
doubted the wisdom of confronting such a populous empire as 
China, and economic considerations shared center stage with 
the Government's domestic political interests. A political 
crisis in the Fall of 1839 created the opportunity for 
middle-class Radicals, whose constituent eagerly awaited 
the "opening" of China, to sv/ay a cautious aristocratic 
government.
I X
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INTRODUCTION
In 183 9 and 184 0 the Government of Great Britain, the 
Melbourne Ministry (1835-1841), contemplated war with 
China. At home the Ministry faced growing political 
resistance. The Opposition stridently called the nation's 
attention to the Chartist riots, a deficit budget, colonial 
rebellions in Canada and Jamaica, Irish unrest, 
disestablishment of the Anglican Church and threats to 
British trade in Mexico, Buenos Aires and China.^ This 
political crisis sets the scene for the Melbourne 
Ministry's decision to wage war in response to the Chinese 
government's seizure of £2,000,000 worth of British owned 
opium.
^Appendix A; Viscount Powerscourt, "House of Commons 
Debate, January 30, 1840," Times, 31 January 1840, p. 3 ; 
See also Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists ; Popular Politics 
in the Industrial Revolution (New York : Pantheon Books, 
1984); Ged Martin, The Durham Report and British Policy: A 
Critical Essay (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,
1972); Philip J. McLewin, Power and Economic Change: The 
Response to Emancipation in Jamaica and British Guiana 
1840-1865 (New York: Garland, 1987); John O. Ranelagh, A 
Short History of Ireland (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983); G.I.T. Machin, Politics and the Churches in 
Great Britain (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1977); I wan Wyn 
Morgan, "Anglo-French Confrontation and Cooperation in 
Spanish America, 1835-1848" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
London, 1975); For China see footnote 2.
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2Although the opium crisis has certainly not been 
ignored, its relationship to the British domestic situation 
has not been fully explored. Current historiography on the 
subject focuses primarily on economic issues in the Far 
EastPrevailing  interpretations argue that the British 
Government needed to respond violently to the Chinese 
authorities' suppression of the opium trade in order to 
protect and to expand a lucrative endeavor. Indian opium 
sales generated revenue for the British-run government in 
Bengal and paid for Chinese tea, a highly prized commodity 
in Great Britain. Furthermore, British industrialists 
demanded war to end the Chinese Government's restrictions 
on trade, known as the Canton System, and to create an 
opportunity to sell mass-produced goods. The resulting war 
changed the economic relationship between Britain and China 
by opening the latter's vast market.
^Gerald S. Graham, The China. Station: War and 
Diplomacy, 1830-1869 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Tan 
Chung, China and the Brave New World: A Study of the 
Origins of the Opium War (1840-42) (Durham, N.C.: Carolina 
Academic Press, 1978); Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840- 
1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part 
of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced 
the Gates Ajar (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1975); Hsin-pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and The 
Opium War (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1964); 
Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 
1800-1842 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951); 
Maurice Collis. Foreign Mud: Being an Account of the Opium 
Imbroglio at Canton in the 1830's & the Anglo-Chinese War 
that Followed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947); David 
Gwen, British Opium Policy in China and India (New Haven : 
Yale University Press, 1934; reprint, Archon Books, 1968) .
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3Douglas North, winner of the 1993 Nobel prize for 
economics, argues that changes in economic institutions 
must be studied in the particular political context of the 
time rather than in isolation. Political institutions 
define and maintain economic relations based on property 
rights and contracts. Since economic, social and political 
institutions by their very nature are slow to adapt 
themselves, substantial economic changes will more likely 
occur when accompanied by either an internal or external 
threat to a political institution.^ North criticizes 
purely economic historical analyses that use simple 
"cost/benefit calculus." This methodology assumes that 
individuals weigh the cost of a particular economic system 
against the potential benefits of changing it. If the cost 
of change outweighs the benefits--economic growth--then 
individuals will act to preserve the system. If, on the 
other hand, the benefits outweigh the cost, then 
individuals will act to change the system.^
Historians of the Opium War have generally used 
cost/benefit calculus to explain the opening of China.
They have argued that "the British" believed that the 
Chinese government's restrictions on foreign trade limited 
the potential for an exponential growth in sales of British
^Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic 
History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 27-9.
^North, Structure and Change, 4-5.
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4manufactured goods. The benefits of change outweighed the 
cost of preserving the system. Because of the inhibiting 
trade environment, the "British" sought an excuse to change 
violently their economic relationship with China.
Two fundamental deficiencies limit the ability of 
these orthodox interpretations to explain the events which 
occurred in China and London at the end of the 1830s.
First, most of the historians who have dealt with the 
issue present a monolithic image of the "British." These 
scholars make few attempts to differentiate between the 
wishes of the merchants in China and the policies of Her 
Majesty's Government in London. They also assume that the 
British Government strove to meet the needs of the 
mercantile and manufacturing communities. The result of 
this methodological approach is an assumption that the 
historian can use the term "British" to mean merchants, 
manufacturers. Foreign Service Officers, the Foreign Office 
and the Government without differentiating among them.
Such an oversight is not unique to the Opium War.
Historian Ged Martin finds similar deficiencies in 
histories of British policy toward Canada during the same 
period (1835-1841). Martin notes that "The historians' 
shorthand may mislead in such terms as ' British’ or ' the 
British Government.’ In the 1830s there was certainly
The conclusion contains criticism of specific 
historians and their work.
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5little sign of ' the Official mind’ and we must guard 
against the more workaday device of ' the Colonial Office 
view ’ .
Second, assuming a convergence of desires among "the 
British" allows historians of the Opium War to ignore the 
complexity of British society and politics in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. They can consider members 
of the British Government in an economic rather than a 
political role. As Douglas North points out, however, most 
politicians concern themselves more with the preservation 
of their own power, rather than with seeking ways to expand 
the econom.y. Economic change occurs when a threat to a 
political institution combines with the desire for economic 
gain. Just as North does not reduce economic policies to 
the search for growth, he refuses to explain political 
action as a simple grab for power and control. A society's 
governing ideology, by providing guidelines for acceptable 
behavior, shapes the actions of both the rulers and the 
ruled.^ In order to place a particular historical event 
in context, one must examine the hegemonic values within a 
community.
^Ged Martin, "Confederation Rejected: The British 
Debate on Canada, 1837-1840," Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 11 (October 1982): 35.
^North, Structure and Change, 21-9.
^North, Structure and Change, 45-58.
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6Until recently the orthodox interpretations in British 
history argued that in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries the English witnessed the final decay 
of traditional society and the emergence of a modern 
nation. As industry and commerce replaced agriculture as 
the most significant aspect of the economy, the rural, 
aristocratic community of the ancien regime gave way to the 
urban, middle class society of the Victorian period. 
Following the political and economic policies and values of 
the middle class, British imperial power reached its 
apogee. During the mid-1970s a new interpretation of 
nineteenth century British social structure began to emerge 
which challenged this standard interpretation. Denying the 
centrality of modernization to the experience of life in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, these historians 
view Britain in the 1830s as a predominantly traditional 
society. The landed aristocracy remained the dominant 
order economically, socially and politically. Although 
Northern industrialists began their challenge to Britain's 
aristocratic order in the this period, the limited scope of 
industrial growth inhibited their ability to win approval 
for middle-class initiatives at the highest levels of 
government.
One of the major points of contention between these 
two sets of interpretations is the nature of the nineteenth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
century economy.® The standard interpretation emphasizes 
the industrial revolution. Between 1760 and 1840 the 
English economy changed from hand production, using human 
or animal power to make unique goods in a family setting, 
to mass production, using machine-generated power to make 
standardized goods in factories. The change in production 
caused the economy to "take-off" as it moved beyond 
providing subsistence needs for a local community to 
providing consumer goods for the society at large and for 
export abroad. Displaced rural laborers left the familiar 
surroundings of the traditional family economy to work in 
the unsafe factory system, which concentrated all aspects 
of production around the steam engine. According to these 
interpretations, overseas trade performed an essential 
service in providing markets for Britain's expanding 
industrial economy.^
For two comprehensive historigraphical essays on the 
early nineteenth-century economy see: David Cannadine, "The 
Past and Present in the English Industrial Revolution,"
Past and Present no. 103 (May 1984): 131-72; Joel Mokyr, 
"Editor's Introduction: The New Economic History and the 
Industrial Revolution," idem, ed., The British Industrial 
Revolution: An Economic Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1993), 1-131.
^Walt Whitman Rostow, British Economy of the 
Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948; reprint, 
1949 ; idem, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1960); 
idem. How It All Began: Origins of the Modern Economy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Phyllis Deane and W.A. Cole, 
British Economic Growth, 1688-1959 : Trends and Structure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); Phyllis 
Deane, The First Industrial Revolution (Cambridge :
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8Critics of this interpretation argue that while 
industrialization began in the early nineteenth century, 
the change affected a relatively small percentage of the 
total economy. Only 10 to 12 per cent of the English labor 
force worked in modern factories ; the remainder engaged in 
agriculture or in traditional trades. Textile production, 
the most widely used example of industrialization, centered 
around Lancashire, It employed one-half of the industrial 
work force, but represented 7 per cent of British national 
income.'"^  When iron and steel are added to textile 
production, total industrial output still only represented 
less than one-fourth of total manufacturing output in 1840. 
The results of these studies show a rate of growth 
considerably slower and more constant in the total economy 
than the rate advanced by advocates of an industrial take­
off theory. Consequently, as historians downplay the 
importance of industrialization to the total economy, they 
similarly diminish the significance previously attributed 
to foreign markets for manufactured goods.
Cambridge University Press, 1965); David Landes, The 
Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969); Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and Overseas 
Trade (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979).
^°Michael Fores, "The Myth of a British Industrial 
Revolution," History 65 (1981): 181-98.
”c. Knick Harley, "British Industrialization Before 
1841: Evidence of Slower Growth During the Industrial 
Revolution," Journal of Economic History 42 (June 1982) : 
267-89; N.F.R. Crafts, "British Economic Growth, 1700-1831:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9The dominance of the industrial take-off theory has 
shaped the standard interpretation of early nineteenth 
century social structure. Social historians tend to find 
the origins of modern English social relationships in this 
period. National class divisions, based on the new urban 
industrial experience, replaced paternalistic social 
relationships derived from life in small rural communities. 
With the decline of traditional relationships the landed 
aristocracy abdicated responsibility to the rising 
capitalist middle class, which struggled to maintain its 
hegemonic position in society against the new industrial 
working class. Each class had unique values that 
necessarily produced conflict among the various social 
groups and their belief systems.
Like their counterparts in economic history, some 
social historians have questioned the validity of viewing 
early nineteenth-century social relationships in modern 
terms. Revisionists downplay the division of English
A Review of the Evidence, Economic History Review 26 (May 
1983): 177-99; idem, British Economic Growth During the 
Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
^ F^or the two most important presentations of this 
general interpretation, see : Harold Perkin, The Origins of 
Modern English Society, 1780-1880 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto, 1969) ; Edward Palmer Thompson, The Making of the 
English Working Class (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963; New 
York : Vintage Books, 1966) .
^ A^ny of the most recent interpretations rest on what 
has been described as a "linguistic turn" in methodology. 
For the pros and cons of this approach see : David Mayfield
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10
society along economic lines--land, capital and labor--and 
examine society in terms of governors and governed, idle 
and industrious orders, or privileged few and the people. 
Those with political power dominated those without, and a 
life of leisure commanded more prestige than did working 
for a living. In this type of society the traditional 
aristocracy still played the dominant role. Domination 
involved more than simply exploitation; it dictated a 
responsibility to the lower orders. Contemporaries thus 
did not view as natural the conflict among the various 
orders of society. Animosities grew out of the perceived 
abuse of political power and the failure to reconcile the
various interests of the community, rather than the misuse
. 14of economic power.
and Susan Throne, "Social History and Its Discontents: 
Gareth Stedman Jones and the Politics of Language," Social 
History 11 (May 1992): 165-88; John Lawrence and Miles 
Taylor, "The Poverty of Protest : Gareth Stedman Jones and 
the Politics of Language--A Reply," Social History 18 
(January 1993): 1-15; Patrick Joyce, "The Imaginary 
Discontents of Social History: A Note of Response to 
Mayfield and Throne, and Lawrence and Taylor," Social 
History 18 (January 1993): 81-5; James Vernon, "Who's 
Afraid of the 'Linguistic Turn’? The Politics of Social 
History and Its Discontents," Social History 19 (January 
1994): 81-97.
^^Francis M.L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the 
Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); 
idem. The Rise of Respectable Society; A Social History of 
Victorian Britain, 1830-1900 (Cambridge University Press, 
1988); Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in 
English Working Class History, 1832-1982 (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1983) ; Patrick Joyce, Visions 
of the People: Industrial England and the Question of 
Class, 1840-1914 (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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11
standard interpretations of domestic politics during 
the late 1830s contrast sharply with the revisions taking 
place in economic and social histories. Political 
histories commonly argue that in the second half of the 
1830s the foundations of the modern British two-party 
system developed. They define a "party" as a structured 
organization with a clear ideology. The Liberal Party, 
according to this analysis, advocated progressive reform of 
the constitution and attracted its support from large urban 
and non-English (Irish, Scottish and Welsh) constituencies. 
The Conservative Party, drawing its support from small 
boroughs and English counties, opposed constitutional 
reform but admitted the necessity of practical reforms.
Once party members entered the House of Commons, they 
seldom voted across party lines ; party organization and 
ideology instilled this discipline.
Such modern definitions of party organization and 
ideology have not stood unchallenged. Challengers to the
^^Norman Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction in English 
Politics, 1832-1852 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955); idem, 
"The Organization of the Conservative Party, 1832-1846,
Part I; The Parliamentary Organization," Parliamentary 
History 1 (1982): 137-59; idem, "The Organization of the 
Conservative Party, 1832-1846, Part II: The Electoral 
Organization," Parliamentary History 2 (1983) : 131-52 ; 
D.E.D. Beales, "Parliamentary Parties and the 'Independent' 
Member, 1810-1860," Ideas and Institutions of Victorian 
Britain: Essays in Honour of George Kitson Clark, Robert 
Robson, ed., (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967), 1-19 ; David 
Close, "The Formation of a Two-Party Alignment in the House 
of Commons," English Historical Review 84 (April 1969).
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12
prevailing interpretation prefer a narrower, and more 
traditional, definition of party politics. Instead of two 
all-encompassing parties, revisionists focus on smaller 
groups of politicians held together by aristocrats through 
bonds of family and friendship. These historians also 
reject the artificial lines created by the yes-or-no nature 
of parliamentary divisions lists. By examining the 
ideological differences within the "Liberal" and 
"Conservative" parties, one finds that a combination of 
interests could produce the perception of a "two party 
system." Various blocs on both sides of parliament joined 
forces to gain divergent goals by the same means.
The conventional interpretations of British imperial 
history reflect the standard versions of economic, social 
and political histories. Proponents of a "free trade 
imperialism" theory argue that British politicians favored
R. Hugh Cameron, "Parties and Policies in Early 
Victorian Britain: A Suggestion for Revision," Canadian 
Journal of History 3 (December 1979): 257-77; Boyd 
Hilton,"Peel : A Reappraisal," Historical Journal 22 (1979) : 
585-514; Peter Handler, Aristocratic Government in the Age 
of Reform: Whigs and Liberals, 1830-1852 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990); Ian Newbould, "Whiggery and the Dilemma of 
Reform: Liberals, Radicals and the Melbourne 
Administration, 1835-9," Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research 53 (1980): 229-41; idem, "Sir Robert
Peel and the Conservative Party, 1832-1841 : A Study in 
Failure?," English Historical Review 48 (July 1983) : 529- 
57; idem, "The Emergence of a Two-Party system in England 
from 1830 to 1841 : Roll Call and Reconsideration," 
Parliaments, Estates and Representation 5 (June 1985) : 25- 
31; idem, Whiggery and Reform, 183 0-41; The Politics of 
Government (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
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13
an aggressive overseas policy in order to expand foreign 
markets for the new industrial economy. Unlike their 
aristocratic predecessors, who sought a formal imperial 
structure, early- and mid-Victorian leaders followed a 
laissez-faire policy which favored inform.al economic 
control to accomplish their imperialistic goals. Events 
around the world drew British forces into areas whose 
political leaders refused to cooperate v/ith the agents of 
the informal empire. This theory emphasizes the role of 
British officials and citizens abroad and their 
relationship to indigenous collaborators. It suggests that 
if overseas officials called for help, or got into trouble 
with native administrations, then the British Government 
sat ready to use force. Most critics of "free trade 
imperialism" do not challenge their antagonists' 
assumptions about the nature of early nineteenth century 
English society. They continue to set English overseas 
exploits within the context of an industrial middle-class 
society. An ideology based on laissez-faire economics.
^^John Gallagher and Roland Robinson, "Imperialism of 
Free Trade," Economic History Review 6 (1953): 1-15; Roland 
Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European 
Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," The 
Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, Edited with an 
Introduction by Wm. Roger Louis (New York: New View Points, 
1976), 128-151; David K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 
1830-1914 (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1973); Bernard 
Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical 
Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and 
Imperialism, 1750-1850 (Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press, 1970).
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however, precluded the possibility of government 
intervention in order to advance foreign trade. Foreign 
wars represented an exception, not the rule.
Currently, Peter Cain and Anthony Hopkins, recognizing 
the new work of economic and social historians, have begun 
to set imperial activity within the context of an 
aristocratic society. Rejecting the notion that the needs 
of Northern industrialists motivated economic expansion, 
Cain and Hopkins developed the idea of "Gentlemanly 
Capitalism." During the course of the eighteenth century, 
bankers and commercial capitalists, those who could best 
afford the lifestyle of gentlemen, entered into Britain's 
ruling elite by supporting the growth of a "Fiscal-Military 
State"--the apparatus needed to finance continental wars, 
to pay for government patronage and to collect excise 
taxes. These gentlemen, located in or near the City of 
London, exercised considerable influence in Whitehall and
^^Desmond C.M. Platt, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: 
Some Reservations," Economic History Review 21 (1958): 295- 
305; idem, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign 
Policy, 1815-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958); idem, 
"Further Objections to an ' Imperialism of Free Trade’, 
1830-50." Economic History Review 25 (February 1973): 77- 
91; Oliver MacDonagh, "The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade," 
Economic History Review 14 (April 1962): 489-501; Britten 
Dean, "The British Informal Empire: The Case of China," The 
Journal of Comm.onwealth & Comparative Politics 14 (March 
1975): 54-81.
*^The most developed presentation of this conception 
is John Brewer's The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the 
English State, 1688-1783 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988).
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led the drive toward imperialist expansion. Parliamentary 
leaders--landed aristocrats--took this advice, because 
"successful expansion, reinforced by colonial acquisitions, 
generated profits and revenues, helped to service the 
national debt, and contributed to employment and political 
stability.
While a reinterpretation of the British Cabinet's 
decision to wage the first Opium War (1839-1842) supports 
these new explanations of early nineteenth-century British 
society, an important anomaly needs to be explained. The 
evidence available shows that Northern merchants and 
industrialists provided the impetus behind the use of 
force, not the City, the Foreign Office, or the Cabinet.
The question then becomes for the historian of the Opium 
War : why did a parliament and Cabinet, dominated by landed 
aristocrats, address so actively the economic needs of a 
political and social minority? The political crisis the 
Melbourne Ministry faced during this period provides the 
key to an answer.
In 1839, just six short years after the summoning of 
the first Reform Parliament, Lord Melbourne still struggled
^°Peter J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 
Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (New York: Longman, 
1993), 103; See also their "The Political Economy of 
British Expansion Overseas, 1750-1914," Economic History 
Review 23 (Novem.ber 1980) : 463-90, as well as, "Gentlemanly 
Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas I. The Old 
Colonial System, 1688-1850," Economic History Review 29 
(December 1986): 501-25.
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with the Great Reform Act's legacy. His Ministry had lost 
the confidence of the House of Commons and faced the 
possibility of losing office. On domestic issues the 
Opposition accused the Ministry of undermining the 
constitution of Great Britain, while Radicals claimed the 
Ministry supported the status quo. It fought back by 
pointing to the active participation of members of the 
Opposition and Radicals in passing controversial pieces of 
legislation. On foreign policy issues Her Majesty's 
Government did not have this luxury.
While normally foreign policy remained "free from 
effective interference by parliament, freedom meant 
taking responsibility for real, or perceived, failed 
policies. In 1836 Melbourne wrote to Lord Palmerston, 
Foreign Minister, "From all I hear of the real temper of 
the House of Commons, We must be very careful what we do in 
foreign affairs.Palmerston was not careful enough.
In 1839 the Opposition asserted that the Ministry's 
inaction in regard to overseas interests threatened the 
commercial position of British merchants. Her Majesty's 
Government thus needed strong, swift action to pacify the
^^Bernard Porter, "British Foreign Policy in the 
Nineteenth Century," The Historical Journal 23 (1980), 194,
^^Viscount Melbourne to Viscount Palmerston, South 
Street, 10 February 1836. Palmerston Papers. Property of 
the Broadlands Trust. Deposited in Southampton University 
Library (Hereafter cited as PP). GC/ME/69.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
commercial and manufacturing constituencies. The opium 
crisis, which had developed in China in March 183 9, 
provided the best opportunity to act swiftly without 
risking a general European war. The political threat from 
the Opposition and the Radicals was a crucial factor in the 
Ministry's decision to send an expeditionary force to 
China.
Domestic politics then played an integral role in the 
decision to wage war. To focus primarily on economic 
issues in the Far East provides too simplistic an 
interpretation of events. Understanding the Melbourne 
Ministry's decision to send an expeditionary force to China 
in 1839 requires a discussion of the institutional changes 
that occurred both in Great Britain and in China during the 
early 1830s. In 1832 Great Britain experienced the 
sweeping changes of the Great Reform Bill; in 1834 the 
China trade lost both of its regulatory institutions--the 
British East India Company and the Canton System. These 
institutional changes contributed to the uncertainty of 
both parliamentary politics and Anglo-Chinese relations. 
Although half way around the world from each other, the 
deterioration of conditions in Britain and China resulted 
in two simultaneous crises that politicians in the British 
Parliament linked together.
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Because the role the nineteenth-century British
"state" falls so easily in and out of favor with
scholars, I feel compelled to explain my concentration
on parliamentary politics. In the early nineteenth century
parliament provided the recognized forum for discussing
issues of national interest. Newspapers of every political
inclination covered events in the capital with considerable
attention. As one newspaper explained to its readers,
the conflicting interests and views which engage 
and direct the energies of the several classes 
forming the community--in the largest acceptance 
of the term--of this vast empire are 
concentrated, and placed as it were in the area 
of parliament for discug,sion in detail, and for 
adjustment in patches."
Parliament thus furnishes a legitimate setting for
historical inquiry. A detailed examination of the issues
that capture the attention of Parliament contributes to a
better understanding of the reaction of that body and the
British press to the news that the Chinese government had
confiscated £2,000,000 worth of British owned opium.
Beginning in August of 1839 and lasting until the
summer of 184 0, the Opposition saw the opium crisis as
another example of Ministerial incompetence. In this tense
2 3 .For the changing fortunes of the "state" in 
historical scholarship see Martin J. Wiener, "The Unloved 
State: Twentieth-Century Politics in the Writing of 
Nineteenth-Century History," Journal of British Studies 33 
(July 1994): 283-308.
^'^"Meeting of Parliament," The Charter (London), 19 
January 1840, p. 8.
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political atmosphere the Ministry met at Windsor Castle on 
1 October 183 9 to decide the fate of the China question.
The following spring, while the political assault from the 
Opposition continued and rumors of war leaked out to the 
press, journalists and pamphleteers argued whether the 
Chinese actions justified a violent response; they failed 
to reach a consensus. The argument then shifted to the 
House of Commons where politicians debated whether or not 
Melbourne's Ministry had acted appropriately in the years 
leading up to the conflict. One can describe the policy 
which emerged from both the private Cabinet debate and the 
public debate as "British" only in the broadest terms. 
Individual members of the Cabinet doubted the wisdom of 
sending forces to China, the press remained divided over 
the issue and almost one-half of the M.P.s voted against 
the Ministry's China policy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1 
THE GREAT REFORM ACT 
AND
DEREGULATION OF THE CHINA TRADE
At the beginning of the nineteenth century an 
aristocratic elite dominated Great Britain. This elite saw 
land as the rudimentary source of wealth and the unwashed 
masses of society as a serious threat to the security of 
the realm. The "unreformed system" theoretically 
restricted the parliamentary franchise to men of 
independent status within the community; property, poor 
rates or income, each defined on a regional basis, 
determined independence. As these economic values changed 
at varying rates and as property changed owners over the 
centuries, the actual wealth and status of individual 
electors varied from region to region. No generalizations 
can adequately describe the incredible number of variations 
within the unreformed system.^ These myriad methods for
^Frank O'Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties: The 
Unreformed Electoral System of Hanoverian England, 1734- 
1832 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 27-105; Michael 
Brock, The Great Reform Act (London: Hutchinson University 
Library, 1973), 18-24.
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selecting Members of Parliament remained overwhelmingly
under the influence of the local landed aristocracy.^ Any 
fundamental change in the constitutional system seemed 
unlikely because the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars had solidified the aristocratic perception of reality.
Political circumstances, however, did not fully 
correspond to the changing economic and social realities. 
The industrial revolution had begun to shift the wealth of 
Great Britain from the agricultural sector of the economy 
to the industrial, and from the rural areas to the urban. 
This redistribution of wealth, and the population migration 
which followed a similar pattern, started a fundamental 
shift in the social structure. Great Britain saw the rise 
of an industrial capitalist class and the growth of the 
urban working classes. Denied the right to share in the 
political power, these groups began their challenge to the 
aristocratic government because they believed that the 
political monopoly encouraged monopolies of wealth. The
Historians disagree about the precise meaning of 
"deference," or aristocratic influence : O 'Gorman, Voters, 
Patrons, and Parties, 225-44; Richard Davis, "The Whigs and 
the Idea of Electoral Deference : Some Further Thoughts on 
the Great Reform Act," Durham University Journal 67 
(December 1974): 79-91; idem, "Deference and Aristocracy in 
the Time of the Great Reform Act," American Historical 
Review 81 (June 1976) : 532-39; J.G.A. Pocock, "The Classic 
Theory of Deference," American Historical Review 81 (June 
1976): 516-23; David Spring, "Walter Bagehot and 
Deference," American Historical Review 81 (June 1976) : 524- 
31; Alan Heesom, "'Legitimate’ versus 'Illegitimate’ 
Influences : Aristocratic Electioneering in Mid-Victorian 
Britain," Parliamentary History 1 (1988): 282-305.
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demographic changes had left many rural areas unpopulated 
and created several new municipalities. While the old 
boroughs retained their representatives, however, the new 
urban centers such as Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds 
failed to gain a voice in Commons.^ This imbalance 
resulted in an unusual situation. Historians estimate that 
between 200 and 338 M.P.s owed their return to a single 
proprietor. Contemporary critics of the system, however, 
used the higher number to argue for reform.^ The 
undemocratic nature of this system meant that most 
Englishmen had no direct representation in the House of 
Commons.^
As information technology changed at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, newspapers, transported by faster 
coaches on better roads, highlighted the inequities of the 
unreformed system.* A limited number of merchants and
^Brock, Great Reform Act, 18.
^0'Gorman {Voters, Patrons, and Parties, 20-1) favors 
the lower estimate, while Brock {Great Reform Act, 34) 
places the number around 275.
*James Vernon disagrees with the above view 
altogether. He argues that "democracy" means more than 
formal participation in a political process; other forms of 
popular protest gave the masses a voice in the "unreformed 
system." The Reform process itself therefore was 
undemocratic because it eliminated more traditional forms 
of political participation. Politics and the People: A 
Study in English Political Culture, c.1815-1867 (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press), 7.
*Brock, Great Reform Act, 17.
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manufacturers could manipulate the electoral process, but 
the money and time involved restricted participants to 
those with substantial wealth and p r e s t i g e T h e  average 
commposition of the unreformed House of Commons broke down 
as follows : 24% M.P.s had aristocratic connections; 25% 
gentry; 33% professional, law, army or navy; and 15-2 0% 
commercial, manufacturing or industrial. The largest 
numbers of M.P.s thus représentâtived the landed interest, 
while the system allowed enough flexibility to include 
other established interests within English society.® To 
many of the disfranchised the political situation was 
intolerable, and they demanded reform. Many others dreaded 
political reform because they feared it would open a 
pandora's box, inviting anarchy.’ The American and French 
Revolutions reinforced the pathological fear that change 
would wipe out all of the existing system.
Edmund Burke (1729-1797) best articulated the English 
aristocratic outlook in Reflections on the Revolution in 
France. Written in the form of a letter to a Frenchman, 
Reflections contains Burke's argument that the French 
Revolution lacked legitimacy and stability because the 
revolutionaries sought to destroy French society and to
^Brock, Great Reform Act, 24-5; Thompson, English 
Landed Society, 7, 40-41, 63.
®0'Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties, 119-2 0.
’Brock, Great Reform Act, 39-42.
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recreate a new one based on untested philosophical 
speculations. Burke supported his position by comparing 
the French Revolution to the English Glorious Revolution of 
1688. He contended that the Glorious Revolution sought to 
correct and conserve, not to destroy and recreate, English 
society.
The key to Burke's argument was his insistence that 
men must base their decisions on practice, not theory: "The 
circumstances are what render every civil and political 
scheme beneficial or noxious to m a n k i n d , n o t  some 
metaphysical quality. For example, the French 
revolutionaries claimed that liberty was a positive good, 
yet Burke asked if a madman should be set free? He 
concluded that societies should not make fundamental 
decisions about political rights founded on untested 
theories that lead to social unrest and violence.
According to Burke, social stability depended upon respect 
for "inherited" principles. Much like a son inherits his 
father's physical characteristics and property rights, a 
society acquires the political system of its forefathers. 
Just as the son is not the father, yet retains his father's 
qualities, a society must only change slowly over time in 
order to avoid violence--as the English did in 1688. Rapid 
changes in political or social relationships invited social
^°Edmund Burke. Reflections on the French Revolution.
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), 8.
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unrest; gradual, or organic change, insured the 
preservation of order.”
While Burke's Reflections offered a strong argument 
for the maintenance of the status quo, his earlier 
political career furnished support for reform. Burke had 
stood for Catholic emancipation and fought against the 
American Revolutionary war and the East India Company's 
imperialism in India. Even in Reflections his 
arguments, based on practical necessity rather than theory, 
called for gradually changing institutions that 
precipitated disorder. Blind obedience to the past or to 
authority represented a threat just as serious as 
metaphysical theories : "A state without the means of some 
change is without the means of its conservation."'*^
Most parliamentary figures in Britain agreed with 
Burke's assessment of the French Revolution and sought to 
maintain the British system relatively unchanged. Labeling 
British post-war politics as a struggle between 
"conservatives" seeking to preserve the status quo and 
"liberals" hoping to invent a new system glosses over, 
however, important differences and similarities among
”Burke, Reflections, 35-9.
''^ James J. Sack, "The Memory of Burke and the Memory 
of Pitt: English Conservatism Confronts its Past, 1806- 
1829," Historical Journal 30 (1987): 623-40.
^^Burke, Reflections, 24.
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political leaders and creates simplistic stereotypes.'^
By referring to Burke's view of change, one can illuminate 
the political landscape in early nineteenth century England 
and define individuals within unique, yet overlapping, 
tendencies--Ultra-Tory, Liberal Tory, Whig and Radical.
Ultra-Tories manifested the most extreme adherence to 
the ideas explicated in Burke's Reflections.'^^ Ultra- or 
High Tories regarded any "Reform" in response to popular 
pressure as an invitation to violent revolution. They 
viewed the role of government within the framework of a 
"managerial philosophy, which thought that the best way to 
minimize social unhappiness was to control society.
The central government should exercise its control through 
a variety of monopolies--political, religious and economic. 
Politically, the subjects of the realm should defer to the 
judgment of the landed aristocracy. Land gave the
For the contrary view of early nineteenth-century 
political circumstances--"Thus the new differences between 
whig and tory, as distinct from the dead differences of the 
early eighteenth century, emerge as a broad distinction 
between a liberal and conservative attitude." Austin 
Mitchell, The Whigs in Opposition, 1815-1830 (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1967), 13.
^^ In "The Memory of Burke and the Memory of Pitt,"
Sack argues that English "conservatives" made little or no 
use of Burke himself before the 1830s because of his 
statements regarding Catholic Emancipation, the American 
Revolution and the East India Company. Sack does not, 
however, establish that conservatives ignored the arguments 
within Reflections, only the author.
^*Boyd Hilton,"Peel : A Reappraisal," Historical 
Journal 22 (1979): 607.
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aristocracy a stake in community stability as well as the 
wealth needed to cultivate a political education. In terms 
of religion, Ultra-Tories clung steadfastly to the 
"catholic" claims of the Anglican Church, believing the 
Established Church essential to the survival of the 
state. Economically, they supported the monopolies of 
the Crown-chartered companies--the Bank of England, the 
East India and Levant Companies. This support helped to 
tie the older middle classes of the City, Shipping, East 
Indian and West Indian interests--those who could best 
afford seats in Commons--to the English ancien regime.
Liberal Tories reflected a more moderate view of 
change than the High Tories. According to this political 
position, practical, gradual reform was a necessary evil. 
Liberal tories believed that, "if one could only strip away 
monopolies and pensions and other manifestations of 
control, society would regulate itself and that it would do
so in such a way as, not to eliminate, but at least make 
sense of pain and vice." They concluded that "social 
order would be restored only if individuals looked to their
^^Jonathan D.C. Clark, English Society 1688-1832 : 
Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice during 
the Ancien Regime (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 349-58.
^^ W.D. Rubenstein, Capitalism, Culture, and Decline in 
Britain 1750-1990 (New York: Routledge, 1994), 140-2.
’^Hilton, "Peel, " 607.
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own duties and relied on God's Providence to harmonize 
t h e m . B r o a d l y  speaking, contemporaries grouped the 
Ultra- and Liberal Tories under the rubric "conservative" 
or Tory. Both groups' commitment to an "Anglican spiritual 
basis for national life" provided the common cause for 
unity
The Whigs had a more positive view of reform. They 
believed that the central government should respond with 
positive measures to pressure for political, religious and 
economic change from out of doors because "agitation" was a 
sign of the people's loss of confidence in the 
constitutional system. This belief stemmed from an older 
eighteenth-century ideology of aristocratic responsibility 
held by Charles James Fox (1749-1806), the leading opponent 
to England's war against revolutionary France and to the 
"tyrannical" tendencies of George III and his ministers. 
Lord Holland, Henry Richard Fox (1773-1840), carried his 
uncle's ideas into the nineteenth century, transforming 
them in the process. He argued that since the British 
political systems rested on the concept of popular 
sovereignty. Parliament, acting as the trustees of the 
people's will, must respond to their needs. His opinion
^°Mandler, Aristocratic Government, 97.
James Sack, From Jacobite to Conservative: Reaction 
and Orthodoxy in Britain, c.1760-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 253.
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went much further than the traditional view of Parliament 
as the balance against despotism and democracy; it also 
stood in sharp contrast to Tory authoritarianism as well as 
to the practical individualism of Liberal Tories.
Radicals, on the other hand, called for the immediate 
elimination of all political, religious and economic 
monopolies. They believed that the current artificial 
political system created all such monopolies, the source of 
inequality and distress, and their removal would then 
provide social stability.Contrary to the assertions of 
either Burke or the Whigs, the study of history 
demonstrated a gradual erosion of free Englishmen's natural 
rights that could only be restored by enfranchising the 
"non-represented" interests.To accomplish this goal. 
Parliament needed to expand the definition of property
^^Mandler, Aristocratic Government, 19-21; Newbould 
places more emphasis on the idea of the Whigs as a balance 
between the extremes of democracy and despotism. Whiggery, 
7; See also Ellis Archer Wasson, "The Great Whigs and 
Parliamentary Reform, 1809-1830," Journal of British 
Studies 24 (October 1985) : 434-464.
Jones, "Rethinking Chartism," 135; John Belchem, 
"Radical Language and Ideology in the Nineteenth-Century 
England: The Challenge of the Platform," Albion 20 (Summer 
1988): 253 ; lorwerth J. Prothero, Artisans and Politics in 
Early Nineteenth-Century London: John Gast and His Times 
(Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 80.
^^T.M . Parssinen, "Association, Convention and Anti- 
Parliament in British Radical Politics, 1771-1848," English 
Historical Review no.88 (July 1973): 504-33.
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beyond landed wealth to include industry, commerce and 
labor.
Because no one of these fluid tendencies--Ultra-Tory, 
Liberal Tory, Whig or Radical--could put together a 
majority of M.P.s in Commons, the Crown's ministers had to 
govern by coalition. After 1815 Liberal Tories held most 
of the key positions in the Government, while Ultra-Tories 
provided the needed support. The post-war ministries 
followed a program of retrenchment to eliminate the war 
debt, which grew from £238,000,000 in 1793 to £902,000,000 
in 1815, and reduced the taxes required service i t T h e  
Whigs, who furnished the majority of the Opposition, 
offered little resistence to such popular measures. 
Furthermore Lord Grey (Charles Grey) , the only 
Parliamentary leader who could command the loyalty of the 
various factions within Whigs, refused to seek office.
In 1828 the Duke of Wellington (Arthur Wellesley), 
hero of the Battle of Waterloo, headed a ministry composed 
of Ultra- and Liberal Tories. The ministry first sought to 
repeal the Test and Corporation Acts, which excluded
^^Norman Gash, "After Waterloo : British Society and 
the Legacy of the Napoleonic Wars," Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society 28 (1978): 152; See also Boyd 
Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce: The Economic Policies of 
the Tory Governments 1815-1830 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977).
^^Mitchell, Whigs in Opposition, 26ff; Newbould, 
Whiggery, 44-5.
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Catholics from holding public office, and then, in 1829 it 
put forth the Catholic Emancipation Bill (1829).
Wellington hoped to end the unrest in Catholic Ireland 
caused by the 1800 Act of Union, but both of his endeavors 
met stiff resistance from the ministerial benches because 
of the threat to the Established Church. Wellington 
finally succeeded in maneuvering these bills through 
Parliament with the help of the Opposition, but in the 
process the cooperation between Ultra-Tories and Liberal 
Tories ceased to e x i s t . A f t e r  this episode the Duke 
abandoned any attempts at reform because he feared it would 
further weaken the Government's position, inviting public 
unrest.
In July and August 183 0, as continental Europeans 
faced violent revolutions, England was in the middle of an 
election. Enthusiasm for reform gripped Great Britain.
The unreformed system became a "scapegoat" for "people too 
ignorant to know how their trouble originated," and "many 
people saw Reform as a panacea. The continental
^^George M. Trevelyan, Lord Grey of the Reform Bill; 
Being the Life of Charles, Second Earl Grey (New York: 
Richard R. Smith, 1929), 208-10; Brock shows that George 
Canning (Prime Minster 1827) had previously weakened the 
Tories by forming a coalition Government but then points 
out the Ultra-Tories' hatred of Wellington and Sir Robert 
Peel for "ratting" on the Protestant institutions of 
Britain. Great Reform Act, 55.
^®Brock, Great Reform Act, 64, 61; Newbould, Whiggery,
42 .
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revolutions had little direct effect on the British 
elections, but the unrest did influence the mindset of many 
Members of Parliament when they took their seats.
Following the election, Wellington's Government returned in 
a weakened position. The Whigs, led by Lord Grey, suddenly 
provided a considerable opposition after fifty years of 
marginal significance. They still hoped that the Duke 
would introduce at least a "sham Reform Bill."^^ Grey and 
the Whigs preferred government-sponsored reform over the 
violence a revolution would bring.Wellington quickly 
dashed their hopes for change, and the Whigs began to 
demand reform.
In the ensuing parliamentary debates Wellington's 
Ministry fell because several Ultra-Tories went into 
Opposition, believing Wellington had earlier betrayed the 
Protestant constitution. Lord Grey formed a Government 
composed of peers and territorial magnates, and had the 
support of Whigs, Radicals and Ultra-Tories. He began the 
push for reform, hoping to eliminate the threat to social 
order and property.Ironically, the Ultras felt the 
unreformed system allowed Wellington to ignore the true
51.
^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 102-3.
^°Trevelyan, Lord Grey, 235-6; Newbould, Whiggery, 40,
^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 69; Newbould, Whiggery, 80. 
^^Newbould, Whiggery, 45-54.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
will of the English people, and reform meant restoring 
Protestant influenceBecause of the coalitional nature 
of its majority in Commons, Grey's Ministry hammered out a 
compromise without totally destroying the existing 
political system. The compromise did, however, introduce 
"sweeping changes" to the constitution to insure that 
further reform would not be needed for another thirty or 
forty years.
The Great Reform Act of 1832 formed the basis of this 
compromise. The act had two essential tenets, both of 
which were designed to limit the visibility of the 
"pocket" or "rotten" boroughs. The bill gave the 
industrial and commercial capitalists the right to vote by 
extending the franchise to £10 households which equaled 
about 200,000 voters, or a 45% increase of the 
e l e c t o r a t e T h e  Reform Bill also changed the medieval 
form of territorial representation, which had excluded the 
new urban centers, to a form of proportional 
representation, which included them. These measures
^^ D.C. Moore, "The Other Face of Reform," Victorian 
Studies 5 (September 1961): 7-34; Newbould, Whiggery, 48- 
52 .
^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 145-8.
*The term "pocket borough" refers to a borough which 
had few, or no, constituents except the landlord. The term 
is used often because the proprietor had the Member of 
Parliament "in his pocket."
^^ 0'Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties, 178-80.
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eliminated a total of 143 seats, the majority of which were 
held by conservatives, and redistributed the seats to the 
new urban-industrial centers as well as English and Welsh 
counties. These changes gave the middle classes' concerns- 
-trade and dissent--a wider and more obvious place in the 
political d e b a t e T h e  Whigs believed that tying the new 
middle classes to rank and property would help to remove 
the threat to social stabilty posed by the lower orders.
The Great Reform Bill still denied the working classes 
the right to vote ; they remained outside the formal 
political system. Anti-reformers felt that popular 
discontent with the constitution arose from material needs 
rather than from an intellectual commitment to reform.
This argument complemented the Whig faithfulness to 
preserving the aristocratic government. To extend the 
franchise to the lower orders would invite future rifts in 
society. The decision to exclude the working classes 
only delayed further agitation on their part ; in 183 9 the 
Chartist movement violently called for reform.
The Great Reform Bill also had immediate political 
ramifications. The bill diluted the power base of the 
conservatives and further destroyed cooperation among
^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 13 8-9, 335-5. 
^^Newbould, Whiggery, 59.
^^Brock, Great Reform Act, 43-4.
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Ultra- and Liberal Tories. As a result of the first reform 
election in 1832, the Tories only held 144 seats, while the 
Reformers claimed 476. The remaining 38 seats went to 
Irish Repealers who pushed for revocation of the Act of 
U n i o n . W h i l e  in Opposition, the conservatives had no 
unified voice, but they were not helpless. One prominent 
spokesman stood out--Sir Robert Peel. Peel, leader of the 
Liberal Tories, gathered support in the House of Commons, 
advocating a policy of cooperation with the Whigs. Peel 
believed that cooperation would allow the conservatives 
enough time to regroup and pose a more serious political 
threat to the Whigs. He tried to offer a middle ground 
which promoted practical reform. He hoped to bring change 
under the control of the friends of the traditional 
constitution and prevent more radical reforms from taking 
place. In the Tamworth Manifesto Peel tried to paint 
himself as the leader of a moderate party committed to 
preserving the status quo, rather than the leader of a 
reactionary party. To accomplish his goal, he had to bring 
the Ultra-Tories to heel. Peel lacked, however, 
credibility with the Ultra-Tories, who wanted "to defend 
and preserve a paternalistic, hierarchical society" against
The New Parliament," The Guardian (Manchester), 1 
January 1833, p.2; Newbould breaks Grey's support into 
three categories : 91 Ministerial M.P.s, 267 Ministerial 
fringe, and 137 waverers. Whiggery, 21.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
any changes in the establishmentHis participation in 
reform legislation had brought his faithfulness to the 
English constitution into question. Peel's weakness showed 
itself most apparently in the House of Lords, where he had 
virtually no influence among the Ultra-Tory Peers. He had 
to depend upon the cooperation of the Duke of Wellington in 
order to entice the Lords to acquiesce in the call for 
moderation.*^ Peel gained strength because his message 
appealed to the small boroughs and English counties.*^
Peel did not attract a consistent enough following in 
Commons and lacked the political strength to challenge 
successfully the Whigs and the advocates of reform. 
Accordingly, from 183 0 to 1841, except for a short five 
month period (December 1834 to April 1835), the Whigs 
managed the House of Commons with the help of Peel as well 
as the Radicals. The Radicals demanded an economic policy 
that favored commerce and industry and a religious policy 
that tolerated non-Anglican churches. As parliamentary 
leaders the Whigs followed a liberal platform. They moved 
beyond political reform to religious and economic reform. 
These modifications challenged the religious monopolies of 
the Anglican Church and the chartered trading companies.
*°Newbould, "Sir Robert Peel," 533.
*^Newbould, "Sir Robert Peel," 536.
* G^ash, Reaction and Reconstruction, 134, 141-2
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such as the East India Company. In return for reform the 
Whigs won support from the constituents of the new 
industrial centers, as well as the more traditional 
commercial and manufacturing cities and their 
representatives--the Radicals.
One of the joint concerns of the Whigs and the 
Radicals was the East India Company's monopoly on trade 
with China. Whigs saw abolition of the monopoly as a way 
of removing a long standing symbol of corruption, while 
Radicals saw abolition as a means of economic 
liberalization. In 1600 Queen Elizabeth had granted the 
company a charter; one of its primary goals was to acquire 
the much desired luxury goods of "Cathay," --porcelains, 
silk, and satins. The Company failed to access directly 
Chinese goods until 1699, but between 1735 and 1795 trade 
began to thrive.
The East India Company located its Far East 
headquarters in India. India was more than just an 
economic center. The Company with its own army and navy 
gained political control over most of India. This control 
gave the Company a considerable power base from which to 
enforce its monopoly and gave the Company's Court of 
Directors a means of dispensing patronage. All British
^^ Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, 162-6
Cathay is the Renaissance term for China and remained 
in use into the eighteenth century.
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trade in the Far East had to be either in East India 
Company ships, or in private ships licensed by the Company. 
Accordingly, at the beginning of the 1800s the East India 
Company, because of its trade monopoly in the Far East, 
controlled British trade with China. The India Act of 1784 
represented the political consequence of merchant 
imperialism in India. As the Company's use of force drew 
heavy criticism from the British Parliament, William Pitt 
(Prime Minister, 1783-1801, 1803-1806) brought the East 
India Company under the control of the British Government 
in London. He hoped to end continued expansion into the 
subcontinent by creating the Board of Control to oversee 
Indian affairs. The President of the Board served as a 
Cabinet member and set policy that the Company's Court of 
Directors in London and the Crown-appointed Governor 
General in India carried out.
The British Government's primary commercial concern 
was a steady supply of high quality tea from C h i n a . T h e  
sale of tea, a highly prized commodity in Britain, 
generated a considerable amount of revenue for the
Cyril H. Philips, The East India Company 1794-1834 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1940; 1961), 30- 
4. The publication date of Philip's study illustrates the 
dearth of recent scholarly research on the political 
aspects of the East India Company.
^^Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, The Management of 
Monopoly: A Study of the East India Company's Conduct of 
Its Tea Trade, 1784-1833 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1984), 23.
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Treasury. The tea tariff, which amounted to no less than 
£3 million, covered one-half the expenses of maintaining 
the best naval fleet in the w o r l d . I n  the early 1830s 
China provided the only available source of tea. The East 
India Company had a monopoly on all tea imported into 
Britain. It also attempted to grow tea in Assam, a region 
in Northeast India. While the effort looked promising for 
the future, it remained a "young experiment" as late as 
1837
The Chinese, on the other hand, wanted nothing 
substantial from Britain except its bullion. British 
merchants bought tea from China, but the fragmented and 
self-sufficient nature of the Chinese economy made it 
difficult for the British merchants to sell their goods to 
the Chinese people.China's hand-finished products were 
of a far superior quality to any of the mass produced goods 
which the British had to offer. A highly unfavorable
^^ Fay, Opium War, 17-18.
^^Lord Auckland to John Cam Hobhouse, Calcutta, 9 
April 1837, Broughton Papers. Letter Books. Oriental and 
India Office Collection, British Library, London (Hereafter 
cited as 010). Mss.Eur.F213/6/150.
^^Madeleine Zelin, "The Economic Structure of the 
Chinese Economy during the Qing Period: Some Thoughts on 
the 150th Anniversary of the Opium War," Kenneth 
Lieberthal, et al. ed. Perspectives on Modern China: Four 
Anniversaries (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 37-8.
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balance of trade emerged which the British constantly 
sought to remedy.
The Chinese Emperor in Peking limited the East India 
Company's commercial ventures by using the Canton System, 
which had two fundamental features.The first limited 
all trade to the port of Canton, located in the far 
southeastern corner of the Chinese Empire.** Chinese 
authorities thought that this location was far enough away 
from most Chinese that "barbarian" contamination could be 
kept to a minimum. Any foreigner wishing to travel to 
Canton had to receive a passport prior to his arrival; the 
Chinese government refused to allow barbarian females into 
Canton. By restricting all foreign trade to a single port 
the Chinese also believed that they could more effectively 
control the foreigners by keeping them under the watchful 
eyes of the emperor's servants.
'^ E^arl H. Pritchard, The Crucial Years Of Early Anglo- 
Chinese Relations, 1750-1800 (Pullman, WA: State College of 
Washington, 1936), 142-69; Both the more traditional 
mercantilist theories and the new laissez-faire theories 
saw a trade imbalance as a positive evil. An unfavorable 
balance of trade caused an outflow of bullion and weakened 
the nation's ability to compete with other European states.
^°Greenberg, British Trade, 46; Hosea Ballou Morse's 
The Gilds of China with an Account of the Gild Merchant of 
Canton (New York: Longmans, Green, 1909) offers a 
comprehensive, but dated, history of the Canton system.
See above p.vi, MAP 1, "China in the Early 
Nineteenth Century,"; from Fay, Opium War, 28.
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The Chinese government itself had little direct 
contact with foreign merchants. In the Chinese social 
structure merchants were at the bottom.Thus, only 
merchants should have contact with merchants. The second 
feature of the Canton system addressed this need. At 
Canton all foreign trade had to be carried on with twelve 
or thirteen merchants--the Co-hong, or Hong merchants. The 
Co-hong were Chinese wholesale merchants licensed by the 
emperor to trade with the foreigners. In return for the 
privilege of trading, the Co-hong collected imperial duties 
and signed a bond guaranteeing that no contraband was 
carried into China. They also had to make sure that the 
barbarians respected Chinese laws and customs.
Under these conditions the Anglo-Chinese relationship 
was very tense, but secure.Everyone involved had 
learned to work within the system, and the tea trade became 
highly profitable. The East India Company recognized the 
apprehension of the Chinese and did its best to follow 
Chinese custom and tradition. The Co-hong realized the 
East India Company's need for Chinese goods and did its 
best to smooth out differences between the barbarians and 
imperial officials.
^^Pritchard, Crucial Years, 108. 
^^ Fay, Opium Vlar, 35.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
On 13 June 1833 Charles Grant, President of the Board 
of Control, introduced the Whigs' resolution abolishing 
the Company's monopoly with the hope of easing tensions 
caused by the Canton system. He blamed the Chinese trade 
restrictions on the Company's dual role as trader and 
sovereign. The Chinese "had heard of the Company's 
victories in many parts of India, and to a people so 
sensitive as they were as to the approach of any foreign 
power to their territory, such matters were great cause of 
jealousy.Allowing private merchants to trade with 
China would entice the Chinese government to open gradually 
its huge market and remove the embarrassing possibility of 
war.
Grant also expressed a practical reason for abolition 
of the monopoly. Since 1815 the licensed private traders' 
share of the goods shipped to and from China out-paced the 
Company's trade. Between 1813 and 1830 the total value of 
the exports and imports carried to and from China in 
Company owned ships fell from £13,500,000 to £11,600,000, 
while in the same period the total value of goods carried 
in licensed private ships rose from £9,000,000 to 
£31,000,000.^^ To continue a de jure monopoly while it
^Charles Grant, "East-India Company's Charter," House 
of Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 18 (13 June 1833), col. 
709 .
^^Grant, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 18 (13 June 1833), 
col. 710.
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did not exist in fact would be contrary to common sense.
The resolution thus rested, not on the metaphysical 
principle of laissez faire, but on bringing institutions 
more in line with reality.
Abolition of the Company's monopoly excited little 
debate in Commons, or in the p r e s s . A f t e r  the fierce 
struggles over the Reform Bill, affairs in India and China 
seemed insignificant. Furthermore, the East Indian 
interests in Parliament had sided with the opponents of 
reform and lost a number of their rotten boroughs in the 
p r o c e s s . T h e  Whigs also compensated the Company's stock 
holders with an annuity of 10.5 percent of the revenues of 
India and left the Court of Directors in control of its 
India patronage network. The Whigs' behavior during 
abolition of the trade monopoly demonstrates the Grey 
Ministry's ability to carry forth reforms that satisfied 
the needs of a variety of interests. The long-term 
significance of abolition rests less on the Whigs' 
purposes, however, than on its unintended consequences for 
Anglo-Chinese relations.
^^ The Manchester Guardian merely noted that Grant 
introduced the bill. 15 June 1833, p.2.
^^Newbould, Whiggery, 60.
^^Philips, East India Company, 285-97.
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CHAPTER 2 
"CHINA BELONGS TO PALMERSTON"
In the 183 0s two new factors began to change the 
context in which British merchants traded in China.^ The 
first was Parliament's action in 1833 revoking the East 
India Company's monopoly in China, thus removing one half 
of the regulatory system that had guided the Anglo-Chinese 
relationship. The second factor was the rise of the opium 
trade, the topic of Chapter 4. The consequences resulting 
from the removal of the Company's monopoly on the China 
trade forms the basis for the present chapter. This 
deregulation, part of the Grey Ministry's attempt to 
further economic reform, had its price because of the power 
vacuum it created. As Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston 
set his policy to carry out the ministry's goal to open 
peacefully and gradually China's market while keeping 
British Governmental interference to a minimum.
When Parliament abolished the company's monopoly in 
1834, it created a three-man trade commission headed by a 
Chief Superintendent of Trade, shifting responsibility for
^Greenberg, British Trade, 215.
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the affairs in China from the Board of Control to the 
Foreign Office. As John Cam Hobhouse, President of the 
Board of Control (1835-1841), explained to Lord Auckland 
(George Eden), Governor General of India (1835-1842),
"China belongs to Palmerston. Palmerston, an Irish 
peer, entered the Foreign Office when Grey formed his 
Ministry in 1830 and remained Foreign Secretary until 1841, 
except for a few short months in 1834/183 5 when the 
conservatives formed a ministry. The third Viscount 
Palmerston's rise to the highest level of British 
Government contrasts sharply with the experience of his 
father who preferred renovating one of the family estates-- 
Broadlands--located near Southampton in Romsey. The elder 
Palmerston had lived the life of leisure, collecting art, 
and even taking his family on the Grand Tour during the 
French Revolution. He had, however, insured that young 
"Harry" received the best classical education in Britain at 
the time. At age four he had a governess who taught him 
French, and at age six the second Viscount hired an Italian 
tutor, who, besides teaching his native language, probably 
taught Harry both Latin and Greek. These early experiences 
prepared him for public school at Harrow, and then the 
University of Edinburgh.^
^Hobhouse to Auckland, India House, 30 August 1837, 
010, Mss.Eur.F213/6/l24.
3^Bourne, Palmerston, 1-11.
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While in Edinburgh the young aristocrat lived with and 
studied under Dugald Stewart, Professor of Moral Philosophy 
(1753-1828). Stewart's official title suggests, from the 
modern academic perspective, a rather limited scholarly 
field, but Professor Stewart had a large sphere of inquiry. 
His moral philosophy laid the foundation for the 
development of a course in political economy.^ Since 
Palmerston's most recent biographer believes that Stewart's 
course on political economy "must have been among the most 
significant experiences of his l i f e , a  closer look at 
Stewart's philosophy might help to explain Palmerston's 
future policies as Foreign Secretary.
In his moral philosophy Stewart sought a middle path 
between Scottish skepticism and French rationalism.'^ He 
belonged to a school of thought called "common sense" 
realism which held that the human mind had an a priori 
capacity, independent of both sense experience and logic, 
to know right from wrong. This position departed from the 
path carved out by Stewart's Scottish predecessors David
^Knud Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political 
Economy: The Contribution of Dugald Stewart," in 
Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. V. Hope 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984), 212.
^Bourne, Palmerston, 25; Bourne mistakenly states, 
however, that Stewart merely provided a "simplified version 
of Adam Smith." Palmerston, 27.
^Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political 
Economy," 212-14, 219.
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Hume and Adam Smith. These men believed that morality 
depended upon a person viewing his own action from the 
position of an imaginary "impartial spectator-the 
relative experiences of human reactions.^  Stewart 
concluded that the human mind's power to know that a 
correct moral answer exists, while it may not be grasped 
immediately, allowed for a confidence in society's eventual
development into a natural system based on a divine
• X. ai m p r i n t .
Stewart's attempt to secure a middle ground in moral 
philosophy carried over into his political economy.^ He 
clearly delineated a difference between "what is abstractly 
right and practically expedient," cautioning his students 
not to apply theory in the face of strong opposition
^Dugald Stewart, The Collected Works of Dugald 
Stewart, ed. William Hamilton, vol. 10, Biographical 
Memoirs of Adam Smith, LL.D., William Robertson, D.D., 
Thomas Reid, D.D. [Hereafter cited as Adam Smith]
(Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 1858), 26-9; Mark Granquist, 
"The Role of 'Common Sense’ in the Hermeneutics of Moses 
Stuart," Harvard Theological Review 83 (1990) : 308-9; 
Russell Niehlei, "Spheres of Intimacy and the Adam Smith 
Problem," Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986); 617.
^Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political 
Economy," 226, 229.
^Donald Winch, "The System of the North: Dugald 
Stewart and His Pupils," in That Noble Science of Politics: 
A Study in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History, ed. 
Stefan Collini, Donald Winch, and John Burrow (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 38.
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because doing do so threatened social stability. As a
philosopher living during Europe's revolutionary turmoil,
he took significant legal risks entering into debates that
included the French philosophes, advocates of theoretical
speculation. One of the ways Stewart overcame these
hazards was by distinguishing between economic freedom and
political equality. The former contributed to the cause of
liberty, while the latter deteriorated into Jacobinism.”
He repeated several times during his lectures that
"the happiness of mankind depends iwmediately, 
not on the form of government, but on the 
particular system of law and policy which that 
form introduces, and that the advantage which one 
form of government possesses over another, arises 
chiefly from the facility it affords to the 
introduction of such legislative improvements as 
the general^ginterest of the community 
recommend."
He also cautioned his students that any change in policy 
must be gradual so as not to disturb the public order.
Stewart defined political economy as a science 
concerned with the general welfare of the community and
^°Dugald Stewart, The Collected Works of Dugald 
Stewart, ed. William Hamilton, vol. 9, Lectures on 
Political Economy, vol.2, (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 
1856), 85-6, 121, 223.
”Emma Rothschild, "Adam Smith and Conservative 
Economics," Economic History Review 45 (1992): 80-81.
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol.2, 376; 
See also Stewart, Adam Smith, 55-6.
’^ Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 210, 
257, 419.
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charged it with supplying actual legislators, rather than 
the multitude, with policy options. The end of all 
political economy--happiness--requires "laws which give 
security of the right of property, and check the inordinate 
inequality in its distribution."’^ By "inordinate 
inequality" he meant unnatural inequality caused by 
unenlightened laws which favor a particular interests at 
the expense of the rest of society. Stewart, following 
Smith and the physiocrats, stated that agriculture held the 
primary position in the natural order of the economy, 
followed by manufacturing, and lastly, foreign trade.
Mercantilism, a "false system of Political Economy 
propagated by merchants and manufacturers," reversed this 
order, allowing the towns to benefit inordinately from the 
labor of the countryside, the basis of all national 
wealth. As a political economist, Stewart recommended 
removing the mercantilist restrictions and subsidies that 
protected trade and manufacturing in order to restore the
’^ Dugald Stewart, The Collected Works of Dugald 
Stewart, ed. William Hamiliton, vol. 8, Lectures on 
Political Economy, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 
1856), 16.
’^ Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 157.
’^ Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 14- 
15, 157, 256, 294; idem, Lectures on Political Economy, 
vol. 2, 195-6; idem, Adam Smith, 60-2.
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natural balance within the community. Stewart further
supported his belief in free trade by underscoring the 
primacy of internal commerce : "the best customers of 
Britain (according to an old observation) being the people 
of Britain."’'^ Modern nations, unlike ancient states, 
depend upon "internal cultivation" rather than conquest for 
strength. Imports and exports in corn, for example, amount 
to a small portion of the commerce in any commodity and 
make only a minor contribution to the economy as a 
whole.Furthermore, exotic commodities such as tea and 
coffee divert the resources of the poor away from the 
nutritious food needed to survive ; Britain's formal system 
of political economy thus contributed to the misery of the 
multitude.
Professor Stewart's emphasis on agriculture did not 
lead him to favor restrictions on trade and manufacturing 
in order to promote the cultivation of land. On the 
contrary, he believed such restrictions would disrupt the 
whole economy by retarding the "natural" growth of the 
subsidiary sectors of the economy. To encourage
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 179-
80.
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 242.
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 43; 
idem. Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 83.
^°Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 144-
5 .
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agriculture only required the dissemination of useful 
knowledge concerning the science of agriculture and 
required "those who fill the higher stations in society, to 
instruct and animate their inferiors by influence of 
example. This position elucidates an important 
difference between Stewart and Smith; Stewart moved the 
focus from the individual to the "goodness of the over-all 
s y s t e m . W h i l e  Smith attributed the advances of the 
"modern" age to the rise of individuals pursuing their own 
self-interests in commerce,Stewart emphasized the 
advent of printing and the freedom to exchange ideas. 
Because printing gave people the means by which they could 
improve their own condition, he argued that social progress 
required a system of government-sponsored education beyond 
the mechanical arts to help individuals cultivate their 
moral capacity.
Besides disturbing the natural order within the 
community, mercantilism also contributed to the bellicose 
nature of the international order. Quoting extensively
^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 181. 
^^Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political
Economy," 228.
^^Winch, "The System of the North," 27-8.
'^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 398. 
^Stewart, Lectures on Politial Economy, vol. 2, 32 8-
333, 341.
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from Smith, Stewart explained that merchants and 
manufacturers encouraged nations to look with jealousy on 
the progress of the neighbors, producing "discord and 
animosity," rather than the natural result of trade, "union 
and friendship." Removing the unnatural influence of the 
"mean rapacity" of these men from governmental policy, 
would restore peace.Merchants and manufacturers only 
focused on their own sectarian interest while neglecting 
the good of the community. Because the prosperity and 
stability of the community depended upon agriculture, only 
the ownership of land provided an individual with the means 
to see the common interests of all.
While the majority of Stewart's course on political 
economy focused on government economic policy, he did 
introduce his students to the theory of government.
Careful to point out that "political wisdom is much more 
the result of experience than of speculation,he 
deviated from the customary treatment of the subject by 
concentrating on the simple forms of government--democracy, 
aristocracy and monarchy--rather than the functions-- 
legislative, judicial, and executive. He recognized the 
need to separate these functions to reduce the chances for
6 .
^^Stewart, Adam Smith, 62.
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 1, 15-
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 424.
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an abuse of power, but he believed that this goal could 
best be accomplished by a "mixed government," one combining 
the three simple forms.Stopping short of enunciating a 
general theory, he pointed to the "perfections of our 
system" to support his case. The British constitution 
checked the ability of either the monarch, the aristocracy 
or the people to ignore the interests of the community at 
large.Stewart believed that the end of government 
simply required "wise and equitable laws, and a vigourous 
and effectual execution of them." To impose artificial 
conditions on a constitution, such as extending the 
franchise to the lower orders, would counteract the 
"obvious intentions of nature" by giving unenlightened 
people a voice in political decisions.
Stewart's course taught that enlightened economic 
policy contributed to a well-ordered society and that true 
statesmen should subordinate sectarian economic 
considerations to the needs of the state. He also stressed 
that good government was not only a practical necessity but 
also a moral responsibility of those in power to look after
2 .
50 .
'^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 3 51- 
^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 44 9-
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 362. 
^^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 3, 378.
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the general welfare of the community. The course provided 
the young Palmerston with a "liberal" economic education 
and a "conservative" political education. Free trade, or 
laissez-faire, would bolster traditional social 
institutions by restoring the primacy of land in the 
economy and the landowner in the political system. These 
lessons drawn from Adam Smith differed from those offered 
by the Radical David Ricardo. Ricardo believed free trade 
would benefit the new industrial sector of the economy and 
provide the basis for British domination of world trade. 
Thus, while Palmerston's later beliefs in free trade 
coincided with those held by middle-class Radicals, his 
convictions stemmed from a vastly different source and 
furnished a basis for his early affiliation with the 
Liberal Tories.Stewart's course also prepared 
Palmerston for a successful career lasting well into the 
Victorian period. One explanation for this success was 
Palmerston's ability to join social conservatism with 
economic innovation, "an underlying theme" of the 
nineteenth century.
When Palmerston left Edinburgh in 1803, he chose to 
continue his education at St. John's College, Cambridge,
^Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, 71. 
^^Bourne, Palmerston, 29.
^^Thompson, Rise of Respectable Society, 30.
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even though his father's death two years earlier had made 
the youth a peer of Ireland. He then entered the House of 
Commons in 1807 after his former guardian, the Earl of 
Malmesbury (James Harris), found an open seat for the young 
man representing the borough of Nevjport on the Isle of 
Wight. Palmerston bought the seat for £4,000 on the 
condition that "he never set foot in the place.
Sitting in Commons allowed Palmerston to take a job as 
Junior Lord of the Admiralty, and two years later, as 
Secretary at War, once again thanks to Malmesbury. The War 
Office came without a seat in the Cabinet and had a 
peculiar function. Instead of directing military 
operations, hiring personnel, setting financial policy or 
planning the overall organization of the army, Palmerston 
acted as an intermediary relaying to the Commons the army's 
needs and supervising the workings of the army for the 
Commons. In neither capacity did he have any authority to 
enforce decisions. He had the burden of responsibility 
without the power to follow through and faced the wrath of 
the army and Parliament for failures.
Although Liberal Tory ministries rose and fell, 
Palmerston remained in the War Office for nineteen years. 
His years in office generated neither high praise nor grave
^*Bourne, Palmerston, 79. 
^^Bourne, Palmerston, 80-97.
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rebuke from his contemporaries. His duties remained rather 
tedious, even though he performed them with skill and 
e n e r g y I t  came as a surprise when Lord Grey chose 
Palmerston to enter the Whig Cabinet as Foreign Secretary 
in 1830. Prime Ministers in the nineteenth century usually 
sought to fill the office with the most capable men. 
Palmerston was, however, the exception. When he first 
joined the Whigs, he was a "second-rate politician," and
only after several years in office did he gain the respect
JT T. • 39of his peers.
Grey had trouble finding a Foreign Secretary and even 
considered keeping the position for himself. After two 
other prominent politicians refused the office for personal 
reasons. Grey turned to Palmerston. As a Liberal Tory, 
Palmerston, and his companion Lord Melbourne (Home 
Secretary, 1830-34), provided the Whigs with the wide 
Parliamentary base needed to govern after fifty years of 
Tory domination.Palmerston's friendship with Melbourne 
serves further to explain the Irish peer's elevation to the 
Cabinet. While A.J.P. Taylor's statement that Melbourne
^^Bourne, Palmerston, Chs. 3, 4 & 6.
^^Charles R. Middleton, The Admistration of British 
Foreign Policy 1782-1846 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1977), 98.
‘^°Bourne, Palmerston, 328-9.
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"carried his illegitimate brother-in-law with him"^^ is 
certainly an exaggeration, Palmerston's "secret" affair 
with Lady Cowper, Melbourne's married sister, helped to 
change his fortunes. Lady Cowper moved in the highest 
social circles in England and secured for Palmerston 
invitations to dinners at Holland House, a center for Whig 
politics and society.
In 1828 Palmerston resigned his office after a 
misunderstanding with the Duke of Wellington, and then 
further separated himself by attacking the Duke's foreign 
policy. These attacks gained him respect at Holland House 
and set out his foreign policy prioritiesPalmerston 
criticized his former colleagues for reversing British 
policy by abandoning Donna Maria, Queen of Portugal, to her 
uncle Don Miguel's attempt to usurp the throne. Such an 
undignified move threatened to bring about an unjust war 
and put Britain in league with the "oppressor . . .
trampling upon the oppressed. Britain had pledged 
itself, and received from Don Miguel a sim.iliar pledge, to
^^A.J.P. Taylor, "Lord Palmerston," History Today, 41 
(January 1991), 16.
'^Bourne, Palmerston, 3 08-9.
^^John W. Rooney, "Palmerston and the Revolutions of 
1830-1833," The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750- 
1850: Proceedings 14 (1984): 406-13.
^^Lord Palmerston, "Affairs of Portugal," Hansard, 2d 
ser., vol. 21 (10 March 1829), col. 99.
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support Donna Maria as the constitutional sovereign of 
Portugal. By breaking his oath Miguel insulted the British 
crown, and "if the insulted honour of our sovereign, is a 
legitimate ground for national quarrel, we are intitled 
[sic] to demand and extort, reparation from Don Miguel.
While Palmerston did have a commitment to "liberalism" 
as one of his foreign policy goals,the term needs to be 
qualified and put into context. As his quarrel with the 
Wellington administration shows, Palmerston favored 
constitutional regimes. Dugald Stewart taught him that 
constitutions were not the laws themselves, but the general 
spirit which animated a whole system of government 
Liberalism depended upon the security of property, a strong 
executive and a free exchange of ideas. By failing to 
support the rightful executive of Portugal and honor 
Britain's pledge, Wellington contributed to the undermining 
of the spirit of the agreement between Donna Maria and Don 
Miguel. These attacks on Wellington demonstrated, however, 
that constitutional principles followed behind national 
honor as a foreign policy p r i o r i t y H o n o r  refers to an
''^Palmerston, "Portugal," Hansard, 2d ser., vol. 21 (1 
June 1829), cols. 1651-2.
'^Bourne, Palmerston, Ch. 8.
'^Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, vol. 2, 376,
422 .
'^ R^ooney, "Palmerston and the Revolutions of 183 0- 
1833," 409.
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inner feeling of self-worth that the community recognizes 
by lauding valor and honesty. Conversely, shame refers to 
an inner feeling of humiliation that the community fosters 
by admonishing cowardice and d e c e p t i o n I n  the 
aristocratic world of international relations a nation 
without honor warranted the scorn and contempt of its 
neighbors, thus weakening its position. Wellington's 
policy had brought shame to Britain, contributing to 
deterioration of national honor.
After the revolutions of 1830 Palmerston faced a 
plethora of foreign policy problems. He decided that 
British interests required him to support constitutional 
movements on the continent and to defend the Ottoman Empire 
from European interference. These endeavors demanded 
constant attention. His policies drew sharp criticism, not 
only from foreign governments, but also from within the 
governments he served. Compared to European affairs China 
was a mere side show. The Foreign Secretary delegated
’^Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and 
Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), 14; Jonathan Po'wis, Aristocracy (Oxford, UK: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984), 8-14.
°^See Charles Webster's The Foreign Policy of 
Palmerston, 1830-1841 : Britain, the Liberal Movement and 
the Eastern Question (2 Vols. London : G . Bell & Sons, 
1951.) for the standard interpretation of Palmerston's 
early career as guided by liberalism; See also Rooney, 
"Palmerston and the Revolutions of 1830-1833" for the 
beginnings of a reinterpretation focusing instead on 
national interests.
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responsibility for overseeing the detailed operations of 
the newly created trade commission to a senior clerk in the 
Foreign Office, while retaining for himself the 
authority to make all final decisions.
To adjust to the changes brought on by the abolition 
of the East India Company's monopoly, Parliament legislated 
several institutional modifications. While the East India 
Company had controlled the China trade, supercargoes, the 
company's representatives, exercised considerable authority 
over British merchants trading in China. In the eighteenth 
century supercargoes traveled aboard each ship and carried 
out all cargo and commercial transactions. By the 
nineteenth century the function of the supercargoes had 
changed. Supercargoes no longer attached themselves to 
specific ships; they remained in Canton throughout the 
trading season and supervised the transactions of a greater 
number of vessels. Once the season ended, the supercargoes 
left Canton for Macao, a peninsula under Portuguese 
control, extending out of the mainland into the Gulf of 
Canton about seventy-five miles from the city of Canton.
Of twelve Company supercargoes in Canton, three or four of 
the senior agents formed the Presidency and Select
^^Middleton, Administration of British Foreign Policy, 
75, 191, 323.
*See above p.vii, MAP 2, "Gulf of Canton," p.ii; from 
Fay, Opium War, 16.
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Committee. The Select had the authority to expel non­
licensed merchants from Canton.
The original plans for the new trade commission called 
for the Chief Superintendent to have the same powers as the 
Company's supercargoes, but, fearing the concentration of 
power in the hands of one man. Parliament limited his 
power. The Chief Superintendent lacked the authority to 
demand obedience from British subjects in China, and the 
merchants were aware of this incapacity. British merchants 
felt that they were not accountable to anyone for their 
trade actions in the Far East. The superintendent was 
there to serve the needs of the merchants, not to control 
them.
The Chinese, both the Hong Merchants and the imperial 
authorities, were also uneasy about the abolition of the 
East India Company's monopoly. For over one hundred years 
trade had flourished under the existing system; they saw no 
need for change. The first Chief Superintendent, Lord 
William Napier, reinforced their concerns when he arrived 
in China on 15 July 1834. Lord Napier had no respect for 
Chinese custom or protocol. He had his orders, and by God,
^^Greenberg, British Trade, 18.
^^Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of 
the Chinese Empire (New York; Longmans, Green, 1910), vol. 
1, The Period of Conflict; 1334-1860, 169; Lord Palmerston 
to Lord William Napier, 25 January 1834, Correspondence 
Relating to China (Great Britain: Parliament, 1840), 5.
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nothing was going to stop him. Hoping to extend British
trading privileges beyond a single port, Palmerston
instructed the Chief Superintendent to proceed to Canton
and take up residence there. Upon his arrival he was to
communicate directly with the Governor-General (or Viceroy)
of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces. Napier took these
orders literally. He proceeded to Canton without receiving
a passport from Chinese officials and only then sent a
**
letter to Governor-General Lu K'un.
Napier's unannounced arrival in Canton greatly 
disturbed the provincial government and the Co-hong. In 
several letters to the Hong merchants dating from 21 July 
to 31 July (designed to be passed on to the foreign 
community), Lu expressed his dissatisfaction with Napier's 
presence. He stated that it was a well-known fact that all 
foreigners must receive a passport before proceeding to 
C a n t o n . T h e  Governor-General could not understand
General accounts of Napier's mission to China can be 
found in most works concerning the Opium War. One cannot 
truly understand his arrogance, however, until reading the 
despatches found in the Correspondence Relating to China 
(7-41).
There are two major styles of transliteration from 
the Chinese characters to Roman letters : Wade-Giles and 
pinyin. 1 am following James Polachek's usage in The Inner 
Opium War--Wade-Giles.
^^Inclosures 2, 3, 4, and 5, Governor of Canton to 
Hong Merchants, in Napier to Palmerston, 14 August 1834,
(The Foreign Office received this letter on 31 January 
183 5.) Correspondence, 17-21.
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Napier's total disregard for protocol and his lack of 
respect for Chinese custom.
Napier's letter further annoyed Governor Lu because 
Chinese law forbade barbarians to send "personal letters" 
to Chinese officials. Foreign correspondence had to be in 
the form of a "petition" from inferior to superior; the use 
of the Chinese character "Pin" on the correspondence 
signified a petition. Chinese custom also prohibited the 
transmission of petitions directly to the official. A 
petition must be delivered by the Co-hong.
Additionally, Lu refused to recognize Napier's 
official position as an agent of the British Government.
The Chinese had never allowed an official of a foreign 
government to reside within its territory. They were not 
about to change thousands of years of tradition for one 
obnoxious man. The Chinese Viceroy ordered Napier to leave 
Canton until he received permission to return and until he 
was willing to follow Chinese practices.
Napier refused to accept the Chinese demands because 
he failed to understand the Chinese government's position. 
He felt that it should, and would, give in to his demands 
for recognition as an official representative of the 
British Crown and for direct communication with Chinese 
officials. He based this assumption on a misconception
^^Napier to Palmerston, 9 August 1834, Correspondence,
7-11.
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about the importance of trade to the Chinese government.
In a letter to Lord Palmerston, Napier wrote the following:
The house of every Chinaman in these extensive 
suburbs, is a shop of one sort or another. Every 
man is constantly at work; nobody seen loitering 
about and idle; and, in fact, every man is a 
merchant; yet does one of these same Edicts 
[ordering Napier to obey Chinese customs and 
traditions] speak of the ' petty affairs of 
c om m e rc e -a s if commerce were a matter of no 
concern to the empire !
Napier concluded that the Chinese government needed British
trade and it was just putting up an elaborate front to
extract unreasonable demands from the foreigners. To
rectify the situation, Napier recommended reminding the
Emperor of his Tartar heritage by pointing out that "he is
only an intruder; and that it will be his good policy to
secure himself upon the throne by gratifying the wishes of
his p e o p l e . I f  the British put the Tartar rulers in
their place by means of military force, then the Chinese
people would welcome British goods.
Napier was wrong. The Governor-General threatened to
stop all trade because of "the fault of one man. Lord
Napier." Following this threat from Lu, the Hong
merchants, who were anxious to get things back to normal.
'^^ Napier to Palmerston, 14 August 1834, 
Correspondence, 12.
^^Napier to Palmerston, 14 August 1834, 
Correspondence, 13.
^^Napier to Lord Grey, 21 August 1834, Correspondence,
26 - 2 8 .
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Stopped trade on 16 August until Napier complied with the 
Viceroy's wishes. This action was succeeded by rumors that 
Chinese officials were circulating derogatory stories about 
the English delegation. Napier responded by posting his 
own account of the "Present state of relations between 
China and Great Britain," translated into Chinese for all 
in Canton to read. In the document, an arrogant statement 
of the British position, Napier called Governor-General Lu 
a liar. The Chinese authorities replied with a quick and 
pointed response, stating that "According to the Laws of 
the nation, the Royal Warrant should be respectfully 
requested to behead you; and openly expose [your head] to 
the multitude, as a terror to preserve dispositions."^^ 
Following this incident Governor-General Lu, on 2 
September 1834, reaffirmed the Hong's decision to stop 
trade. He also intensified the standoff by closing Napier 
and the foreign community off from the outside world. 
Demanding Napier's departure. Lu denied the foreign 
community access to communication, servants and 
provisions, and surrounded its factories with troops on
Memorandum, Foreign Office, February, 1840 [based on 
the "Records of Proceedings" kept by the superintendents at 
Canton], Correspondence, 34.
According to K. N. Chaudhuri this action was the 
typical response to European threats by indigenous Asian 
states. The Trading World of Asia and the English East 
India Company (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 
125 .
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land and sea.*° Napier instantly responded by calling in 
two British Navy frigates and landing a contingent of 
marines in Canton. In a letter to the Hong merchants 
Napier justified his actions by claiming that the Chinese 
"have opened the preliminaries of war." He stated that 
"His Imperial Majesty will not permit such folly, 
wickedness, and cruelty as they have been guilty of, since 
my arrival here, to go unpunished; therefore tremble 
Governor Loo, intensely tremble .
Once again, Napier was wrong. The crisis drained him 
of his strength, and he fell ill. After the Viceroy 
threatened to use force, Napier decided to withdraw from 
Canton on 21 September, just two short months after his 
arrival. Napier knew the damage his actions had wrought 
would not be tolerated by the Foreign Office. Palmerston's 
original instructions had ordered Napier not to lose any of 
the trading privileges already obtained and to "abstain 
from all unnecessary use of menacing l a n g u a g e . T h e  
Chinese added insult to injury by delaying Napier's journey 
as he left Canton. A trip that usually took less than a
The Agents of the East India Company in China to the 
Honourable the Court of Directors in London, 29 September 
1834, Correspondence, 42.
^^Napier to the Hong Merchants and Chinese 
authorities, 8 September 1834, Correspondence, 36.
^^Palmerston to Napier, 25 January 1834, 
Correspondence, 3-4.
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day required one week. This delay prevented Napier from 
receiving proper medical care. He died on 11 October 1834.
As a result of the Napier mission the Chinese 
authorities became more suspicious than ever of the British 
in Canton. British merchants in Canton called for forceful 
action, but Sir John Francis Davis, Second Superintendent 
of Trade under Napier, disagreed. He assumed the position 
of Chief Superintendent of Trade and was determined to 
follow a policy of quiescence. Davis, a former President 
of the Select Committee and resident of China for twenty- 
one years, removed himself and the commission to Macao. 
These changes succeeded in putting British trade back on 
the road to success. The British merchants immediately 
resumed trade on the same footing as though Napier had 
never arrived.
The merchants objected to Davis's new policy, because 
they feared that another unfortunate incident might be 
repeated under different circumstances. Accordingly, the 
British merchants at Canton sent a petition "TO THE KING'S 
MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL," encouraging the Council 
to take measures to "maintain the honour of our country, 
and preserve the advantages . . . [of] safe and
uninterrupted commerce with China." Calling "the insults 
wantonly heaped upon" Lord Napier to the attention of the 
King's council, the merchants stated that the the Chief 
Superintendent Office's impotence compounded the problem.
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They wanted the King to send a Plenipotentiary with full 
authority to deal with any situation that might arise. The 
merchants also called for an extension of trading rights to 
Amoy, Ningpo, and Chusan. The merchants took a dim view of 
the proceedings of the past few m.onths. According to them, 
Napier tried his best, but he lacked the authority to 
demand change. The British merchants in Canton wanted a 
guarantee that similiar insults would not recur. They 
thought that the best way to prevent a recurrence would be 
to redress forcefully the insult and extend trading 
rights.^
In England, James Matheson, partner in the largest 
British firm in China, Jardine, Matheson & Company, gained 
the support of the commercial and manufacturing lobbies of 
Manchester, Glasgow and Liverpool for a new "forward 
policy" in regard to C h i n a . H e  argued that the 
government needed to protect the "new individual system of 
enterprise"*^ because British merchants were "daily 
subjected to injuries and insults."** The Napier mission
British Merchants at Canton to the King's Most 
Excellent Majesty in Council, 9 December 1834, 
Correspondence, 68-70.
*^Greenberg, British Trade, 193-4.
**James Matheson, The Present Position and Prospects 
of the British Trade with China; Together with an Outline 
of Some of the Leading Occurrences in its Past History 
(London: Smith, Elder, 1836), 7.
**Matheson, Present Position, 5.
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provided Matheson with the perfect example of Chinese 
governments "imbecility, avarice, conceit, and obstinacy" 
and of the need for British governmental action to counter 
the humiliating results of Napier's failure. Protection 
thus meant more than defending the status quo; it meant 
extending British commercial privileges to ports beyond 
Canton, if necessary, with force. Matheson even received 
the patronage of Lord Napier's widow. In a letter to Lord 
Palmerston she urged him to meet with Matheson and to 
consider his recommendations for extracting retribution for 
the insults heaped upon her husband and for opening China's 
m a r k e t T h e r e  is no evidence that this proposed meeting 
ever took place, or that Palmerston even took Matheson's 
suggestions seriously. British merchants in Canton, 
however, fully supported Matheson's proposals.
Hugh Hamilton Lindsay, former East India Company 
Supercargo, agreed with Matheson's evaluation of British 
relations with China. In a public letter to Lord 
Palmerston, Lindsay argued forcefully for "armed 
interference." He believed that a small naval force of 
"one line-of-battle ship, two frigates, six corvettes, and 
three or four armed steamers, having on board a land force 
of about six hundred men, chiefly artillery, in order to
Lady Napier to Palmerston, 14 April 1835, Foreign 
Office, General Correspondence: China. Public Record 
Office, Kew (Hereafter cited as F017), F017/12/346-7.
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protect any land operation which might be necessary" could 
secure a more stable trading relationship.*® The goal of 
this force would be to disrupt the Chinese coastal trade in 
grain on which some parts of China were "entirely 
dependant" for the "necessaries of life." Lindsay believed 
that such an operation would cause great anxiety in Peking 
and force the Emperor to open several Northern ports, to 
define import and export duties, and to abolish the Co­
hong.*’ The time needed for the armed intervention would 
be no more than seven months, and in all probability, 
perhaps half that time; it could take place between March 
and September while the China trade was at its seasonal 
stand-still. The use of force would cause no interruption 
in the British trade with China.
Karl Gutzlaff, German protestant missionary, foremost 
expert on China and joint-translator for the trade 
commission, agreed with Lindsay's assessment of the 
situation. In an essay secretly commissioned by the 
Foreign Office, Gutzlaff stated that "the moment the 
[Chinese] Government is persuaded that Great Britain will 
take no notice of the late, most lamentable occurrences, it
Hugh Hamilton Lindsay, Letter to the Right 
Honourable Viscount Palmerston on British Relations with 
China, 2d. (London: Saunders and Otley, 1836. vol. 1140, 
Wellington Pamphlets), 12-13.
*’Lindasy, Letter to .. . Palmerston, 10-11.
^°Lindsay, Letter to .. . Palmerston, 18.
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will grow bolder, glory in the impunity with which it can 
carry it's [sic] measures into effect and become more 
troublesome than it was before. To stem this 
deplorable turn of events, he suggested seizing one of the 
Chusan islands and using it as a base to blockade China's 
coastal trade. This threat to the economic vitality of six 
or eight maritime cities would force the Chinese officials 
to negotiate a more agreeable trade relationship.^^ As a 
contributing writer to the Chinese Repository, a monthly 
established by protestant missionaries in China, Gutzlaff 
may have had an ulterior motive for making these 
suggestions. The Chinese Repository hoped to convince the 
British and American general public that the opening of the 
China trade would have the added benefit of creating an 
opportunity to convert the Chinese population to 
Christianity. By presenting China as a weak and wicked 
empire, the editors believed that they made the decision to 
wage war more likely.^
Such belligerent attitudes did not go unopposed.
George Thomas Staunton, also a former East India Company
^^Karl Gutzlaff, "Present State of our Relations with 
China," Separate Inclosure, Robinson to Palmerston, 26 
March 1835, F017/9/131.
"^Gutzlaff, "Present State," FO17/9/148-50.
^Murray A. Rubinstein, "The Wars They Wanted:
American Missionaries' Use of The Chinese Repository Before 
the Opium War," The American Neptune 48 (Fall 1988) : 271- 
82 .
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Supercargo and now M.P. for Hampshire borough (1832-1835), 
disagreed with Lindsay and Matheson. Staunton acknowledged 
that Lindsay's proposals had the support of the great 
majority of British merchants in Canton, yet the M.P. 
regarded those suggestions as unjustified in seeking 
redress for the Chinese treatment of Napier. The British 
were, "in a national point of view, totally and entirely in 
the wrong in all our proceedings upon this occasion.
The expedition, far from succeeding, would increase the 
fear and hostility of the Chinese toward the British and 
would hurt the existing trade.
Despite Staunton's common sense argument, the whole 
Napier incident provided a wonderful opportunity for the 
British Government to go to war. Not only had the Chinese 
stopped trade, but the Emperor's Viceroy had threatened to 
behead an officer of the crown. The Chinese had insulted 
British life, liberty, and property. The demands of the 
majority of British merchants at Canton and in Britain 
provided a splendid excuse for military action.
The reaction to the episode among British officials 
was, however, quite mild. The Duke of Wellington, who 
temporarily replaced Lord Palmerston in 183 5 when the Grey 
Ministry fell, responded immediately with a succinct note
^^George Thomas Staunton, Remarks on the British 
Relations with China, and Plans for Improving Them (London: 
Edmond Lloyd, 1836. vol. 1141 Wellington Pamphlets), 12.
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reminding Lord Napier of British policy : commercial 
privileges were to be obtained by peaceable means, not 
force.Palmerston did not deem it necessary to change 
this policy when he returned to the Foreign Office later in 
1835. Considering Dugald Stewart's warnings about avoiding 
the counsel of merchants and manufacturers, this decision 
should come as no surprise. To open violently China's 
market would have disrupted the natural economic order just 
as surely as granting the East India Company a monopoly 
did. For the next three years Palmerston continued to let 
the British trade with China follow its natural course, 
neither protecting nor restricting it.
^^Duke of Wellington to Napier, 2 February 1835, 
Correspondence, 5.
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNAL DISSENTION
The abolition of the East India Company's monopoly 
produced uncertainty in Anglo-Chinese relations. The 
British Trade Commission in China needed clear guidance 
from London, but Palmerston's laissez-faire policy left His 
Majesty's servants in China without definite instructions. 
The Chief Superintendents had to decide on their own the 
most prudent course of action, and the commission fell into 
internal turmoil. Junior members of the commission had 
their own ideas about what ought to be done. Clashes over 
policies within the commission dominated the management of 
Chinese trade for the whole of 1835 and 1836. When 
Palmerston put an end to the dispute, he did so without 
restating his own policy. In 1837 and 1838 the Foreign 
Secretary finally stated, in unequivocal language, that the 
British Government had no intention of taking an active 
role in opening the Chinese market.
On 19 January 1835 John Davis officially resigned his 
position as Chief Superintendent because of "personal 
reasons." Privately, however, he made his reasons known. 
"If I find that I have nothing to do but sit still until
74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
the Government at home have made up their minds, I shall 
probably accompany Mrs. Davis home."  ^ Davis was 
frustrated because he had begged his superior in London for 
instructions, but none were forthcoming. Davis believed 
that the government should take a firm and consistent 
stance in regard to China in order to offset the 
embarrassments caused by Napier's miserable failure to 
force the Chinese to bow to his wishes. In the second and
third chapters of the first volume of his The Chinese: A
General Description of the Empire of China and Its 
Inhabitants, Davis provided a short history of "British 
Intercourse" with China. Beginning with the arrival of the 
first British ship in 1637, he chronicled the "frequent
interruptions" of the China trade. He argued that every
time the British had submitted to the Chinese government's 
demands, the latter responded by pressing for more 
concessions. If, on the other hand, the British merchants 
had refused to back down, Chinese authorities always 
retreated to their previous position.^
Davis's argument should not be confused with the 
"crude and ill-digested" program set forth by the British
^Davis to John Barrow, Macao, 8 November 1834, First 
Enclosure, Barrow to John Backhouse, 13 March 1835, 
F017/12/175.
^Sir John Francis Davis, The Chinese: A General 
Description of the Empire of China and Its Inhabitants, 
vol. 1 (London: Charles Knight, 1836), Ch. 2 & 3.
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Merchants in Canton after the Napier episode.^ Davis
believed that the British should take no violent steps that 
might disrupt the status quo. Firmness required a clear 
diplomatic strategy that would gradually put the British 
trade with China on a more secure footing. When he 
resigned, Davis instructed Sir George Best Robinson, who 
moved up from Second Superintendent to Chief 
Superintendent, to continue the quiescent policy that Davis 
had established until the Foreign Office instructed the new 
Chief Superintendent otherwise.^ Captain Charles Elliot, 
R.N., appointed Third Superintendent on the Departure of 
Davis, disagreed and argued for a more forward approach. 
Elliot believed that the commission should open 
communications with the Chinese Vioeroy through the Hong 
Merchants using the Chinese character "Pin," signifying a 
petition.^
Robinson, a former East India Company Supercargo, had 
lived in China for fifteen years, while Elliot had only 
arrived with Lord Napier in 1834. Robinson refused to take 
Elliot's advice but then relented at his first opportunity 
as leader of the British trade delegation to have contact
^Davis to Palmerston, Macao, 19 January 1835, 
Correspondence, 80.
^Extract from the "Records of Proceedings," 19 January 
1835, Correspondence, 80.
^Elliot, "Minute," Enclosure, Robinson to Wellington, 
Macao, 26 April 1835, FO17/18/30.
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v/ith the Chinese authorities. On 21 January the Argyle, a 
British merchant vessel, dropped anchor off the coast of 
China to repair the damage done to the ship by a fierce 
tempest. While attempting to make the repairs, the 
captain, Mr. Alexander MacDonald, sent a small boat with a 
twelve-man party ashore for the purpose of finding a pilot 
to guide the ship to Canton. The group never returned.
The twelve sailors had been kidnapped by a band of lawless 
Chinese who demanded a $500 ransom.
Not having the m.oney on board, MacDonald decided to 
proceed to Macao and there informed Robinson of the 
incident. Robinson thought the episode could be handled 
without any official contact between himself and the 
Chinese authorities. Elliot pressed Robinson for action. 
The Third Superintendent wanted Robinson to open 
communications with the Chinese and ask for their 
assistance. Robinson gave in to Elliot "less from an idea 
that there existed a chance of its [the communication] 
being received, than from a wish to convince that gentleman 
he had formed an erroneous opinion in anticipating, that on
The Spanish dollar from Mexico was the currency of 
choice for Chinese foreign commerce. "The tael (T. or 
Tls.), the basic unit of Chinese currency at Canton, was a 
hypothetical coin of pure silver weighing 1.2 08 oz. The 
only circulating Chinese coin was the copper cash [1000 
cash = T.l]. The basic coin in foreign commerce was the 
Spanish dollar [$1 = T. 0.72], with an intrinsic value of 
4s. 2d. (4/2), and an exchange value ranging from 5s. 2d.
upwards." Pritchard, Crucial Years, 103.
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any pretext or under any circumstances, would the Canton 
authorities be induced to communicate with an officer of 
this commission."*
On 1 February 1835 Elliot proceeded to Canton with a 
formal request that the Viceroy investigate the matter. 
Robinson avoided putting the request in the form of a 
letter by adapting the same mode of communication used "by 
public officers in their reports to each other" in an 
attempt to avoid Lord Napier's mistakes. Like Napier's, 
this attempt at communication failed, and the Chinese, once 
again, insulted one of His Britannic Majesty's officers.
Accompanied by Karl Gutzlaff and Captain MacDonald, 
Captain Elliot arrived at Canton in full uniform. The 
expedition did not go to the foreign factories as Lord 
Napier had done, but to a small gate a few miles away, 
where in 1831 another naval captain had successfully 
transmitted a letter to the Viceroy. After entering the 
gate, the group proceeded a "few houses" into Canton, where 
without provocation, a group of Chinese soldiers, led by a 
"second lieutenant," attacked Elliot and threw him to the 
ground. Gutzlaff tried to protest this action and to 
explain the purpose of their visit. The soldiers, however, 
continued to push the party forcibly back through the city
Robinson to Palmerston, Private and Confidential, 
Macao, 13 April 1835, Foreign Office, Embassy and Consular 
Archives: China. Public Record Office, Kew (Hereafter cited 
as F0228), F 0 2 2 8 / 2 / 1 2 3 .
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gates. Once this had occurred, a mandarin of higher rank 
arrived and Captain Elliot tried to present Robinson's 
request for assistance. The mandarin "sneered 
contemptuously" at the document and laughed at Elliot when 
he requested that the Chinese lieutenant be punished.^
The mandarin then withdrew. Captain Elliot remained 
and continued to plead for an official to come and receive 
the report. After over half an hour had passed, Mowqua, a 
senior member of the Co-hong, arrived with several 
Mandarins. Elliot beseeched the mandarins to accept the 
document, but they continually replied that only petitions 
were acceptable. Their rigidity forced Elliot to leave 
Canton, having failed miserably at his self-imposed task. 
One month later, however, the Chinese authorities obtained 
the release of the twelve sailors and the unfortunate 
incident came to an end.^
Once again an excuse for war had presented itself. 
Chinese renegades held twelve British subjects for ransom. 
The Chinese authorities responded by assaulting an officer 
of the crown. The fact that the British Government did not 
respond to this incident is striking and significant. No 
reference to the incident can be found in any document sent
Charles Gutzlaff's report, in an extract from the 
"Records of Proceedings," 1 February 1835 (received 7 July 
1835), Correspondence, 84-85.
^Gutzlaff's report. Correspondence, 85.
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out by the Foreign Office. Lord Palmerston completely 
overlooked it.
As a result of Elliot's experience, Robinson embarked 
on the same policy Davis had chosen to follow--quiescence. 
Robinson informed Lord Palmerston that no further contact 
with the Chinese would be attempted unless it was necessary 
and that the commission awaited "definite instructions. 
Those instructions never arrived; Robinson was left without 
instructions from the Foreign Office for almost two years. 
The last despatch concerned Lord Napier's troubles and told 
the superintendents to avoid any further disturbances.
This forced Robinson to set his own policy, while 
continuing to appeal for advice. Even after considering 
the six months it took for despatches to travel from China 
to London, and then back again, the absence of instructions 
implies that Palmerston had only a minimal interest in 
British commercial and diplomatic affairs in China.
Without instructions from England Robinson's quiescent 
policy continued to draw sharp criticism from Elliot. The 
next internal conflict over policy arose in August 1835 
over the behavior of a British merchant named James Innes. 
Innes believed that the Chinese authorities had acted 
illegally when they seized one of his cargoes. It was 
under the care of a Chinese pilot who had proceeded up the
^Robinson to Palmerston, 16 October 1835, 
Correspondence, 101.
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river to Canton without a passport. Innes demanded redress 
for this outrage and threatened to attack Chinese trade in 
order to get compensation. Robinson persuaded Innes 
that violence was not the best course of action. The Chief 
Superintendent told Innes that the commission would bring 
the matter to the attention of the Chinese at the first 
opportunity. Innes agreed, but Elliot vigorously opposed 
this line of action. He believed that the commission 
should "forcibly" expel Innes from China for his threats 
and deny him the right to trade. The Chief 
Superintendent decided against such strong action and 
referred the matter to England for further instructions.
Another quarrel broke out between Robinson and Elliot 
in late 183 5 when the steam-boat Jardine arrived from 
London. The owner hoped to use the steamer as a ferry 
between Macao and Canton and Lintin. After observing the 
Jardine in the Gulf of Canton, the Chinese authorities 
ordered it out of Chinese waters. Ignoring these 
orders, the captain of the vessel continued to prepare for 
a trip up the river to Canton. Elliot demanded that the 
commission should exert its authority by ordering the ship
^°Palmerston to Robinson, Foreign Office, 6 June 1836,
Correspondence, 111-2.
’^ Elliot, "Memorar 
Palmerston, Macao, 20 November 1835, F017/18/86.
^^Alan 
(1986): 69.
ndum," Enclosure, Robinson to
Reid, "The Smoke Ship," Mariner's Mirror 72
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to leave. Robinson believed that he had no authority to 
stop the Jardine, while Elliot felt that the commission had 
both the authority and the obligation to order the Jardine 
not to proceed with its plans. He reasoned that the 
presence of the steamer would cause the Chinese government 
to stop all trade and would increase the animosity of the 
commercial community toward the commission.
Once again Robinson chose to ignore Elliot's advice.
On 1 January the steamer proceeded up the river, but the 
Chinese military halted its progress by firing its cannons. 
Six days later an Imperial Edict announced that any further 
attempt to use the "smoke ship" would be met with equal 
fury and that it should leave Chinese waters immediately. 
Seeing little chance for a successful business in Canton, 
the captain left for Singapore. The incident had no
effect on the rest of British trade with China, but it 
added to the dissention within the trade commission.
The internal turmoil caused by the Jardine incident 
was exacerbated by a larger conflict between Robinson and 
his subordinates. On 1 December 1835 Robinson moved his 
base of operations from Macao to a forty ton cutter named 
the Louisa, anchored off Lintin, a small island in the Gulf
of Canton. He moved because the Portuguese felt he
^^Elliot, "Minute," Macao, 27 December 1835, 
Correspondence, 122.
^^ Reid, "Smoke Ship," 70.
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threatened their jurisdiction and because he wanted to be 
at the heart of British mercantile interests. Lintin 
was the anchorage for mercantile vessels both waiting to 
proceed to Canton and depositing opium on receiving ships, 
floating opium warehouses. Robinson also took this move to 
avoid putting himself and British trade at the mercy of the 
Chinese authorities. He prophetically warned that residing 
at Canton would be troublesome in times of confrontation.
If a conflict arose, and the Superintendent failed to 
submit to Chinese demands, the British could have "their 
servants taken away; their provisions stopped; and houses 
unroofed.Robinson concluded that in such a situation 
the British community, led by the Superintendent, would 
have no alternative but total submission to the Chinese 
demands.
Robinson follov/ed this policy for a year, and trade 
continued on its peaceful course. His new residence also 
won the approval of the British Chamber of Commerce at 
Canton, because the commission's residence at Macao had 
been a great inconvenience to them. As Robinson 
explained to Lord Palmerston, large ships could not
^^Costin, Great Britain and China, 30-31.
^^Robinson to Palmerston, 1 December 1836, 
Correspondence, 106.
^^Sprott Boyd, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce at 
Canton, 8 December 1835, Correspondence, 109.
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approach Macao's harbor due to physical constraints, and 
thus lay open to sudden winds while waiting for port 
clearance into Canton. A residence at Lintin, on the 
other hand, provided the British ships with a safe and 
speedy place to take care of official business.
Captain Elliot, now Second Superintendent and 
supported by Third Superintendent Alexander R. Johnston, 
energetically disapproved of Robinson's move. In 
memorandums enclosed in Robinson's despatches Elliot 
criticized Robinson's policies. The Second Superintendent 
felt that Robinson's actions violated the instructions 
given to the trade commission and broke English law.
The instructions called for the commission to reside at 
Canton. He believed that until new instructions arrived in 
China the commission should attempt to receive permission 
from the Chinese authorities to proceed from Macao directly 
to Canton. Elliot also maintained that Robinson put the 
legitimate trade at risk by residing among the receiving 
vessels. He assumed that the Chinese officials would see 
the residence as de facto approval by the British 
Government of the illicit trade and that an incident 
involving the opium traffickers and the Chinese would bring
^^Robinson to Palmerston, H.M. Cutter Louisa, Lintin, 
February 1836, F0228/3/79.
''^ Elliot to Robinson, Macao, 23 November 1835, 
Enclosure No. 1, Robinson to Palmerston, Macao, 16 January 
1 8 3 6 ,  F0228/3/24.
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the wrath of the Canton authorities down upon the 
commission. Both Elliot and Johnston refused, 
therefore, to move with Robinson to Lintin and refused to 
sign any official documents.
Robinson defended his decision, referring to the fact 
that the China trade continued unmolested. Contrary to the 
assertions of Elliot and Johnston, the Chinese authorities 
ignored his residence at Lintin, even though one or two war 
junks maintained watch over the anchorage.Robinson 
told Palmerston that the commission had nothing to do with 
the opium trade and argued that if a residence at Lintin 
was illegal, then residing at Macao "must be equally 
illegal.Historian Chang Hsin-pao states that these 
defensive despatches "must have bored Palmerston 
considerably,but it was Elliot whom the Foreign office
^°Elliot, "Minute," 30 November 1835, Enclosure No. 1, 
Robinson to Palmerston, Lintin, 29 February 1836, 
F0228/3/124.
^^Robinson to Palmerston, Lintin, 5 January 1836, 
F0228/3/1.
^^Robinson to Palmerston, H.M. Cutter Louisa, Lintin, 
25 February 1836, FO228/3/101-2.
^^Robinson to Palmerston, H.M. Cutter Louisa, Lintin, 
29 February 1836, F0228/3/119.
^^Chang, Conunissioner Lin, 68.
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chastised for sending home "such voluminous records of 
matters of small amount.
The internal dissension became so serious that Elliot 
accused Robinson of suspending him from office, a deed the 
Captain considered a violation of the "King's 
Instructions."^* Elliot felt that he had the right to see 
all despatches sent to and from the Foreign Office. 
Robinson's residence deprived him of this right. Robinson 
responded by telling Elliot that he had formed an 
inaccurate opinion. The Chief Superintendent explained 
that he would let Elliot see the despatches if he agreed to 
perform his duties for the commission.
The conflict among the members of the commission 
continued throughout the trading season. During this nine- 
month period Robinson continued to report the tranquil 
state of affairs which existed between the merchants and 
the Canton authorities and waited with "regret and anxiety" 
for instructions from England. He wanted to know what to 
do but refused to listen to the opinions of Elliot and 
Johnston. Chief Superintendent Robinson believed that his 
colleagues' views differed "in idea only from those which
^*William Fox-Strangways to Elliot, Foreign Office, 14 
September 1836, F0228/4/49.
^*Elliot to Robinson, Macao, 9 January 1836, Enclosure 
No. 3, Robinson to Palmerston, Macao, 16 January 1836, 
FO228/3/30.
^^Robinson to Elliot, 9 January 183 6, Enclosure No.
3A, Robinson to Palmerston, 16 January 1836, FO228/3/20-46.
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dictated the early proceedings of this Commission [under
Lord Napier] and if adopted, I predict their results would
be equally disastrous."^® Even though Robinson received
no instructions, he felt secure with his position. He
finally decided to break his connections with the East
India Company in November 1835.^* Thus, when rumors of
the abolition of the Office of Chief Superintendent and the
promotion of Captain Elliot to head the trade commission
surfaced in Canton one year later, Robinson felt frustrated
that his authority had been undermined.^® These feelings
could not possibly have matched the feelings of abandonment
when he learned that the rumors were true.
The reasons for Palmerston's actions are not clear
because of the contradictory nature of the evidence. At
first glance one might assume that Palmerston disapproved
of Robinson's policies, but the Foreign Secretary had
originally approved of the Lintin station. He stated that
HIS Majesty's Government approve of the proposal 
contained in your despatch, of December 1, 1835 
[detailing the move]; and they are of the opinion 
that it would be desirable to extend the limits 
of the power of the Superintendents of British
^®Robinson to Palmerston, Macao, 12 October 1836,
FO228/3/206.
^^Robins
Macao, 23 November 183 5, F0228/2/148-9.
^°Robinson to Palmerston,
28 November 1836, F0228/3/212.
inson to Palmerston, Private and Confidential,
 H.M. Cutter Louisa, Lintin,
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Trade in China . . .  to include Lintin and 
Macao.
Just ten days later Palmerston was less decisive about
the Lintin residence. He had sent Robinson's despatches to
both the India Board and the Board of Trade and had asked
those two agencies to submit their opinions on the
establishment of permanent residence at L i n t i n . O n  7
June 1836 the India Board reported that it could not form
an opinion until Robinson provided further information.^^
That same day Palmerston wrote a letter that mimicked the
letter from the India Board.
As to the advantages which you [Robinson] 
anticipate would result to British commerce from 
the formation of a permanent establishment at 
Lintin, of the nature of that which you suggest 
in your despatch of December 1st, 183 5, I have to 
say that, after duly considering what you have 
said yourself in favour of such an establishment, 
and the reasons against it, His Majesty's 
Government do not feel that they have yet been 
put sufficiently in possession of the means of 
forming any final opinion upon this suggestion; 
and I, therefore, cannot authorize the permanent 
residence of the Commission at Lintin, until I 
have received further information upon the 
subject.
^^Palmerston to Robinson, 28 May, 1836,
Correspondence, 111.
^^Backhouse to R. Vernon Smith, Foreign Office, 2 May 
1836, F017/16/116-7; Backhouse to Denis Le Merchant, 
Foreign Office, 2 May 1826, F017/16/118-9.
^^Smith to Backhouse, India Board, 7 June 1836, 
F017/16/134.
‘^^Palmerston to Robinson, Foreign Office, 7 June 1836, 
Correspondence, 113-4.
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That information would never be provided. In the same 
letter in which Palmerston withdrew his outright approval, 
he dismissed Robinson from his post as Chief Superintendent 
of Trade in China. He gave no foreign policy reason for 
doing so. He merely stated that His Majesty's Government 
had abolished the office of Chief Superintendent in order 
to reduce the size and expenses of the commission.
Robinson should turn over all official documents to Charles 
Elliot.
Social differences might have played a role in this 
personnel change. After his return to England in 1835, Sir 
John Davis urged John Backhouse, Permanent Undersecretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, to bring to the attention of 
Lord Palmerston the immediate necessity of removing 
Robinson in favor of Elliot. Davis believed that "such a 
man as Elliot should not remain below such a man as 
Robinson.Charles  Elliot was the cousin of Lord Minto 
(Gilbert Elllot-Murray-Kynymound), First Lord of the 
Admiralty. Lord Minto had been a friend of Palmerston 
since childhood. Their fathers had been close associates 
and the youths spent a considerable amount of time 
togetherRobinson  was a mere merchant. Whether Davis' 
pleading had the desired effect is hard to determine.
^^Davis to Backhouse, Portland Place, London, 26 June 
1835, F017/12/341-2.
^^Bourne, Palmerston, 1-16.
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Backhouse responded by writing that Lord Palmerston did not 
have the time to consider the request,and the Foreign 
Secretary did not replace Robinson for another year. When 
the promotion of Elliot over Robinson did take place, 
however, it had less to do with any modern "rational" 
notions of merit than with traditional conceptions of 
status based on aristocratic family ties.^®
The lack of an explanation for the change is 
symptomatic of a larger uncertainty surrounding the change 
because Palmerston did not specify Elliot's new role. When 
the despatch informing Elliot of the decision reached China 
on 14 December 1836, he took over as ranking officer of the 
British trade commission at Canton without receiving any 
definite instructions from the Government. The Foreign 
Secretary told Elliot to consider himself "Chief of the 
Commission," but this title lacked any clear meaning. In a 
book on the British Consular Services abroad Desmound C.M. 
Platt does not even consider Elliot's office as worthy of 
consideration.^^ Elliot's new office was an 
administrative aberration.
^^Backhouse to Davis, Draft, Foreign Office, 3 0 June 
1835, F017/12/343.
^®W.D. Rubinstein, "The End of 'Old Corruption’ in 
Britain 1780-1860," Past and Present 101 {November 1983) : 
65 .
^^Desmond C.M. Platt. The Cinderella Service: British 
Consuls since 1825 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971) 182.
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In regard to the conflict of opinion that existed
between Robinson and Elliot, Palmerston was equally vague.
He wrote to Elliot on 15 June, stating that he did not wish
to go into any details.
But I think it due to you to assure you that His 
Majesty's Government entirely exonerate you from 
any imputation of having been ' factiously 
disposed’ in your proceedings with regard to Sir 
George Robinson; or of having been influenced in 
your conduct by any other motive than the good of 
the Service. The decision of His Majesty's 
Government which I communicate to you will afford 
you the most satisfactory answer to your letter 
upon this subject.
To Elliot this despatch must have seemed like a full
endorsement of his proposal for a more active trade
commission.
The vagueness of his instructions to Elliot came back 
to haunt Lord Palmerston during the course of the next four 
years. Palmerston's blank check allowed Elliot to 
experiment with a new China policy which lacked the 
explicit approval of the Government in London. Palmerston 
had to spend the next several years clarifying his policy. 
In the course of the correspondence from London to China 
Palmerston sided with the opinion that Robinson had 
expressed during his tenure as Chief Superintendent more 
often than he declared approval for Elliot's propositions.
Upon receiving the June 15 despatch from Lord 
Palmerston, Elliot immediately decided to change course and
^°Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 15 June 1836,
F0228/3/18-19.
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to put into effect ideas that he had contemplated in the 
years preceding his appointment. He wanted to reopen 
communication with the Viceroy and to reside at Canton, 
maintaining that these changes would bring advantages to 
the merchant community. After establishing himself in 
Canton, Elliot had proposed aiding the Chinese authorities 
in their attempts to control trade, which would cause them 
to "court direct communication.
Elliot regarded his appointment as head of the British 
trade delegation as the perfect opportunity to put his plan 
into action. Elliot also thought the newly appointed 
Governor-General, Teng T'ing-chen, might be amenable to the 
new course and open a dialogue. Accordingly, on 14 
December, the very same day he received his appointment, 
Elliot asked the Hong merchants to deliver a petition to 
the Viceroy. The petition announced Elliot's appointment 
and his desire to reside at C a n t o n . T e n g  responded by 
ordering an investigation into Elliot's intentions and into 
the nature of his mission. He sent the Hong merchants to 
question the Captain. Elliot informed them that his "duty 
at Canton will be to conduct the public business of my
‘^^Elliot to Foreign Office, 14 March 1836, 
Correspondence, 13 7.
^^Inclosure 1, Elliot to Governor of Canton, 14 
December 1836, in Elliot to Palmerston, 30 December 1836, 
Correspondence, 142.
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nation, and by all possible means to preserve the peace
which so happily subsists between the two countries.
Elliot's proposal appealed to Governor-General Teng.
In a memorial to the Emperor, he recommended allowing
Elliot to proceed to Canton. Elliot considered this a
major break-through in Anglo-Chinese relations, but the
Viceroy deemed it only a minor readjustment.^^ He stated
that since the termination of the East India Company's
monopoly, the British merchants in Canton had been without
guidance. The Viceroy judged it prudent to grant Captain
Elliot permission to reside in Canton in order
to controul [sic] the merchants and seamen 
. . . and . . .  in case of any disturbances, he
alone is answerable. . . . [T]hough he is not
precisely the same as the Chief Supracargo [sic] 
hitherto appointed, yet the difference is but in 
name, for in reality he is the same. And after 
all he is a^foreigner to hold the reins of 
foreigners.
Hence, Elliot received permission from the Emperor to 
reside in Canton under the same restrictions as the 
Supercargoes. The Chinese expected Elliot to control the 
merchants during the trading season, and then, to retreat
'^^Inclosure 8, Elliot to Hong Merchants, 28 December, 
1836, in Elliot to Palmerston, 30 December 1836, 
Correspondence, 146.
^^Inclosure 1, Edict from the Governor of Canton, in 
Elliot to Palmerston, 18 March 1837, Correspondence, 193.
^^Inclosure 2, Extract of a Memorial from the Governor 
of Canton to the Emperor of China, in Elliot to Palmerston, 
27 January 1837, Correspondence, 152.
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to Macao. Neither Governor-General Teng nor the Emperor 
considered Elliot a diplomatic officer.
Elliot expected his news to be received in England 
with jubilation, but his resumption of communications with 
the Viceroy through the Hong Merchants had been premature. 
One month after promoting Elliot to his post, Palmerston 
finally got around to responding to Elliot's proposals.
The Foreign Secretary informed Elliot that it had been 
acceptable for merchants of the East India Company to send 
petitions through the Hong Merchants, but now it was 
improper for an agent of the crown to submit to such 
restrictions.^^ By the time Elliot received these 
instructions, his plan was already well under way. He 
decided to ignore Palmerston's instructions and to stay the 
course. He told Palmerston that it "would be exceeding 
injudicious, and perhaps prejudicial to the tranquil course 
of trade" to turn back.
Palmerston was livid when he read Elliot's despatch. 
The Foreign Secretary instructed Elliot to take steps 
immediately to rectify the situation--to discontinue the 
use of the Chinese character "pin" and of the Hong 
Merchants. Palmerston could not believe Elliot's 
persistence in his course even after being given specific
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 22 July 1836, 
FO228/4/49-50.
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, 12 January 1837, 
F0228/5/6.
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instructions to the contrary. The Foreign Secretary
chastised Elliot for his insubordination and concluded by
reminding him
that it is the duty of an Officer of the Crown on 
a foreign Station to take no important steps 
without Instructions; and to obey promptly and 
punctually the Instructions which he may receive; 
and the greater the distance which separates such 
officer from England, the more incumbent upon him 
it is, to attend to these Rules ; because so much 
longer will be the interval of time which must 
elapse before the Government at home can repair 
any inconvenience which may be produced by his 
unauthorized acts, or by his neglect to execute 
his Instructions.
Palmerston set foreign policy. He did not expect Elliot to
make decisions on his own. Even with the year it took for
letters to travel to and from China Palmerston wanted his
instructions to be followed with as little deviation as
possible.
In regard to trade policy Palmerston made it clear 
that Elliot was to exert no pressure on the Canton 
authorities for changing the present system. He had John 
Backhouse forward to Elliot a petition from the Glasgow 
East India Association which called for a more active role 
for the British Government in improving trade relations 
with China and the Foreign Office's response. The memorial 
stated that British Government should protect trade by 
seeking authorization from the Chinese for Admiralty 
Jurisdiction in China, communications with the Court at
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 12 June 1837,
FO228/6/30.
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Peking, living quarters for merchants and their families in 
Canton, new British owned warehouses, the protection of 
Chinese Laws, access to northern ports, freedom to trade 
with all Chinese and an island off the coast.Backhouse 
responded to these suggestions in no uncertain terms. He 
stated that the Government would not put the trade in 
danger in order to press for these changes.^ '' With this 
set of letters Palmerston demonstrated to Elliot that the 
British Government did not favor an active role for itself 
in opening up the Chinese market.
During the course of 1836 Palmerston also clarified 
his position in regard to two other disputes between Elliot 
and Robinson. Responding to Elliot's desire to stop the 
advance of the steam-ship Jardine, Palmerston stated that 
Elliot possessed limited authority when interfering with 
the undertakings of British merchants in China. Palmerston 
told Elliot that he had no authority to stop the Jardine.
In the future Elliot should be "very careful not to assume 
a greater degree of authority over British subjects in
^^Glasgow East India Association to Palmerston, 
Enclosure No. 1, Backhouse to Elliot, Foreign Office, 22 
July 1836, F0228/3/42-4.
^°Backhouse to Glasgow East India Association, Foreign 
Office, 16 July 1836, Enclosure No. 2, Backhouse to Elliot, 
Foreign Office, 22 July 1836, F0228/3/45.
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China than that which you [Captain Elliot] in reality 
possess.
In regard to the case of James Innes the Foreign 
Secretary informed Elliot that the British Government would 
consider violent acts against the Chinese as acts of 
"piracy." Innes would be left to the mercy of the Chinese 
if he carried out his threats. In a second letter dated 
the same day, however, Palmerston went on to say that it 
was a "misconception" for Elliot to believe that he had the 
power to expel any one from China. The East India Company 
Supercargoes had possessed the authority to expel 
unlicensed merchants from China. Since a license was no 
longer needed to trade in China, the power had also ceased 
to exist.
The Foreign Secretary knew that such limitations on
Elliot's powers affected the status of the trade
commission. He wrote :
His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the 
inconvenience arising both from the undefined 
state of Jurisdiction of the Superintendents in 
China, and from their want of power to enforce 
their decisions to which they may come, on
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 22 July 1836, 
F0228/3/4B.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November 
1836, F0228/4/58.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November 
1836, FO228/4/69-70.
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matters submitted to them^^by members of the 
commercial body in China.
He added that the Government was deliberating on the nature
of the trade commission in China. Clarification of the
role of the Superintendents would be forthcoming. He
concluded, "In the meantime, I recommend to you to confine
your interference, when called for, as much as possible to
friendly suggestions and advice to the parties
concerned. If Elliot had any questions about the
limits of his authority, Palmerston's instructions should
have answered them. In two instances the Foreign Secretary
rebuked his subordinate for wanting to take a more active
role in controlling the China trade. Captain Elliot
possessed no real power or authority to act.
Another concern of Lord Palmerston was the expenses of
the commission. A "mystical faith in 'Cheap Government’"
dominated political debates in the first half of the
nineteenth century. Since the Liberal Tory Government's
retrenchment measures left the Whigs with only £5,000,000
to cut from the budget, they experienced difficulties
finding areas in which to reduce fiscal o u t l a y s . T h e
trade commission in China was one area that they could
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November 
1836, F0228/4/67.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November 
1836, F0228/4/67-8
^^Gash, "After Waterloo," 156-7.
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reduce without hurting their policy objectives. In 
November 1836 reduction of the commission's expenses 
followed the reduction of commission staff itself in June. 
The Foreign Secretary abolished several minor offices, and 
slashed the salaries for each of the remaining offices by 
£500 per annum. Finally he cut the clerical and contingent 
expenses from £5000 to £2500. Palmerston then instructed 
Elliot that "the above amount shall, under no 
circumstances, in future be e x c e e d e d . I n  another 
letter dated the same day Palmerston reprimanded Elliot for 
the commission's decision to pay £1014.15 for the creation 
of a seamen's hospital. Palmerston recognized the need for 
the hospital but thought the amount appropriated was too 
high. He also disapproved any allocation of funds without 
prior approval from London. He considered such allocations 
a violation of English law.
China absorbed Palmerston's attention on 8 November 
183 5, for on that same day he dealt with another instance 
of inappropriate distribution of public capital. In a 
dispute between Messrs. Turner & Co. and Mr. Arthur 
Launders Keating over Spanish $300, the British trade 
commission in China had paid the sum to Mr. Keating in 
order to avoid a more general disruption of trade in
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November 
1836, FQ228/4/73.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November 
1836, F0228/4/76.
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Canton. Although Palmerston did not intend to hold the 
members of the commission personally responsible, he did 
not want Elliot to make this type of mistake again.
Once more Palmerston's instructions came too late. 
Elliot had already undertaken on his own authority to spend 
public funds. The main reason for the disbursement was 
Elliot's move to Canton. In Canton Elliot had to rent 
additional residential and office space for the commission 
during the season. These expenses amounted to $5765.*° 
Elliot also spent money on H.M. Cutter Louisa, which he 
found badly in need of repairs. He thought that the vessel 
was unseaworthy. He "furnished [it] with new decks and 
topside, recoppered and thoroughly re-equipped in spars, 
sails, boats and rigging" at a cost of $6500.*^ He 
suggested raising the contingent expenses of the commission 
by £1000 per annum in order to pay for the upkeep and 
manning of the vessel. He argued that the vessel provided 
the best means of traveling from Macao to Canton because 
the Chinese authorities allowed it to move unmolested.
*^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 8 November 
1836, F0228/4/65.
*°"A Statement of the disbursements made by Captain 
Elliot since his assumption of the Office of Chief 
Superintendent . . .," Enclosure No. 1, Elliot to
Palmerston, 17 September 1837, F0228/5/324.
*^ "A Statement of the disbursements . . .,"
F0228/5/329.
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when Palmerston received the news of Elliot's 
expenditures, the Foreign Secretary decided to allow them. 
He raised the contingent expenses by £750, less than the 
£1000 Elliot had requested. Here Palmerston's flexibility 
stopped.
While I communicate to you a very liberal 
provision which Her Majesty's Government have 
made for this Service, I must again impress on 
you the necessity of exercising the most rigid 
control over the Contingent Expenditure of the 
Commission; and of making from time to time any 
reductions therein which may be compatible with 
the due execution of the public Service.
Neither Palmerston's policy of reducing the commission
nor Elliot's policy indulging the Chinese authorities
pleased the British merchants in Canton. John Slade,
editor of the Canton Register, wrote to Palmerston, "every
measure for the protection and promotion of the British
trade to China, originating with the government of which
your lordship is a member, has failed utterly, and
disgracefully.
The Trade Commission's internal conflict provided
Palmerston with an opportunity to delineate a clear China
policy, but he had acted before clarifying his intentions.
This mistake led to tensions between Palmerston and Elliot.
The Foreign Secretary was finally forced to define British
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 2 June 1838,
F0228/8/8.
^^Slac 
F017/28/212.
de to Palmerston, Canton, 9 October 1838,
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policy. He did not wish Crown representatives in China to 
direct a new forward commercial policy. In the face of 
opposition from the merchants in China the Foreign 
Secretary wanted to reduce the British Government's 
involvement in China rather than expand it. As Chief of 
the Commission, Elliot was a minor official with little 
voice in policy decisions and with limited authority over 
British subjects. He also had few financial resources at 
his disposal. The steps Elliot would take during the opium 
crisis of March 1839 greatly exceeded his role as 
Palmerston had defined it.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4 
FAILURE TO TAKE HEED
Elliot's inability to follow simple instructions was 
extremely unfortunate for the Foreign Minister because of 
crises that developed in Britain and China. Although 
stemming from unrelated causes, they created tense 
atmospheres in both imperial capitals, leading to a 
deterioration in Anglo-Chinese relations. The crisis in 
London, the topic of Chapter 5, resulted from a backlash 
against the reform measures of the Whigs. In Peking the 
crisis arose out of the Chinese Emperor's desire to 
revitalize his dynasty. The Emperor's decision to suppress 
the illegal opium trade provided a link between the two 
crises, when the British Foreign Office failed to respect 
the Superintendent's warnings about the increasing risk the 
opium trade posed to legitimate British commerce.
During the late 1820s and early 1830s a danger to the 
Anglo-Chinese relationship arose. This threat came about 
because the British merchants finally found a product which 
the Chinese were willing to buy en masse--opium. The sale 
of opium successfully altered the balance of trade in the 
British favor, but this shift too had its price. During
103
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the early 1800s raw cotton exports from India to China had 
closed the trade gap. Indian cotton remained, however, an 
uncertain venture. Its price depended upon the size of 
China's own domestic crop. The problems in the Chinese 
cotton market became serious in the 182 0s when trade in the 
commodity came to a standstill, leaving the trade imbalance 
as an irritation.^ Opium provided relief.
The East India Company grew and processed the drug in 
India for consumption in China. The laborers on Company 
plantations sowed the seeds for the poppy in autumn, and 
the flower bloomed in the spring. The poppy flower varied 
in color from white to deep violet, and the plant stood no 
higher than five feet tall. Once the spherical seed pod 
developed on the end of the stem some time between July and 
August, the flower fell off. Laborers then walked the 
fields in the evening, making shallow incisions using 
hooked knives around the sphere. During the course of the 
night, a white milky liquid exuded from the interior of the 
pod and built up on the outside of it. The next day 
workers reentered the fields in order to collect the raw 
opium, now a dark brown mass because of the heat of the 
sun. The field hands repeated this process of cutting the 
capsules and collecting the opium for several days until
^Greenberg, British Trade, 9-10, 80-94.
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the plant no longer produced the liquid.^ Processing the 
substance was simple. Opium was boiled in open vats for 
several days in order to remove as much of the moisture as 
possible. Workers then took the processed opium and rolled 
it into balls. They covered these balls with poppy leaves 
and placed them into chests that held two layers of twenty 
balls each.^
The Company did not directly engage in the sale of 
opium in China because in 1792 a Chinese imperial edict 
forbade its importation. The Company felt the trade was 
too much of a risk, so during December or January it held a 
public auction in Calcutta. There, the Company sold the 
opium in lots of five chests to private speculators, who 
then hired merchants to deliver the product to China.^
These merchants, called country traders, had to obtain a 
license from the Company in order to participate in the 
legal trade in China. They brought in the opium along with 
their legitimate merchandise.^
After the Honorable Company's monopoly ended in 1833, 
the country traders continued to trade in China but without
^"Cultivation of the Poppy," Documents Relating to 
Opium, &c. (Canton: Chinese Repository, 1837), 45. 
F017/28/155.
^"The Traffic in Opium carried on with China," 
Documents Relating to Opium, 69. F017/28/167.
'^"Traffic in Opium," 69. F017/28/167.
^Greenberg, British Trade, 14-15.
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a license. The traders also could legally engage in the 
tea trade, without any competition from the East India 
Company. In order to finance this new endeavor British 
merchants increasingly turned to Anglo-American merchant 
bankers in New York and London.* Since American merchants 
engaged in the China trade continued to run a trade 
deficit, it was more efficient for them to draw a bill of 
exchange from one of the Anglo-American Houses to pay for 
Chinese merchandise than to continue to ship silver. The 
Chinese merchants in turn used the bills to purchase 
British goods--opium. These financial arrangements caused 
credit to replace bullion as the mechanism for exchange and 
linked the Canton markets to those in London and New 
York.^
Once in Chinese waters the merchants transferred the 
opium to receiving ships. The British merchants brought 
these vessels to China but the ships never left Chinese 
waters; they were floating warehouses whose only purpose 
was to house illegal goods. Local authorities knew of 
their presence, but did not have the naval capability to 
drive them away.” As a result, Chinese opium dealers
*Weng Bang Cheong, Mandarins and Merchants: Jardine 
Matheson & Co., a China Agency of the Early Nineteenth 
Century (London: Curzon Press, 1978), 228-9.
^Peter Temin, The Jacksonian Economy (New York: 
Norton, 1969), 81-82.
*Fay, Opium War, 46.
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purchased opium directly from the receiving ships, paying 
in silver.
The Chinese were responsible for transporting the 
opium on shore, which usually meant bribing a local 
official. Boats of various sizes came alongside the 
receiving ships, loaded up with opium and then took the 
illegal substance ashore. This arrangement allowed the 
country traders to claim both that they did not smuggle 
opium into China and that the Chinese officials sanctioned 
the trade.’
The private merchants felt no threat from Imperial 
authorities. They even held them in contempt by publishing 
a newspaper, called the Canton Register, that contained the 
current prices of opium, and specified the names of those 
participating in the illicit trade. Those participants 
were the same individuals and merchant houses that 
conducted the legal trade after the abolition of the East 
India Company's monopoly.
While historians have an abundance of evidence 
concerning the opium trade itself, the material needed to 
paint an accurate picture of the drug's consumption in 
early nineteenth-century China is scarce. Unlike most 
European and Middle Eastern consumers who either chewed
’select Committee on the Trade with China. Report,
1840. 72. 
10Report, 1840, 49-50, 73, 94.
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opium or mixed it with a liquid, the Chinese smoked it.
They would place a small portion of opium on the end of a
thin skewer and heat it above a lamp. Once the opium
reached the point of turning into a vapor, the addict
placed the skewer within a shallow bowl at the end of a
pipe and inhaled. This method of taking the drug greatly
increased the narcotic effect.
Neither the British nor the Chinese lacked knowledge
about the long-term consequences of using opium. Both
realized the escape it provided and the destruction of the
body that inevitably followed.
('The opium eater’) soon after having taken the 
opium perceives an unusual exhilaration and 
activity of the spirits; his imagination revels 
in luxurious images, and he enjoys a feeling of 
more than common strength and courage; but this 
pleasing intoxication soon leaves him, and in its 
stead follow laziness, disgust at all kinds of 
occupation, and a certain imbecility of the 
senses, closely bordering upon insanity. To 
avoid the duration of this insufferable state, 
opium must again be taken, thus continually 
changing between the highest excitement and the 
lowest state of despondency, the consequence of 
which is an early derangement ^f the functions of 
the body, and premature death.
Chinese descriptions of the narcotic's effects are no more
heartening.
Jonathan Spence, "Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China," 
Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Carolyn Grant eds., Conflict and 
Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), 145-50; Fay, Opium War, 8-9.
Testimony as to the effects of using opium," 
Documents Relating to Opium, 70. F017/28/167.
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When any one is long habituated to inhaling it,
[opium], it becomes necessary to resort to it at 
regular intervals, and the habit of using it, 
being inveterate, is destructive of time, 
injurious to property, and yet dear to one even 
as life. Of those who use it to great excess, 
the breath becomes feeble, the body wasted, the 
face sallow, the teeth black: the individuals 
themselves clearly see the ^ 1 1  effects of it, 
yet cannot refrain from it.
Confucian officials, courtiers, merchants and soldiers 
were the first to use the drug. Not until the 1870s did 
the habitual use of opium spread to the peasants, the vast 
majority of the Chinese population. Although the 
devitalizing effects of the drug remained relatively 
isolated in the upper echelons of Chinese society, they 
were highly visible to the Court in Peking.
As early as 2 January 1835, John Davis warned Lord 
Palmerston that a sudden increase in opium smuggling was 
taking place and that this increase might bring on the 
wrath of the Imperial government at Peking. This 
expansion occurred as a result of increased competition.
At the turn of the century territories under the East India 
Company's control provided the only source of opium. The 
Company made a sizable profit selling relatively small
"Memorial from Heu-Naetse to the Emperor, proposing 
to legalize the importation of Opium," Inclosure No. 1, 
Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, 2 February 1837, 
Correspondence, 156.
^^Spence, "Opium Smoking," 150-3.
^^Davis to Palmerston, 2 January 1835, Correspondence,
76 .
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quantities of opium by keeping prices high. In the 1820s 
this situation began to change when Indian princes, who 
were outside of the East India Company's jurisdiction, 
started growing opium and selling it at a much cheaper 
price. In order to retain its market share, the Company 
slashed prices and increased production. The urban markets 
in China seemed easily to accept this increase.
By the end of the 183 0s the country traders, the East 
India Company and the British Government had become 
dependent on an illegal trade without effective 
controls. The profits from opium paid for the tea. At 
first country traders exchanged the bullion they received 
from the Chinese for bills of remittance from the East 
India Company. The Company then used the bullion to buy 
tea, which it shipped to England. With the abolition of 
the company's monopoly, the country traders used the 
profits from selling Company opium to buy tea for 
themselves, or their clients. Once the tea reached
England, the revenue generated from the tea tariff paid one
half of the expenses of maintaining the best naval fleet in
the world.
*^Fay, Opium War, 58-59.
^^Greenberg, British Trade, 215; Morse, International 
Relations, 168.
’®Fay, Opium War, 18.
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The increase in the illicit trade occurred 
simultaneously with policy and personnel changes in the 
Chinese imperial government at Peking. In 1835 the Tao- 
kuang emperor (r.1821-1850) appointed P'an Shih-en to 
replace the recently deceased Ts'ao Chen-yung as Grand 
Councilor. This administrative change marked the 
ascendancy of a minority faction within the imperial 
bureaucracy. For the previous hundred years, the 
examination system, by which mandarins advanced in 
government, favored scholars of the k'ao-cheng school.
This branch of Confucian scholarship advocated philological 
textual studies of ancient manuscripts. By the nineteenth 
century these scholars were immersed in technical debates, 
neglecting the social and moral concerns present in 
Confucian literature. P'an used his position as Grand
For an in depth study of the school see Benjamin A. 
Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual Aspects 
of Change in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: Council on 
East Asian Studies, Harvard Univeristy Press, 1984).
°^Hao Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Intellectual 
Transition in China, 1890-1907 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), 13; Chang's first chapter provides 
an excellent introduction to the competing philosophical 
traditions within Confucianism.
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Councilor to support members of the literati* who 
preferred the T'ung ch'eng school
The T'ung ch'eng School, opposing k'ao-cheng 
scholasticism, emphasized the use of the Confucian classics 
for the moral cultivation of China's elite. If the 
examination system favored adherence to these principles, 
according to the T'ung ch'eng School, then advancing 
statesman would possess a "moral charisma" which would 
morally transform the Chinese people.Within the 
literati the Spring Purification Circle, whose members 
adhered to the T'ung ch'eng school, organized a network of 
families and friends to gain the patronage of important 
officials such as P'an. Sympathetic to this faction's 
cause, P'an appointed its members to key positions within 
the empire in order to tilt the balance within the 
bureaucracy toward the moral cultivation school.
Frightened by recent rebellions in Southeastern China 
and the military's inability to put down the rebellions, 
the Tao-kung emperor sanctioned his new Grand Councilor's
The term literati refers to the one-half percent of 
the male population who passed one of the three levels of 
the imperial examination system. Polachek, Inner Opium War, 
20 .
^^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 83.
^^Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 16-7; Polachek, Inner Opium
War, 89 
23Polachek, Inner Opium War, 63-83.
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c h a n g e s . The emperor attributed the military's failure 
to opium use and a great debate ensued about how best to 
control the importation of an article that both sides 
acknowledged as a destructive toxin. Two methods of 
dealing with the opium trade emerged out of the debate-- 
legalization and prohibition. The advocates of 
legalization considered opium an ordinary commodity. They 
posited that the best way to control and regulate its 
importation was to use the Canton system. This change 
would limit the market, which had been continuously 
expanding, and would stop the flow of silver out of the 
empire. Proponents of prohibition argued that opium 
destroyed the hearts and minds of innocent Chinese. The 
Son of Heaven should never sanction such a decadent trade. 
The only way to control the spread of the dreadful habit 
was to eliminate the supply brought to China by greedy 
barbarians. The prohibition of opium would also have the 
added benefit of eliminating the exportation of silver.
The legalization initiative found support within the 
bureaucratic establishment. Provincial governors and 
governor-generals, realizing the weakness of the Ch'ing 
state in the face of rising organized crime, believed that
^^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 114-15.
^^Captain Elliot provided Lord Palmerston with a 
series of Chinese memorials (received 17 July 1837) 
detailing the nature of the debate over opium. 
Correspondence, 153-181; Polachek, Inner Opium War, 103-19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
relaxation of restrictions on the drug provided the only
solution available without increasing the police capacity
of the state. The Spring Purification Circle emerged as
the major proponent of suppression. Its members saw the
opium trade as a symptom of a larger problem of dynastic
decline. They thought that effective management of the
barbarians in this instance would lead to greater domestic
political rewards for themselves and their cause.
Elliot began informing Lord Palmerston of the Court's
debate on 27 July 1836. He told the Foreign Minister that
the Peking authorities would choose legalization because
they "cannot do without our opium. He went on to say
that Peking's decision to regulate the trade, when it came,
would be too late to avoid an international incident. The
local authorities in Canton, after such a long period of
independence, would not tolerate interference from Peking.
[This] will lead to grave difficulties. A long 
course of impunity will beget hardihood, at last 
some gross insult will be perpetrated, that the 
Chinese authorities will be constrained to 
resent; they will be terrified and irritated, and 
probably commit some act of cruel violence that 
will make any choice but armed interference, 
impossible to our own Government.
^^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 135.
“"'Elliot to Palmerston, 27 July 1836 (received 15 
February 1837), Correspondence, 138.
^®Ibid.
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In Elliot's opinion the legalization of opium, the best 
possible short-term solution the British could hope to 
achieve, would only increase the possibility of future 
violence. Legalization would, in fact, lead to war between 
Great Britain and China by overthrowing the corrupt local 
officials and the opium smugglers too quickly.
The opium crisis began to take shape at the end of 
183 5 when the Tao-kuang emperor decided against 
legalization and for prohibition.^^ In October 1835 Teng 
T'ing-chen, Governor-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi 
provinces, commenced a crack-down on the illicit trade by 
issuing a decree ordering several foreign merchants out of 
China. Most notably, the Chinese authorities expelled 
William Jardine (called "old iron-headed rat" by the 
Chinese) and Lancelot Dent, two of the most prestigious 
British merchants and most notorious opium smugglers in 
China, along with six other merchants.^' Elliot warned 
Lord Palmerston of the seriousness of this move and asked 
for a man-of-war to proceed to China in order to protect 
British interests. Elliot also stressed the need for
^^Polachek, Inner Opium War, 125.
^Inclosure 1, Edict from the Heads of the Provincial 
Government, 28 October 1835, in Elliot to Palmerston, 7 
February 183 7, Correspondence, 183.
Jardine did not leave China until February 1839, and 
Dent remained in China throughout the crisis in March 1839. 
They repeatedly received temporary stays of Teng's order.
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regular correspondence between himself and the provincial 
authorities. He believed that if difficulties arose, he 
could place himself in his official station between the 
opium merchants and the Chinese authorities and avert an 
interruption of trade.Elliot's confidence in his own 
ability to influence the decisions of the Chinese 
authorities was unrealistic, indeed almost laughable. They 
considered him a mere "foreigner to hold the reins of 
foreigners, not a diplomatic officer who negotiates 
between equals.
Even as the local authorities increased the pressure 
on the opium trade, Elliot held to his belief that the 
legalization of opium was just around the corner.
Moreover, if the Chinese legalized the importation of 
opium, they would also legalize the growth of opium in 
their own empire. This change, Elliot claimed, would cut 
into the market share of the British. The British 
merchants must gradually begin to shift away from their 
dependence upon opium. According to Elliot, "any abrupt 
interruption of this traffic involves a very nearly
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Macao, 7 February 1837, 
F0228/5/72.
^^Inclosure 2, Extract of a Memorial from the Governor 
of Canton to the Emperor of China, in Elliot to Palmerston, 
27 January 1837, Correspondence, 152.
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complete interruption of the whole commerce with the 
country [China] .
Elliot was right only on this last point. Like Napier 
before him, he was not a very good judge of the intentions 
of the Chinese government. The situation continued to 
deteriorate. The Chinese authorities in Canton decided to 
call upon Elliot to stop the prohibited trade. In two 
decrees in August of 183 7 the provincial authorities, 
acting on the emperor's orders to suppress the opium trade, 
instructed the British Superintendent to send away all of 
the receiving ships from the China coast. The decrees also 
warned Elliot that if the smuggling of opium continued, it 
would "lead to the entire stoppage of commercial 
intercourse.
A month passed, and the receiving ships remained on 
the China coast. The Chinese provincial authorities issued 
another decree ordering the dispersal of the ships.
-i*krreoveri— the]r-atrtax*ed-^ H:inot-'-s-^ :najCtdnoirndiirectd:yi They--
noted that although Elliot claimed that he resided in 
Canton to control the British merchants, he refused to move 
against the despicable enterprise. The Chinese authorities
^^Elliot to Palmerston, 21 February 1837, 
Correspondence, 190.
^^Inclosure 1, Abstract of an Edict from the Governor 
and Lieutenant Governor of Canton, 17 August 1837, in 
Elliot to Palmerston, 18 November 1837 (received 15 May 
1838), Correspondence, 234.
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concluded that "he is unfit for the situation as 
Superintendent."^^ In the ensuing dialogue between the 
imperial officials in Canton, Captain Elliot merely bided 
for time, intensifying the crisis. Elliot told the Chinese 
that his commission only covered the legal trade at the 
port of Canton. He claimed to have no official knowledge 
of the opium trade, because the ships outside of the port 
did not present their papers to him. Elliot informed 
Governor-General Teng that he should relay a formal request 
from his Emperor to the King of England asking for 
assistance. This request would enable Elliot to respond to 
the allegations and to appeal to his Sovereign for 
advice
The Chinese officials recognized Elliot's ploy for 
what it was--a hopeless attempt to avoid responsibility. 
Governor-General Teng could not understand how Elliot could 
make an appeal to ignorance, but he decided to take Elliot 
up on his offer. Teng directed the prefect of the 
department of Canton to make a formal declaration of the 
Chinese government's intentions. Elliot notified Teng that 
the information had been transmitted to the British
^^Inclosure 1, Abstract of an Edict from the Governor 
and Lieutenant Governor, 18 September 1837, in Elliot to 
Palmerston, 18 November 1837, Correspondence, 235.
^^Inclosure 2, Elliot to the Governor of Canton, 25 
September 1837, in Elliot to Palmerston, 18 November 1837, 
Correspondence, 236-7.
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Government. Elliot claimed that he would act on his 
Government's instructions as soon as he received them.^^
Along with the Chinese decrees and his own responses, 
Elliot dispatched further alarming information to the 
Foreign Office. While the Chinese waited for Elliot's 
response, they had not sat idly by. Recognizing the role 
that the Chinese subjects played in smuggling the opium 
ashore, the authorities moved against the natives.
Burning the boats used to carry opium from the receiving 
ships, the Chinese officials successfully disrupted the 
smuggling operations. Elliot reported to Lord Palmerston 
that this disruption produced a "very hazardous change" in 
the opium trade. "European passage-boats belonging to 
British owners, slenderly manned with Lascar seamen," now 
smuggled the opium on shore. Lightly armed, these vessels 
operated side by side with the legitimate trade and 
increased the possibility of a violent confrontation 
between British merchants and the Chinese government.^®
^^Inclosure 3, Governor and Lieutenant Governor to 
Elliot, 28 September 1837, in Elliot to Palmerston, 18 
November 1837, Correspondence, 237; Inclosure 4, The 
Prefect and Commandant of Canton to Elliot, 29 September 
1837, in Elliot to Palmerston 18 November 1837, 
Correspondence, 237-4 0; Inclosure 5, Elliot to Governor of 
Canton, 17 November 1837, in Elliot to Palmerston, 18 
November 1837, Correspondence, 240.
^®Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 19 November 1837, 
F0228/6/141-43.
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The Chinese thus began a two-pronged assault on the 
opium trade--against the foreigners and against the 
Chinese. Elliot believed the situation could not be 
tolerated. He recommended that Palmerston authorize the 
dispatch of a Special Commissioner to China to negotiate a 
commercial treaty and station several ships in the seas off 
the China coast to protect the legitimate trade.
Palmerston failed to address any of Elliot's concerns. He 
had already agreed to send one naval vessel to China in 
order to protect British property, but not to extract 
commercial benefits. He commanded the ship's commander and 
crew to be very careful not to offend the Chinese. The 
ship was to protect British interests and to control the 
rowdy crews of British merchantmen. Palmerston's 
instructions were not what Elliot or the British merchants 
had in mind, but the Foreign Secretary deemed them 
adequate.
In regard to the question of opium Palmerston clearly 
articulated his position. In the only despatch mentioning 
opium and in response to Elliot's proposal to place himself 
between the merchants and the Chinese, Palmerston wrote in 
no uncertain terms :
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 19 November 1837, 
F028B/6/144-54.
^°Inclosure, Palmerston to the Lords of the Admiralty, 
20 September 1837, in Palmei^ston to Elliot, 2 NovemJcer 
1837, Correspondence, 193 -4 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
With respect to the smuggling of opium . . . Her
Majesty's Government cannot interfere for the 
purpose of enabling British subjects to violate 
the laws of the country to which they trade. Any 
loss, therefore, which such persons may suffer in 
consequence of more effectual execution of 
Chinese laws on this, must be borne by the 
parties who have brought that loss on themselves 
by their own acts.
Elliot was not in China to protect the opium merchants.
His duty was to the legitimate trade alone. Beyond this
statement Palmerston refused to venture. He declined to
give Elliot either the power to suppress the trade or
advice on how to deal with the Chinese government.
Palmerston either did not recognize the opium trade's
connections to British revenue and to international money
markets or he did not deem them as important as historians
have in hindsight.
Palmerston's response forced Elliot to follow a policy
of inaction, while the Chinese tolerance of the illicit
trade reached its limit. On 8 December 1838 Elliot wrote
to Palmerston "that the trade is at this moment cast into a
state of critical difficulty. Peking decided that the
time had come for more decisive action against the
importation of opium, and Governor-General Teng inaugurated
a policy of enforcing the existing opium laws against the
^^Palmerston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 15 June 1838, 
F0228/8/18-19.
^^Elliot to Palmerston, HM Cutter Louisa, Whampoa, 8 
December 1838, F0228/8/351; Received 18 April 1838, 
Correspondence, 323.
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foreigners importing opium into China. This strengthening 
of resolve led to the breach of Anglo-Chinese relations.
Four days later, on 12 December, the Governor- 
General 's attempt to enforce the law produced a direct 
confrontation between the foreign com.munity and the 
provincial authorities. The Chinese decided to execute a 
native opium dealer in an attempt to demonstrate the 
seriousness of the new campaign. They directed the threat 
directly toward the foreigners by ordering the execution to 
take place in front of the foreign factories at Canton.
The foreign community considered this a barbarous act and 
physically foiled the plans of the Chinese. Several 
European merchants dismantled the execution apparatus 
without any opposition from the Chinese "police" assigned 
to carry out the death penalty. After several hours the 
crowd, which had gathered to watch the spectacle, increased 
in numbers to reach almost 6,000 persons. Some of the 
foreign merchants who had grown weary of the multitude 
marched into the Chinese crowd and began swinging sticks. 
The Chinese responded by throwing stones at the Europeans, 
and the ensuing riot lasted for several hours.
Palmerston's response to Elliot's description of the 
12 December incident, although not received until the 
latter part of 183 9, should be noted. Palmerston told
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 13 December 1838,
F0228/8/355-7.
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Elliot that he did not have enough information to form an 
opinion about the matter and wanted to know if any of the 
foreigners were British subjects. More importantly, 
Palmerston wished "to know upon what alleged ground of 
right these persons considered themselves entitled to 
interfere with the arrangements made by the Chinese 
officers of justice for carrying into effect, in a Chinese 
town, the orders of their superior authorities."^^ 
Palmerston's response did not concern the actions of the 
Chinese, but the actions of the foreigners. Elliot warned 
Palmerston that the situation was degenerating, but 
Palmerston failed to take heed. Apparently, he blamed the 
breakdown of Anglo-Chinese relations on the British 
merchants rather then the Chinese government; the merchants 
would have to bear any loss in trade.
For the moment Elliot had no use for Palmerston's 
response, even had the Foreign Secretary encouraged 
stronger action against the Chinese. The Hong merchants, 
fearing reprisals from their own government, decided to 
terminate all trade until the foreigners did something 
about the opium problem. Elliot judged that it was time 
for him to act. On 17 December 1838 Elliot made his first 
public statement regarding the importation of opium. At a 
meeting of the entire foreign community, Elliot announced
^^Palmerston to Elliot, 15 April 183 9, Correspondence,
325.
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Palmerston's policy that British ships engaged in the
illicit traffic would receive no protection from Her
Majesty's Government. This declaration meant that British
merchants would be held accountable for their actions under
Chinese law--capital punishment for opium smuggling--and
that resisting arrest also would not be tolerated. He then
went further and ordered all British opium boats out of the
Canton river estuary.British merchants strongly
objected to this action because they believed that the
Chinese government would conclude that Elliot possessed the
power to order all of the opium trade stopped.Elliot
also decided on his ovm to reopen communications with the
provincial authorities. He conceded to the Chinese demands
that he use the character "pin" and that he transmit the
petition through the Hong merchants. To support his
unauthorized move, Elliot used the same arguments that
failed to convince Palmerston earlier. Now, Elliot also
claimed that the closure of trade necessitated 
47communications.
Inclosure 7, Address by Elliot to a General Meeting 
of all Foreign Residents at Canton, 17 December 1838, in 
Elliot to Palmerston, 2 January 1839, Correspondence, 331- 
2 .
^^John Slade, Narrative of the Late Proceedings and 
Events in China (Canton: Canton Press, 1839; Reprint, 
Wilmingham, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1972), 5.
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 2 January 1839, 
F0228/9/9.
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Elliot's action accomplished its immediate goal. The
Hong reopened trade, but the threat to commercial
activities did not terminate. As 1839 began, Elliot still
felt that the British merchants' behavior in China
threatened Anglo-Chinese trade relations. He asked Lord
Palmerston for "defined and adequate powers," something
Palmerston had promised in October of 1836. Elliot also
made an unusual request.
I humbly hope that Her Majesty's Government 
(taking into it's [sic] consideration the novel, 
responsible and undefined station I fill and 
casting a thought upon the embarrassing 
circumstances which have beset me) would be 
pleased to determine whether I have a claim to 
such an expression of support, as I might be 
permitted to publish to the Queen's Subjects in 
this Empire."
Such a plea for support does not illustrate a man confident 
in his own decisions or his superior's foreign policy.
Once again, Palmerston ignored Elliot's pleas and gave 
neither advice, nor powers. He simply wrote in private to 
express the "entire Approbation of Her Majesty's 
Government" regarding Elliot's actions in December.
This letter, even though it reached China after the 
opium crisis in March, demonstrates that Palmerston 
approved of Elliot's decision to take a more active role 
against the opium trade.
^^Elliot to Palmerston, Private, Canton, 2 January
1839, FO17/30/61.
’^palmei 
F0228/11/29.
rston to Elliot, Foreign Office, 13 May 1839,
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The time for Palmerston to act had come to an end.
The Emperor decided that the money-hungry barbarians must 
know the power of the Celestial Empire and that the 
decadent opium trade must end. The campaign to suppress 
the traffic had succeeded. Trade in the drug had remained 
at a standstill for the previous four months,but the 
opium merchants had not left Chinese waters. To eradicate 
the trade altogether, the Emperor appointed a special 
commissioner, Lin Tse-hsü.^^
On 10 March 1839 High Commissioner Lin, a headstrong 
civil servant and an associate of the Spring Purification 
Circle, arrived in Canton. Eight days later he issued the 
infamous edict requiring that all opium be turned over to 
him and that the foreign community guarantee the cessation 
of the opium trade. Lin reminded the foreign community of 
the generosity of the Emperor in allowing them the 
privilege of trading with the Middle Kingdom. Lately, the 
opium trade had tested the limits of that generosity and 
would no longer be tolerated. The High Commissioner gave 
the foreign community three days to comply with his 
demands. If it did so, then he would forget the
^°Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 30 January 1839, 
F017/30/240.
^Vrthur Waley's The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) is based on 
Lin's diary and contains a developed account of the 
Commissioner's activities during the crisis.
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barbarians' past abuses and allow legitimate trade to 
continue as before .
The foreign community delayed taking action. To make 
the merchants comply with Commissioner Lin's orders, the 
Hoppo, the administrator of Canton Customs, quarantined the 
whole foreign community. He surrounded the foreign 
factories with troops and refused to allow any one to 
leave, or to communicate with those outside of Canton. The 
action taken against the entire foreign community was 
thoroughly consistent with what the British knew of Chinese 
law and established precedent. From the British point of 
view, the Chinese "doctrine of responsibility made it 
necessary that someone must suffer, whether the guilty 
person or not, whenever a crime was committed.
Furthermore, Chinese law held to the principle of 
collective responsibility--the community must be held 
accountable for the actions of its members.
The Hoppo's orders caught the attention of Elliot, who 
was in Macao at the time. The Chief of the British trade 
commission decided to force his way into the foreign 
factories at Canton and to demand passports for the entire
Inclosure 1, Edict from the Imperial Commissioner 
Lin to the Foreigners of all Nations, 18 March 1839, in 
Elliot to Palmerston, 22 March 1839, Correspondence, 350-2
^^Pritchard, Crucial Years, 109.
^^ Fay, Opium War, 38.
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community. Before leaving for Canton, Elliot clothed 
himself in his dress uniform, the symbol of his authority, 
and publicly ordered the British ships in the Gulf of 
Canton to hoist "their national colours, [and] be prepared 
to resist every act of aggression on the part of the 
Chinese Government. Immediately upon his arrival in 
Canton, Elliot directed the foreign community there to 
follow a similar course. In his despatches to Lord 
Palmerston, Elliot wrote as though the world was about to 
fall in on the whole foreign community and that only his 
actions saved them from starvation and the threat of 
violence.
Elliot was wrong. He even contradicted himself in his 
letters to Lord Palmerston. It was Elliot's decision to 
place himself between the opium merchants and the Chinese 
government that inflam.ed the situation; the Hoppo, taking 
the same steps that forced Lord Napier's departure, 
increased the number of troops around the factories and cut 
off the barbarian's supplies and servants. Robert Inglis, 
who testified before the Select Committee on Trade with 
China in May of 1840, stated that the threat did not arise
Inclosure 10, Public Notice to Her Majesty's 
Subjects, 22 March 1839, in Elliot to Palmerston, 30 March 
1839 (received 29 August 1839), Correspondence, 363.
^*Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 30 March 1839 
(received 29 August 1839), F017/31/5-14.
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until after Captain Elliot arrived in Canton.William 
Jardine, who resided in China from 182 0 to 183 9, also told 
the committee that no threat to British life or property 
existed at the time Lin issued the e d i c t . T h e  merchant 
community never believed that the Chinese would carry out 
their threats ; indeed, the merchants felt certain the 
Chinese would settle for a partial solution.
What might have happened if Elliot had not arrived is 
not clear. It is clear that Elliot's actions provoked the 
Chinese to become more rigid. The Chinese believed the 
foreign community had made arrangements to cooperate, but 
the captain's intervention frustrated these plans.*'’ 
According to the Chinese, Elliot claimed he occupied a post 
of authority, but only used that post to protect the opium 
smugglersElliot's earlier appeals to impotence and 
ignorance concerning the opium trade failed to carry any 
weight. Lin continued to demand the opium.
On 27 March 1839, fearing the worst, Elliot reversed 
course and ceased standing up to the Chinese. He commanded
Report, 184 0, 8.
^^Report, 1840, 91.
*’siade. Narrative, 42-6.
’^inclosure 17, The Prefect of Canton to Elliot, 26 
March 1839, in Elliot to Palmerston, 30 March 1839, 
Correspondence, 372.
*’waley. Opium War Through Chinese Eyes, 35.
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the British opium merchants in China to hand over their 
merchandise to Lin. At first the merchants resisted 
turning over the opium, but they agreed after receiving a 
guarantee from Captain Elliot that the British Government 
would reimburse them. The merchants released to Elliot 
over £2,000,000 worth of opium. Since 1836 the British 
merchants had found it difficult to sell their commodity in 
China. As a result several thousand chests of opium 
remained unsold year after year. Elliot's offer to pay 
gave the merchants what they wanted--a market for their 
goods and the official involvement of the British 
Government in the dispute.Elliot expected that the 
pledge to deliver the opium would be enough to lift the 
restrictions, but the Chinese did not trust the barbarians. 
The quarantine continued for six weeks. As a sign of good 
faith, however, Lin "sent the foreigners a present of beef, 
mutton, and other f o o d . T h e  Imperial Commissioner also 
agreed to lift gradually the restriction as the opium came 
into his possession. On 5 May he allowed all of the 
foreigners, except sixteen notorious opium merchants, to 
leave the factories.
^^Morse, International Relations, 214-30.
^^Cheong, Manderins and Merchants, 134-5.
^^Greenberg, British Trade, 203-4.
^^ As quoted in Waley, Opium War Through Chinese Eyes,
39.
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When all of the opium had been delivered on 24 May, 
the Chinese released the remaining foreigners. The 
provincial authorities then proceeded to destroy the opium. 
They also agreed to reopen trade on the condition that the 
foreign community guarantee that the opium trade would 
cease. To guarantee cessation Lin demanded that all 
foreigners sign a bond stating that they would not import 
opium into China. Beginning in the autumn of 183 9 anyone 
caught breaking the bond would "suffer death at the hands 
of the Celestial c o u r t . E l l i o t  felt that this demand 
was unreasonable. He stated that he had no authority to 
bind future merchants without their knowledge and pleaded 
with Commissioner Lin to accept a compromise bond. The 
foreign merchants pledged themselves "not to deal in opium, 
nor to attempt to introduce it into the Chinese Empire.
The Commissioner refused to compromise. Elliot even 
proposed a five month grace period for merchants coming 
from India and a ten month grace period for merchants 
coming from England before the new law went into effect 
Lin again refused to compromise.
^^Inclosure 1, "Proposed Bond Regarding Opium," in 
Elliot to Palmerston, 6 April to 4 May 1839 (received 21 
September 1839), F017/31/144-6.
^^Inclosure 7, The Foreign Merchants to the Imperial 
Commissioner, Canton, 25 March 183 9, Elliot to Palmerston, 
Canton, 6 April to 4 May 1839, FO17/31/31/169-70.
*^Inclosure 6, Elliot to Lin, Canton, 10 April 1839, 
Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 6 April to 4 May 1839, 
FO17/31/16S-70.
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Believing that the Chinese government needed foreign 
trade, Elliot warned Lin that if he continued to demand the 
bonds, then "there would be no alternative but for the men 
and vessels of his [Elliot's] country to depart.
Elliot never carried out his threat. He did recommend a 
cessation of British trade until the matter was settled.
The merchants complied. Elliot hoped to gain protection 
against what he considered the arbitrary actions of the 
Chinese government. His actions did not produce the 
desired effects. The Chinese refused to grant British 
merchants any special protection. American, German,
Danish, and Spanish traders, who all signed Lin's bond, 
moved in to fill the vacuum created by Elliot's refusal to 
reopen British trade with China.
It is essential here to consider the reaction in 
Britain. The Opposition, not the Ministry, responded 
first. After reading a newspaper report on 1 August 1839, 
Lord Ellenborough (Edward Law), former President of the 
Board of Control, introduced the subject into Parliament 
with a question to the Prime Minister that same day. The 
most startling aspect of the question was the theme. One 
would assume that Ellenborough would have questioned the
Inclosure 12, Elliot to Lin, Canton, 20 April 1839, 
Elliot to Palmerston, Canton, 6 April to 4 May 1839, 
F017/31/182.
°^Morse, International Relations, 227-36.
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action of the Chinese authorities, but he did not. The 
lord questioned the actions of Elliot and the Government 
that he represented--the Melbourne Ministry. The Ministry 
had allowed the China trade to be almost totally dependent 
upon opium, and with the cession of the opium trade all of 
Britain's China trade was threatened, including the 
lucrative tea trade. Ellenborough concluded with a call 
for papers relating to the incident, but Melbourne, denying 
any official knowledge of the incident, declined any 
further comment.
Even without access to the documents elucidating the 
conflict in China, the conservatives began their attack on 
the Ministry. They asserted that the incompetency of the 
Ministry had lost one of Britain's most prized trading 
partners and that the Government had to be held 
responsible. The weakness of the Ministry in Commons 
amplified these charges.
’^Appendix B; Lord Ellenborough. Hansard, 3d ser., 
vol. 49 H  August 1839), cols. 1052-55.
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CHAPTER 5 
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
In 1834 Lord Grey's Government fell, and Sir Robert 
Peel formed a Ministry. The political right had not 
recovered, however, from the devastation of the Great 
Reform Act, and Peel led a minority Government.
Accordingly, his term in office was short-lived; he 
resigned in five months. The Whigs quickly regained 
control of Commons, allowing Lord Melbourne to forge a new 
Ministry. His Governemnt ruled Great Britain from 1835 to 
1841. During this extended period, the Whigs saw their 
majority in the House of Commons slowly decline. In the 
summer months of 183 9, before news from China reached Great 
Britain, the Liberal Tories joined the Ultra-Tories in 
their attacks on the Whigs. At the same time parliamentary 
Radicals, frustrated by the slow pace of reform, seized 
upon the vulnerablity of the Government and pressed their 
own agenda.^ This crisis of confidence intensified Lord
'"Resignation of the Ministry," Leeds Mercury, 11 May 
1839, p.4; "Position of the Ministry," The Guardian 
(Manchester), 27 March 1839; "Position of the Ministry.-- 
State of Public Opinion," The Guardian (Manchester), 30 
March 1839 ; Newbould, Whiggery, 231-41.
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Ellenborough's charges that Lord Melbourne's Whig Ministry 
neglected British interests in the Far East.
While Elliot tried to pacify the Chinese, the conflict 
between the Whigs and the conservative Opposition began to 
take shape. On 7 May 183 9 Lord Melbourne resigned his 
position as Prime Minister after winning a crucial vote in 
Commons by only five votes. Even though his Ministry won 
this contest, the Prime Minister felt that the vote 
indicated "with sufficient clearness and distinctness . . .
a want of confidence on the part of a great proportion of 
that House of Parliament. Melbourne believed that for a 
ministry to continue in office it must have the support of 
both the Monarch and the House of Commons; support from a 
mere majority of Members in Commons was not enough.
Writing to Queen Victoria in March, he stated that the 
Ministry "must resign" if it should carry the House of 
Commons by a "small m a j o r i t y . T h e  Prime Minister's 
views of the constitution were in line with contemporary 
theorist J.J. Park. In Dogmas of the Constitution (183 2) 
Park asserts that "It would be esteemed politically
^Lord Melbourne, "Resignation of the Ministers," House 
of Lords, Hansard, 3d ser., 46 (7 May 1839), col. 974; 
George K. Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party: A Study 
in Party Politics, 1832-1841, 2d ed. , (Hamden, CT: Archon 
Books, 1964), 417-23.
^Melbourne to Queen Victoria, South Street, 22 March 
1839, "Cabinet Reports by the Prime Minister to the Crown, 
1837-1867" (Microfilmed by Harvester Press, 1973), Reel 1.
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dishonourable and improper, if [the government] were to 
retain office after the support and adhesion of a majority 
in the House of Commons should have been unequivocally 
withdrawn from them. His resignation thus resulted less 
from mechanistic, or rational, constitutional principles 
than from aristocratic notions of the honor needed to 
command respect.
According to his own political principles then, 
Melbourne had no choice but to advise Queen Victoria, who 
was in the second year of her reign, to invite the 
conservatives under the leadership of the Duke of 
Wellington to form a ministry. The Duke declined the 
invitation, stating that the Prime Minister should sit in 
the House of Commons, the more troublesome of the two 
Houses of Parliament, and that Sir Robert Peel was a better 
choice.^ Peel accepted the offer reluctantly, because he 
did not believe the conservatives sufficiently strong. He 
almost succeeded in forming a government. In fact all of 
the plans had been made, but the Queen refused to accept 
Peel's intention to replace some of the Ladies of the 
Bedchamber with women from conservative families. Peel 
thought it would be difficult to gain the confidence of the
As Quoted in Angus Hawkins, "'Parliamentary 
Government' and Early Victorian Political Parties, c .1830- 
C.1880," English Historical Review 104 (July 1989): 641.
^Robert Peel, "Ministerial Explanations," House of 
Commons, 3d ser., 46 (13 May 1839), col. 981.
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young Queen with the wives of leading Whig politicians 
acting as Ladies of the Bedchamber.
In rejecting Peel's proposal. Queen Victoria stated 
that she liked her companions and that any attempt to 
remove them infringed on her prerogative. She considered 
Peel's request as part of a general conservative attack on 
the moral integrity of her household. Giving in to Peel's 
demand would have been tantamount to admitting that 
conservative allegations of moral misconduct were true 
Her rejection denied Peel his wish for "public proof" of 
Her Majesty's "entire support and confidence"^ and forced 
him to resign his commission. The Queen willingly turned 
back to Melbourne, who reconstructed his Ministry.
The result of the Bedchamber Crisis was that it 
appeared as if the Melbourne Ministry's position of 
authority rested outside the current constitutional system. 
The prerogative of the Queen, not the will of Commons, had 
determined who would govern Great Britain. To their 
opponents the hypocrisy of the Whig Ministry was self- 
evident. The Charter, a newspaper "established by the 
working classes," observed that "An overweening respect for
Richard Spall, "The Bedchamber Crisis and the Hasting 
Scandal: Morals, Politics, and the Press at the beginning 
of Victoria's Reign," Canadian Journal of History 22 
(December 1987): 37; For the details of the story see James 
Clark, "The Late Flora Hastings," The Charter (London), 13 
October 1839, p.587.
^Peel to Victoria, Copy, 10 May 1839, PP, GC/ME/292/l.
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prerogative was not at one time a Whig doctrine," while the 
conservative Quarterly Review wrote that the principles of 
"parliamentary government" were the "doctrines, which the 
old Whigs affected to monopolise, and which the present 
Whigs are equally zealous to repudiate.
In the House of Lords the Earl of Winchilsea (George 
William Finch-Hatton) asked Lord Melbourne to state the 
principle by which he planned to govern since the 
Bedchamber Crisis brought those principles into question. 
Melbourne replied that he was not "a very great friend to 
declarations of general principles on the part of the 
Government. He would govern as any other Government by 
the prudence, wisdom and firmness of Parliament. Such a 
broad statement brought Lord Brougham (Henry Brougham), 
former Lord Chancellor under Lord Grey and advocate of 
further reform, to his feet. He "never heard a question, 
that was more plain or more easily to be answered, if an 
answer was to be given, but he had never yet heard an 
answer that answered so little.Melbourne's statement
^"Farcical Demonstrations of the Whigs," The Charter 
(London), 26 May 1839, p.288; "The Household and the 
Ministry," Quarterly Review 64 (June 1839): 270; See also 
"Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine for June," The Northern 
Star and Leeds General Advertiser (Leeds), 22 June 1839, 
p . 4 .
^Melbourne, "The Ministry," House of Lords, Hansard, 
3d ser., vol. 46 (31 May 1839), col. 1162.
°^Lord Brougham, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (31 May 
1839), col. 1167.
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of "principles" pleased neither the Opposition nor some on 
his own side of Parliament.
The memory of the Bedchamber Crisis had not faded by 
the time Lord Ellenborough questioned the Prime Minister in 
Parliament on 1 August 183 9 regarding Captain Elliot's 
action in Canton. The crisis would be a source of constant 
irritation for the Ministry. Melbourne's position worsened 
as Peel continued to withhold his cooperation. The 
Ministry depended more than ever on the support of the 
Radicals to stay in office. The Radicals realized that 
their strength was disproportionately larger than their 
small numbers and pushed for further political reform.
Probably the most immediate problem facing the 
Melbourne Ministry and Great Britain in 183 9 was Chartism. 
The Chartist movement, composed of the disenfranchised, had 
six demands in its national petition: universal suffrage, 
vote by secret ballot, annual Parliaments, equal electoral 
districts, pay for M.P.s, and abolition of property 
qualifications for Members. The Chartists wanted the 
process begun by the Great Reform Act continued by 
extending formal political participation beyond the middle 
classes to the working classes. Chartist rhetoric
^^Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 300.
^^"Six Points," Leeds Mercury, 6 October 1838, p.4; 
Thomas Atwood, "National Petition--The Chartists," House of 
Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 47 (14 June 1839), col.
225 .
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chastised the parliamentary reformers for ending black 
slavery in the colonies, while supporting the slavery of 
freeborn Englishmen. By maintaining the status quo 
Whigs and Radicals betrayed the people and joined the 
Tories as political oppressors. While the 
conservatives provided the most vocal opposition to the 
Chartist demands, many supporters of the Government shared 
their fears. The conservatives believed that further 
revolutionary changes of the constitution would weaken the 
stability of Great Britain by giving power to the unwashed 
masses; that England would follow the same path that France 
had traversed after 1789.''^
The issue of the secret ballot, one of the six 
Chartist demands, divided the Melbourne Ministry itself.
The members decided to make the proposition an "open 
question." This decision meant that the Ministry as a 
whole did not support the ballot, but individual members of
''^ Richard Oastler, "To the People of Yorkshire, " 
Northern Star (Leeds), 4 April 1840, p.l.
Beware of the Whigs," The Charter (London), 17 
March 1839, p. 113; Feargus O'Connor, "To the Working Men 
and Women of Birmingham," Northern Star (Leeds), 20 March 
183 9, p.4; Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists (London: Temple 
Smith, 1984), 7, 40.
^^"Six Points," Leeds Mercury, 6 October 1838, p.4; 
"Six Points," Leeds Mercury, 13 October 1838, p.4; "The 
Chartists and Their Proceedings," The Guardian 
(Manchester), 4 May 1839, p.2.
The Chartist and Universal Suffrage," Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine, 46 (September 1839), 289-303.
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the Cabinet could. Conservatives charged that the move 
proved the weakness of the Ministry, demonstrated the 
disunity of the Cabinet and illustrated the Whigs' support 
for further constitutional reform. Lord Howick, Secretary 
of War, countered these charges by stating that he 
personally supported making the ballot an open question in 
order to defeat it.^  ^ Howick's candid remark caused an 
uproar among the Radicals. The Ministry had to reiterate 
that Howick expressed his personal opinion, not the opinion 
of Her Majesty's Government. The damage had been done.
Chartism represented more than a simple political 
threat to the Ministry. In the Winter of 1838/1839 the 
Chartists lost hope in the ability of the Reformed 
parliament to satify their demands and rejected appeals by 
parliamentary Radicals to petition for redress of 
grievances. The agitation before the Great Reform Act 
taught the Chartists that the threat of violence provided a 
powerful incentive for political change. The Ministry 
experienced the repercussions of this change in tactics 
when the manufacturing city of Birmingham exploded into 
open revolt on 15 July. Following ten days of unrest, the 
Chartists completely destroyed two houses, gutted several 
others and burned furniture in the streets, while the city
^^Lord Howick, "The Ballot," The House of Commons, 
Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 48 (18 June 1839), col. 500.
 ^^Thompson, Chartist, 12, 17.
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magistrates delayed calling on the military or police for 
several hours. The Duke of Wellington stated that the 
city appeared as if it had been taken by storm. When 
questioned on the events the next day, Lord Melbourne 
stated that he knew no more concerning the matter than what 
had been reported in the newspapers. He accused Wellington 
of exaggerating the effects of the riot.
The Duke of Wellington quickly challenged Melbourne's 
competence.
I am rather surprised that the noble Viscount 
should bring a charge against me of having 
indulged in exaggerated statements; but I am 
still more surprised that the noble Viscount, 
considering the station he holds, should only 
have known the state of things in Birmingham by 
the public accounts . . . .  This is ^ot the way in 
which a country should be governed.
The decision of Lord John Russell, Home Secretary and 
leader of the Whigs in Commons, to grant the city of 
Birmingham a charter contributed to some of the Ministry's 
political problems stemming from the Chartist riots. 
According to the Municipal Corporation Act of 183 5, the 
Ministry could dismantle the old oligarchical city 
governments and replace them with elective councils and
Another Serious Riot in Birmingham : Several Houses 
Gutted," The Guardian (Manchester), 17 July 1839, p.2; 
"Another Chartist Riot: Attempt to Fire Birmingham," Leeds 
Mercury, 20 July 183 9, p.4.
^°Duke of Wellington, "Riots at Birmingham," House of 
Lords," Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 49 (16 July 1839), cols. 
377-8.
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magistrates appointed by the Home Office. In the selection 
of magistrates for Birmingham, Russell had chosen several 
members of the Chartist movement. The conservatives 
attributed the delay in calling for police intervention to 
the magistrates being sympathetic to the rioters. The 
Opposition wondered how the Ministry expected the working 
classes to respect magistrates who had once called for 
public agitation.
Such an open threat to property and to social order
was bad enough, but the conservative Opposition also
accused the Ministry of undermining the moral fiber of the
nation and maligning the constitution by threatening the
Church of England through the Irish Tithe Act of 1835 and
educational reforms. The Tithe Act threatened the
financial integrity of the Church. The appropriation
clause constituted the most controversial aspect of the
bill. The clause, ultimately struck from the act, would
have allowed a district to reallocate surplus money to
secular projects if the majority of those living in the
district chose to do so. The conservatives viewed this
move as one step in a plan of total dismemberment and
22
confiscation of Church property.
^^Lord Wharncliff, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 49 (15 July
1839), col. 381.
^^G.I.T. Mac
Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 33-9, 51-4.
hin, Politics and the Churches in Great
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The conservatives' concerns about the threat to the
Church gained added strength when Russell, another pupil of 
23Dugald Stewart, announced on 12 February 183 9 the 
Government's proposal for reforming the nation's 
educational system. The Whig reform program had three main 
goals. The first reform would replace the Church's 
domination of education with a committee of the Privy 
Council, a board appointed by the Prime Minister. The 
second reform would enable the committee to distribute 
educational grants to organizations other than the Anglican 
National Society and the Dissenters' British and Foreign 
Society. The Ministry wanted to distribute educational 
grants according to the needs of the community instead of 
merely matching the funds raised by the two educational 
societies. This change, if implemented, would remove the 
need for schools to depend solely on "voluntary local 
contributions" and eliminate Anglican control of funding. 
The final goal would establish a set of Normal Schools 
(teacher training colleges) designed to standardize teacher 
education. These schools would also design a nonsectarian 
religious curriculum. The educational reforms would have
^^John Prest, Lord John Russell (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1972), 12.
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drastically reduced the role of the Church in educating the 
nation's youth.
The conservatives again accused the Ministry of 
undermining the constitution. The Church was a part of the 
state; to alter it was the same as altering England itself. 
Both the Tithe Act and the educational reforms were seen by 
the Opposition as a deliberate attempt by the Ministry to 
put its own political gain before the good of the state. 
There could be no state without the Anglican Church.^'
Vocal opposition of High Churchmen and Wesleyan Methodists 
arose throughout the kingdoms to Russell's plans and forced 
the Ministry to scale back the proposed c h a n g e . T h e  
conservatives objected to the subordination of education to 
the Privy Council. They asserted that this would make 
education a tool of party politics. When it finally 
brought the matter up for a vote in June, Melbourne's 
Government introduced the measure as a simple money bill. 
The bill would authorise the Privy council to allocate 
£30,000 as it saw fit. This parliamentary maneuver allowed
Ian Newbould, "The Whigs, the Church, and Education, 
1839," Journal of British Studies 26 (July 1987) : 332-46; 
Machin, Politics and the Churches, 64-8; Gash, Reaction and 
Reconstruction, 76.
Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 269-83.
National Education," The Guardian (Manchester), 1 
June 1839, p.2; "National Education," Leeds Mercury, 25 May 
1839.
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the Ministry to avoid a defeat in Lords since only Commons 
decided the fate of money bills.
The revised bill still pleased neither the 
conservatives nor the Radicals. Lord Stanley, former 
Colonial Secretary under Lord Grey, now sitting in 
Opposition, stated the conservative case. Objecting to the 
"unlimited and irresponsible powers" the bill gave to the 
the committee of the Privy Council, he blasted the proposal 
as "despotic." To place funds at the discretion of such a 
committee, backed by a weak Government, invited tyranny and 
partisanship.^^ To the Radicals the new plan abandoned 
real reform. It bowed to Church pressure for the 
maintenance of the "present state of ignorance throughout 
the country.Benjamin Hawes stated that one need only 
examine the rising crime rates and their correlation to 
illiteracy figures to understand the necessity for real 
educational reform. He admitted that educational reform 
threatened the old Tory constitution. Education provided 
the means to replace "that old consitution by something
^^Lord Stanley, "National Education," House of 
Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 47 (14 June 1839), col. 
232 .
^®Joseph Hume, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 47 (4 June 
1839), col. 1383; See also "National Education and Its 
Opponents," The Charter (London), 2 June 1839, p.296; 
"Education for the People," Norther Star (Leeds), 22 June 
1839, p.4.
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much better and more substantial."^^ The house voted on 
the proposal after four nights of debate. The bill passed 
by only two votes, not a very strong sign of support. Such 
an anemic showing did not bode well for the future of the 
Ministry.
Events in Ireland further reinforced fears of violent 
opposition to the established order. By the late 1830s 
Ireland faced severe economic distress. The Irish blamed 
their problems on the Act of Union of 1800 and demanded its 
repeal. Daniel O'Connell, leader of the Irish repeal 
movement in Commons, supported the Ministry on many 
controversial pieces of legislation. Conservatives 
believed O'Connell's cooperation proved that the Government 
sanctioned reversing the Act of Union and encouraging 
rebellion.
The Earl of Roden (Robert Jocelyn), a leader of the 
Protestant Orange Society, considered the Government's 
response to the violence in Ireland woefully inadequate.
He moved that the House of Lords establish a commission to 
investigate the administration of the island. The Earl 
attributed the unparalleled state of unrest in Ireland to 
an official tolerance of Ribandism, a Catholic conspiracy
^^Benjamin Hawes, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 47 (14 June 
1839), col. 289-90.
^°John 0. Ranelagh, A Short History of Ireland (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 102; Newbould, 
Whiggery and Reform, 283-98.
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designed to threaten Protestant life and property.
Although he claimed that he imputed no blame to Lord 
Normanby (Constantine Henry Phipps), Lord-Lieutenant of 
Ireland (1835-1839), Roden stated that Normanby must accept 
responsibility for the "tears of sorrow and streams of
blood that had marked the career of his vice regal
authority.
Normanby, who left his post as Lord-Lieutenant of
Ireland in February 183 9 to take on the job of Colonial
Secretary, defended his administration against what he 
considered an act of censure by demonstrating that Ireland 
in the past had seen unrest that paralleled, if not 
exceeded, the present level of violence. He went so far 
as to claim that the Ireland "was in a state of progressive 
improvement."^^ If any unrest did exist, then it arose 
from the "harsher" rule of the Tories. The upper house of 
Parliament disagreed with Normanby's assessment. It voted 
to approve the creation of the commission.
Ireland was not the only part of the Empire in a state 
of rebellion. Violence had swept across Canada and 
Jamaica. To put down the rebellions the Ministry 
maneuvered through Parliament measures which suspended the
^^Earl of Roden, "Government of Ireland," House of
Lords, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (21 March 1839), col. 956.
^^Marquess of Norm 
March 1839), col. 977.
anby, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (21
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Canadian and Jamaican constitutions.^^ Of the two
rebellions the Canadian presented a far greater threat to 
the honor of the Ministry. Palmerston considered it more 
vital to the domestic interests of the Ministry than any 
other problem overseas.
The Canadian Rebellion resulted from the demands of 
French Radicals for control over expenditures and for an 
elective upper legislative chamber in Lower Canada.
Tensions between the Radicals and the colonial Governor, 
appointed by the Colonial Office, reached their peak in the 
summer of 1837. The colonial administration attempted to 
arrest the leader of the radicals, Louis Papineau. In 
Lower Canada French radicals rose up in response to the 
tyranny, and an uprising in Upper Canada followed.The 
Melbourne Ministry responded by suspending the Canadian 
constitution and by sending a proponent of radical reform. 
Lord Durham (John George Lambton), to Canada. Durham 
viewed himself as a viceroy and acted accordingly. He 
issued a proclamation pardoning all the participants in the
Albert H. Imlah, Lord Ellenborough: A Biography of 
Edward Law, Earl of Ellenborough, Governor General of India 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), 73.
^^Palmerston to Russell, Windsor, 2 0 October 183 9,
Lord John Russell Papers. Public Record Office, Kew. 
PRO30/22/134.
^^Ged Martin, The Durham Report and British Policy: A 
Critical Essay (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1972), 11.
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rebellion except the leaders. He ordered these men 
transported to Barbados and threatened capital punishment 
if they returned.
The Ministry's response to events in Canada 
illuminates its priorities. Upon hearing news of Durham's 
proceedings, Parliament abrogated his proclamation. The 
Parliament stated that Durham had no legal authority 
outside of Canada and could not order the men to remain on 
Barbados. Feeling betrayed because the Melbourne Ministry 
did not support his decision, Durham resigned his 
commission. After returning to England at the end of 
183 8, Durham wrote his recommendations for solving the 
problems of Canada in what became known as the Durham 
Report. It called for the unification of Upper and Lower 
Canada into a single state. The Melbourne Ministry 
professed support for this plan but delayed taking action 
until 184 0.^  ^ Traditionally, historians view the report 
and the Melbourne Ministry's decision to implement it as an 
enlightened colonial policy and a conscious decision to 
improve the conditions in Canada. Historian Ged Martin 
disagrees. He concludes that domestic political concerns
Morison, "The Mission of the Earl of Durham,"
The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. 6, Canada 
and Newfoundland, eds. J. Holland Rose, et al, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1930), 290-2.
^^Morison, "Mission of the Earl of Durham," 294-5.
^^Morison, "Mission of the Earl of Durham," 299-307.
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motivated the Ministry: "The immediate concern of the 
Melbourne government, then, was not to save Canada but to 
save themselves.
Even though the Ministry considered Canada more 
important, the Jamaican rebellion also played a key role in 
its troubles. Parliament's vote on the Whig's Jamaican 
policy directly precipitated the Bedchamber Crisis. The 
trouble for the Whigs began in 1833 when the Grey Ministry 
sponsored legislation in Parliament for the abolition of 
slavery in the British West Indies. The Parliament decided 
to compensate former slave owners for their slaves by 
allocating £20,000,000 and requiring former slaves to serve 
as apprentices "for a period of four years in the case of 
domestic servants and six years in that of fieldhands.
Like the Southern planters after the United States 
Civil War, the Jamaican elite used the judicial system to 
negate the gains of emancipation. Parliament responded by 
passing the Act for the Better Government of Prisons in the 
West Indies. The Jamaican House of Assembly viewed this 
act as undue interference in its internal matters by the
^^Martin, Durham Report, 12.
^°Izahak Gross, "Parliament and the Abolition of the 
Negro Apprenticeship, 1835-1838," English Historical Review 
96 (July 1981): 560.
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Imperial Parliament and "simply refused to function.
The colonial legislature had to approve all money bills; 
otherwise the Jamaican Governor, appointed by the Colonial 
Office, could not execute the laws of the colony.
The Melbourne Ministry proposed following a course 
similar to that pursued in Canada--suspending the 
constitution. During the Parliamentary debate Peel accused 
the Ministry of bypassing the existing constitutional 
framework, and thus threatening the established order. The 
leader of the conservative Opposition stated that he had 
previously agreed to suspend the Canadian constitution, but 
now the Ministry was setting a dangerous precedent. He 
viewed the Government's Jamaican policy as a manifestation 
of a weak Government and a sign of the future demise of 
English liberty if the present Ministry should remain in 
p o w e r . T e n  Radicals voted with the conservatives, 
compelling Melbourne to resign.
'^Vhilip J. McLewin, Power and Economic Change: The 
Response to Emancipation in Jamaica and British Guiana 
1840-1865 (New York: Garland, 1987), 73.
^^Peel, "Jamaica Government Bill," House of Commons, 
Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (3 May 1839), cols. 79-5; Philip 
McLewin demonstrates the imperial historian's typical 
neglect of domestic affairs by stating that "Details of how 
the dispute was finally resolved is of less interest here 
than the conciliatory attitude the Home Government took 
toward Jamaica." Power and Economic Change, 74.
^^"Resignation of Lord Melbourne's Ministry," The 
Guardian (Manchester), 11 May 1839, p.2; "Resignation of 
Ministers," Northern Star (Leeds), 11 May 1839, p.4; "The 
'Shabbies' Adrift at Last," The Charter (London), 12 May
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Financially, according to the conservatives and the 
Radicals, the Ministry also proved incapable of managing 
the financial affairs of Britain. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer had presented a deficit budget for the past two 
years. During 1837 the deficit soared to over £2,000,000 
and only fell to £400,000 in 183 8 The Government, 
however, continued to spend money without increasing 
revenues. Thomas Spring Rice, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
blamed the deficits on extraordinary expenses related to 
the Canadian rebellion. The conservative Henry Goulburn 
pointed out that an "early application of our military 
resources" could have prevented the large expenditure ; the 
Radical Joseph Hume stated that "If the Government had 
given Canada a representative government, he was confident 
that in two months the expense of their military 
establishment there might be s a v e d . E v e n  without such 
attacks from the conservatives and Radicals, the Ministry's 
domestic and foreign policies made the prospects for a 
bright fiscal future dim.
1839, p.248.
^^Lucy Brown, The Board of Trade and the Free Trade 
Movement, 1830-1842 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 483.
^^Henry Goulburn, "The Budget--Postage Duties," House 
of Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 48 (5 July 1839), col. 
1367; Joseph Hume, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 48 (5 July 1839) 
col. 1379.
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Domestically, the conservatives accused the Ministry 
of fiscal mismanagement because of its handling of the 
Penny Post. The Penny Post gave the lower classes access 
to the postal system by creating a uniform postal rate for 
the entire United Kingdom. The plan called for a decrease 
in postal fees in order to increase volume. Proponents 
argued that the increase in volume would compensate for the 
decrease in rates and produce a surplus in the long run.
In the short run, however, they expected a deficit until 
new customers began to use the s e r v i c e . T h e  Ministry 
decided to back the proposal in order to appease the 
Radicals and to "keep the government a l i v e . T h e  postal 
bill went into effect on 10 January 184 0, but had not been 
put into the budget. The budget deficit had no hope of 
getting better. The conservatives accused the Ministry of 
putting the nation's financial security at risk for 
partisan gain.
On these domestic and colonial issues the Melbourne 
Ministry refused to accept all of the blame for the 
country's problems because Opposition and Radical members 
had played a role in helping get the controversial pieces 
of legislation through Parliament. Foreign policy was
^^"Uniform Penny Postage," House of Commons, Hansard, 
3d ser., vol. 49 (12 July 1839), cols. 277-308; Howard 
Robinson, The British Post Office: A History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1948), 244-302.
^^Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 3 00.
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another matter. The Ministry's almost exclusive control 
over foreign policy left the Government wide open for 
attack. Additionally, commerce, the central concern of the 
industrial and commercial capitalists, greatly depended on 
British foreign policy for safe and secure markets. If 
foreign commerce was threatened, then the Ministry could be 
held directly responsible and risked losing the support of 
the Radicals and their constituencies--the new urban- 
industrial centers
Commerce was threatened in three areas. The first 
threat occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. In 1838 the French 
had imposed a naval blockade on Mexico,an act 
endangering British investment. Since Mexican 
independence, British merchants had been buying Mexican 
government bonds. The blockade hindered the Mexican 
government's ability to pay them off. This act was a 
direct threat to British interests, yet the Ministry chose 
to do nothing. Palmerston had proposed sending a naval 
force to Mexico in order "to induce the French to negotiate
^®Greenberg argues in British Trade and the Opening of 
China 1800-42 that pressure from the British manufacturing 
interest forced the government to take decisive action.
^^Nancy Barker, The French Experience in Mexico, 1821- 
1861: A History of Constant Misunderstanding (Chapel Hill; 
University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 53-88.
^°Robert Lacrete, Great Britain and Mexico in the Age 
of Juarez, 1854-1876 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 
1975), 1-27.
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with the Mexicans before they begin hostilities."^^ 
Palmerston's inducement included placing a British squadron 
between the Mexican castle at San Juan d'Ulua and the 
French fleet. Melbourne refused to approve such a bold 
move which risked a European war and ordered Palmerston to 
pursue a more conciliatory policy toward France.
French intervention in Mexico caused another point of 
contention between the British and the French. On 27 
November 1838 a French man-of-war stopped a British 
merchant vessel by shooting across its bow. The French 
commander boarded the British vessel and forcibly removed 
the Mexican pilot who was under the protection of the 
British flag.^" The conservatives considered this act an 
"Insult to the Flag." The French later publicly 
apologized, claiming they had made a mistake. The apology 
did not pacify the Opposition. They felt that the Ministry 
had failed to protect British commerce by not taking 
decisive action. Lord Palmerston responded by stating that
^^Palmerston to Melbourne, Windsor, 14 September 183 8, 
PP, GC/ME/531/1.
^^Iwan Wyn Morgan, "Anglo-French Confrontation and 
Cooperation in Spanish America, 1836-1848" (Ph.D. diss. 
University of London, 1975), 102.
^^Lt. Croke to Capt. H. Plumridge, Copy, 9 March 183 9, 
Enclosed in Minto to Palmerston, Admiralty, 15 March 1839, 
PP, GC/Ml/378 enc 1.
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he was "satisfied" with the apology; the Opposition and the 
commercial interests were far from satisfied.
The French also closed the port of Buenos Aires to 
British trade. The closure represented an extraordinary 
turn of events. During the three decades following the 
separation of the viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata from Spain 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, British trade 
grew until it dominated the region. In return for formal 
recognition of independence, Argentina guaranteed British 
commercial supremacy by treaty in 1825. The treaty 
acknowledged the rights of the British merchants in 
Argentina and insured that the merchants would not be 
drafted into the service of Argentina's military.
Britain's privileged position was threatened when the 
Government of Argentina drafted French merchants into its 
military service. The Argentines claimed that after a 
foreigner resided in their country for three years, he 
automatically became an Argentine citizen, susceptible to
Insult to the British Flag," House of Lords, 
Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 45 (21 February 1839), cols. 700-3; 
"Insult to the British Flag, House of Commons, Hansard, 3d 
ser., vol. 45 (25 February 1839), cols. 844-6; "Insult to 
the Flag," House of Lords, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 46 (8 
March 1839), cols. 132-45; Morgan, "Anglo-French 
Confrotation and Cooperation in Spanish America," 114.
^^John Cady, Foreign Intervention in the Rio De La 
Plata, 1838-50 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1929), 17-18.
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the draft. As a result of Argentina's actions, France 
imposed a naval blockade on Buenos Aires on 28 March 1838. 
It hoped to gain the same privileges which had been granted 
to Great Britain.
British merchants called for action. They wanted the 
Melbourne Ministry to protect their interests abroad from a 
wanton attack by the French on their supremacy in Spanish 
America. Although the blockade had little effect, at 
the time the prospects for continued prosperity appeared 
bleak. In 1839 Sir Woodbine Parish, former British Chargé 
d'affaires at Buenos Aires, believed that the French 
blockade fell heaviest "upon those neutral parties who have 
established an extensive commercial intercourse" with 
Argentina. The "calamitous consequences" of the 
hostilities would be "difficult to estimate.
The British Government did nothing. Palmerston chose 
not to take forceful action in the face of considerable
"Memorandum: Quarrel between France and Buenos 
Ayres," 2 March 1839,"The Papers of William Lamb, second 
Viscount Melbourne," EP Microfilm Limited, 1975. Manuscript 
Collection. British Library, London (Hereafter cited as 
Lamb Papers). M859/4: Box 81/36; Morgan, "Anglo-French 
Confrontation and Cooperation," 126-7.
^^Morgan, "Anglo-French Confrontation and 
Cooperation," 98.
^^Henry S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the 
Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 243.
’^woodbine Parish, Buenos Ayres, and the Provinces of 
the Rio de la Plata; Their Present State, Trade, and Debt 
(London : John Murray, 1839), 388-9.
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opposition from British commercial interests. He 
recognized France's right to protect its citizens abroad, 
even though he questioned the use of military force to gain 
commercial privileges. Once again, British commercial 
interests perceived a direct threat; the Ministry failed to 
act.
In all of these cases Palmerston and the Melbourne 
Ministry consciously chose not to take forceful action.
One must ask why. The answer lay in the Middle East: 
during the 1830s Russian expansion and Mehemet Ali's 
rebellion in Egypt threatened the stability of the Ottoman 
Empire, more importantly, Britain's life line to India. 
Great Britain needed France's help to off-set Russian 
aggression and to control Mehemet's rebellion, which had 
provided Czar Nicholas I with an opportunity to extend 
Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire.*^ The details of 
what happened in the Levant not only help to explain 
Palmerston's policy in Spanish America but also why he had 
so little time for Anglo-Chinese relations.
In 1832 Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt (1805-1849), 
tried to break away from his Ottoman master, Sultan Mahmud 
II (1808-1839). The Pasha ordered his son, Ibrahim, to
*°Cady, Foreign Intervention, 22-55, 62; "Memorial: 
Quarrel between France and Buenos Ayres," 2 March 1839, 
Lamb Papers, M859/4 Box 81/36.
^^Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of 
the Entente Cordial (London: Athlone Press, 1974), 9.
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attack Syria. The successes of Ibrahim's army forced the 
"Sick Man of Europe" to turn to Russia for help. The two 
eastern powers reached an agreement and signed the Treaty 
of Unkiar Skelessi (1833), in which the Czar agreed to 
defend the Sultan in exchange for Russian control over the 
Turkish straits in times of war. The Russo-Ottoman 
alliance successfully stopped Ibrahim's advance, but it 
could not defeat the Egyptian army. The peace of Kutuhia 
provided a compromise. The Sultan allowed Ibrahim to 
remain governor of Syria. In return Ibrahim agreed to pay 
an annual tribute. Mehemet gained control of Syria through 
his son while he recognized the overlordship of the Sultan. 
Such an arrangement did not sit well with the British 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston. Russian influence 
increased at the Ottoman court, and a rebellious ruler 
controlled British access to India
Events in the Levant took a more settled course until 
May 1838. Mehemet Ali once again struck out against 
Mahmud; this time the Pasha formally declared his 
independence. Ibrahim responded to his father's 
declaration by provoking a fight with the Sultan.
Ibrahim's army repeated its previous victories and closed 
the noose around Mahmud's neck. Palmerston hoped France
^^Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of 
Muhammad Ali (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
222-31.
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would join with Great Britain to stop Egyptian expansion. 
Adolphe Theirs, Louis Philippe's Foreign Minister, rejected 
Palmerston's offer. "Mehemet employed French officers and 
technical experts, and France regarded her influence over 
Egypt as a valuable counterpoise to British dominance in 
the eastern Mediterranean.
When Sultan Mahmud tried to subdue his rebellious 
subject in 183 9, the Ottoman emperor failed to restore 
order and lost the Turkish fleet in a mutiny. The threat 
of Russian intervention seemed real. Without French 
support Palmerston had to convince the other great powers 
to act in concert, rather than unilaterally. The task of 
coordinating such an alliance took the whole year. Until 
the Russians agreed, Palmerston could not insult the 
F r e n c h . I f  Palmerston took aggressive action in Mexico 
or Buenos Aires, then he risked cutting off Britain from 
its most prized colony--India. No Ministry could risk such 
an embarrassment.
Compared to events in Mexico and Buenos Aires, the 
opium crisis, the third and most recent threat to British 
trade, occurred in relative isolation. The Opposition 
considered Commissioner Lin's decision to stop all British
*^Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the 
Entente Cordialle, 18; Marsot, Egypt, 238-45.
^^Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the 
Entente Cordial, 1-19.
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trade, including tea, as a fait accompli. The
conservatives used Captain Elliot's handling of the
situation as evidence of the incompetence of the Ministry.
The Government declined to discuss the situation until the
papers relating to China were laid on the table. The
request for papers began with Ellenborough's question in
August 183 9 and continued during the month of January.
Palmerston delayed producing the papers by claiming that
the sheer magnitude of the correspondence was overwhelming
his staff; the Foreign Secretary did not produce the papers
until March 1840 (Correspondence Relating to China).
On 23 August 1839 Lord Lyndhurst (John Singleton
Copely), an Ultra-Tory leader in the House of Lords,
decided that before the session of Parliament concluded, he
wanted to review the Government's policies. He asserted
that the Melbourne Ministry failed in its responsibilities
to the nation because it could not get Parliament to pass
any significant piece of legislation. The Ministry also
had to take responsibility for the Chartist-inspired unrest
in the Northern parts of the country.
It was they who first roused the people--they 
first excited and stimulated them to acts of 
tumult and disorder--they first sent forth the 
watchword, "Agitate, agitate, agitate!" . . .
Agitation was convenient to raise them to power.
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and they were willing to keep up as much^pf it as 
was necessary to maintain them in power.
Lyndhurst's charges summarized six years of conservative
accusations.
Melbourne responded with his usual lackluster
performance. He charged Lyndhurst with fostering
discontent by questioning the authority of Her Majesty's
Government and with degrading it in the eyes of Parliament
and the public. As to the Ultra-Tory's charge that the
Government could not legislate, Melbourne stated that
the passing bills and making laws is only a 
subsidiary and incidental duty of Parliament; the 
principal duty of Parliament is to consider the 
estimates for the public service, to retrench 
what is superfluous ; to correct what is amiss, 
and to assist the Crown with those supplies and 
subsidies which it thinks it right and necessary 
to afford.
Judging the Ministry on these principles, Melbourne stated 
that the Government served the country well. The people 
"were roused, if roused they were, by the imprudent and 
obstinate resistance to the redress of grievances which was 
given by the noble and learned Lord [Lyndhurst] and those 
who acted with him.
^Lyndhurst, "Business of the Session," House of 
Lords, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 50 (23 August 1839), col. 
515 .
‘^‘^Melbourne, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 50 (23 August 
1839), col. 518.
'^^Melbourne, Hansard, 3d ser. , vol. 50 (23 August 
1839), col. 527-8.
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Lord Brougham rose again to deliver a blow to 
Melbourne's Government from the Ministerial benches. The 
noble lord wished to know how the Prime Minister could 
charge that Lyndhurst wanted to push the reputation of the 
Government lower when it already reached the lowest depth 
of degradation. The Ministry had reached such a point 
because it was "of an obstructive nature rather than a 
party of movement. To this charge Melbourne cried "No, 
no," but Brougham continued his assault. The Tories could 
not have hoped for better policies from Lord Melbourne if 
he were the viceroy of the Duke of Wellington. Brougham 
claimed that blaming the Reform Act for the country's 
problems, as the conservatives did, distorted the truth.
The Act acted as a safety-valve for social pressures, but 
the machine needed competent operators in order to function 
properly. At present the "Parliamentary business of the 
country was intrusted to the hands of men utterly imbecile 
and incapable of doing it. He concluded that the 
Ministry could only solve its problems by sponsoring 
legislation that adhered to the principles of reform.
The nature of the House of Lords' debate exemplified 
the problems the Melbourne Ministry faced since the
*^ ®Brougham, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 50 (23 August
1839), col. 532.
'^^ Brougham, 
1839), col. 536
’^Brougha Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 50 (23 August
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Bedchamber Crisis: "In Reforms they went too far for the 
Tories, and not far enough for the Radicals. . . . They
held the a medium between opposite e x t r e m e s . T h e  
crisis of confidence forced the Whigs to consider the 
political ramifications of policy decisions before they 
acted. Without the support of the conservatives, the 
Radicals, a minority faction, held the balance of power.
The political tempest tested the Ministry's ability to walk 
an "impossible tightrope. In this tense political 
atmosphere the Ministry met to decide on a China policy, a 
matter of immense interest to the Radicals and their 
supporters.
Résignâtion of the Ministry," Leeds Mercury, 11 May
1839, p.4. 
71Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 246.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE DECISION TO WAGE WAR
The Opposition's threat to the survival of the Whig 
Ministry was serious. The time for exploring policy 
options had ended; the time for action had arrived. Lord 
Melbourne's Government clearly stood poised on the 
defensive on a multitude of issues. It could not afford to 
sit idly by as it had in Mexico and Buenos Aires; the 
Ministers needed to react to the situation. Because of 
China's isolation from other British interests and the 
"outrageous" actions of Commissioner Lin, the opium crisis 
presented the best opportunity to act forcibly without 
putting other foreign policy concerns at risk. Most 
historical interpretations of the Opium War, by ignoring 
the details of the Cabinet's decision to wage war on China, 
assume that war was a foregone conclusion.^ This 
proposition is far from the truth. Melbourne's Cabinet 
waited several months before deciding upon the proper
Owen, British Opium Policy, 168; Collis, Foreign Mud, 
256; Greenberg, British Trade, Ch. 7; Chang, Commissioner 
Lin, 194; Chung, China and the Brave New World, 205;
Graham, China Station, x; Polachek, Inner Opium War, 102; 
Only Peter Fay {Opium War, 192-5) and Kenneth Bourne 
{Palmerston, 587) provide accurate details of the decision.
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response; several ministers doubted the wisdom of waging 
war; and one had no interest at all in the details of China 
question. The Government's domestic political interests 
were central to the decision-making process.
Official despatches concerning the March opium crisis 
reached the Foreign Office on 29 August 183 9,^  and the 
Cabinet began debating the matter in September. News of 
Elliot's promise to pay for £2,000,000 worth of opium could 
not have come at a more inopportune time. During the 
summer of 183 9, Palmerston had learned that his 
reorganization of the trade commission three years earlier 
was legally questionable and that certain "parties at 
Canton" intended to challenge Elliot's authority. In 1836 
the Foreign Secretary had appointed Elliot to the post of 
Chief of the Commission rather than to the post of Chief 
Superintendent of Trade, as required by act of 
Parliament
No direct evidence of Palmerston's immediate reaction 
to the March opium crisis exists, but John Cam Hobhouse, 
Palmerston's "most consistent" ally in the Cabinet,^ did 
make his feelings known. Hobhouse, President of the Board
^Elliot to Palmerston, 30 March, 1839, Correspondence,
355 .
^"Memorandum," 8 July 1839, Foreign Office, Supplement 
to General Correspondence, Public Record Office, Kew, 
F097/96.
^Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 40.
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of Control, quickly recognized the political implications 
of the opium question. Early in September he wrote to Lord 
Auckland, Governor General of India, explaining 
Ellenborough's intent to hold the Ministry responsible for 
the detrimental effect of the opium crisis on India. As 
for a future course of action, Hobhouse was at a loss. He 
did not believe the British had the resources to send an 
army from India to China.^
At the time of the opium crisis Auckland confronted a 
major threat to Indian security on the territory's 
northwestern frontier. Four men struggled for power in 
Central Asia : Runjeet Singh, Maharajah of Lahore, Punjab 
(1799-1839); Dost Mohommed, Emir of Afghanistan (1826-1839, 
1842-63); Shah Shuja (or Shja-ul-Mulk), King of Afghanistan 
(r.1803-1809, r. 1839-1842); and Muhammad, Shah of Persia 
(1834-1848). This struggle put the overland trade route 
between Europe and India in jeopardy. Czar Nicholas I's 
attempts to extend Russian influence into Central Asia 
further complicated the situation. He instructed his 
representatives in the region to use the local disputes to 
Russia's advantage. As early as 1828 the Duke of 
Wellington, then Prime Minister, realized the threat and 
instructed British officials in India to find a way to 
extend British influence beyond the Indus River. From the
^John Cam Hobhouse to Lord Auckland, India Board, 3 
September 1839, Letter Books, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/182.
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British perspective the Czar's efforts succeeded in the 
summer of 183 7 when the Shah of Persia invaded Afghanistan 
with the help of Russian military and political advisors.* 
Palmerston and Hobhouse collaborated to solve the 
Central Asian problem. Palmerston worked through the 
British minister in Tehran, Sir John McNeil, while Hobhouse 
advised Lord Auckland. Both McNeil and Auckland had the 
trust of their superiors. They conducted the British 
empire's distant affairs with a considerable degree of 
freedom yet still could not set policies without the 
approval of the Cabinet in London.^
As the Persian advance reached Herat, Afghanistan, 
British concerns intensified. The Czar had offered Dost 
Mohommed protection from the Persians. The British also 
heard rumors that the Czar had plans to march on Khiva and 
Bokhara. In May 1839 Palmerston told McNeil to issue an 
ultimatum to the Shah; if the Persians did not stop the 
invasion, then Britain would break off relations and take 
steps to protect its possessions. Auckland also took steps 
to thwart Russian and Persian influence in Afghanistan. He 
arranged a triple alliance with Runjeet Singh and Shah
*J.A. Norris, The First Afghan War, 1838-1842 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 37, 118,
^Norris, First Afghan War, 87.
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Shuja in order to overthrow Dost Mohommed and to place Shah
Shuja back on the throne in Kabul.^
The Persian failure to take Herat brought the invasion 
to a halt and forced the Russian Foreign Minister in London 
to denounce the actions of his emperor's representatives in 
Central Asia. These events had little effect on British
policy in the region. Neither Palmerston nor Hobhouse
believed that British India could be protected until 
Afghanistan was secure. They convinced the Cabinet to 
sanction the joint venture Auckland had arranged. For his 
part Auckland issued the Simla Manifesto on 1 October 1838; 
it publicly turned the quarrel into one among local rulers, 
rather than a European contest. He left out any references 
to the Russians in order to keep peace in Europe.^
The British-led expedition to restore Shah Shuja to 
the Afghan throne began in the spring of 1839 (just as 
troubles began in China). Auckland had his hands full in 
Central Asia. No British or Company army had ever 
proceeded past the Indus. The petty chieftains who 
controlled the territory did not welcome the huge army and 
refused to supply it with provisions. As British supplies 
ran low, the troops reached the point of mutiny. British 
generals avoided a disaster by taking the city of Kandaher
^Norris, First Afghan War, 160-9. 
^Norris, First Afghan War, 215-21.
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along with its rich agricultural regions. After the 
success at Kandaher, the expedition quickly moved into 
Afghanistan. On 23 July it seized the fortress of Ghazni 
after a one night siege and then took Kabul without a fight 
on 7 August. Dost Mohommed fled for his life. News of 
this easy success reached London at the end of October 
1839.’°
The threat to British India demanded Palmerston's and 
Hobhouse's full attention. Defeat in Central Asia would 
mean giving more political ammunition to the conservatives. 
In January 183 9 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, whose 
founder, William Blackwood, was an "uncompromising 
Tory,attacked Lord Auckland as "lamentably deficient 
in the powers which should enable him to grapple with so 
momentous a c r i s i s . T o  place Shah Shuja, an unpopular 
ruler, on the throne of Afghanistan required constant 
supervision and skilled leadership. If the British failed 
in their chosen mission, then they would create a more 
serious crisis. Dost Mohommed would march back into Kabul 
under the protection of the Russian Czar.
^°Norris, First Afghan War, 264-7, 289-99.
^Maurice Milne, "The 'Veiled Editor' Unveiled,
William Blackwood and His Magazine," Publishing History 16 
(1984): 101.
^^"Persia, Afghanistan and India," Blackwood's 45 
(January 1839): 105.
Persia, Afghanistan, and India," 101.
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Even after Auckland's initial success became known to 
the British public, Blackwood's continued its assault on 
the Melbourne Ministry's India policy. By crossing the 
easily defensible Indus river, a "natural frontier," the 
Ministry had opened the only invasion route into India, 
leaving the valuable territory unprotected. A contributor 
to the magazine wrote "So low had the reputation of the 
British name sunk in the East, that even the Chinese, the 
most unwarlike and least precipitate of the Asiatic 
empires, had ventured to offer a single injury to the 
British name, and insult to the British name. Russia 
surely knew of India's vulnerability and would take 
advantage of the situation.
Hobhouse sympathized with Lord Auckland's position; to 
divert men, ships and supplies from India to China at the 
beginning of September would certainly have jeopardized the 
Afghan expedition. As the month progressed, Hobhouse's 
opinion began to change and the Cabinet's new China policy 
emerged. The Cabinet was "embarrassed by the conduct of 
the Chinese," and Hobhouse came to believe that some show 
of force would be necessary. The force, however, should
The Afghanistan Expedition," Blackwood's, 47 
(February 1840): 247.
^^Hobhouse to Auckland, India Board, 16 September 
1839, Letter Books, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/184.
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be to relieve Elliot and to restore British honor, not to 
protect the opium trade.
On 22 September 183 9 Hobhouse wrote to Auckland, 
"Doubtless, you must give up the cultivation of the poppy, 
and substitute an unprofitable export duty for your present 
m o n o p o l y . H i s  letter was not mere idle chatter between 
politicians. In January 1840 Hobhouse formed definite 
plans to cut the links between the Indian Government and 
its opium monopoly. He pressed his policy on the Chairs of 
the East India Company over their objections. The 
Ministry could not afford to tolerate the Company's opium 
monopoly any longer. Some of the Whig's most strident 
supporters denounced the Government's participation in the 
drug trade as immoral. The Leeds Mercury, a newspaper that 
defended the Whigs against the attacks of both the Radicals 
and the conservatives, lashed out at the East India Company 
and the British merchants in Canton for pushing the toxin 
upon the Chinese population : "There is no slavery on earth 
to name with the bondage into which Opium casts its 
victims.
^%obhouse to Auckland, India Board, 22 September 
1839, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/l89.
''^ Hobhouse to Chairs of the East India Company, Draft, 
India House, May 1840, 010, Mss.Eur.213/50.
’^ "British Opium Trade with China," Leeds Mercury, 7 
September 183 9, p.3.
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While Hobhouse dealt with the East India Company 
representatives and with Lord Auckland, Palmerston faced 
the British commercial community. Its members demanded to 
know if the Government would honor Elliot's promise to pay 
for the opium. They insisted on vigorous measures. One of 
several groups to whom Palmerston granted a personal 
audience was Jardine, Matheson & Co. The company had a 
considerable interest in the formation of the Government's 
new China policy. After Elliot's pledge to pay for the 
opium, the company's agents handed over to Elliot in one 
day 7,341 chests of opium--almost one half of the total 
amount surrendered to Lin.’’ At the meeting with the 
Foreign Secretary, Jardine himself and the company's agent, 
John Abel Smith, M.P., explained their views, which 
differed little from the rest of the British merchants and 
industrialists interested in the China trade.
Palmerston assured them that the Government would respond 
appropriately. A number of merchants were not so easily 
reassured. They threatened to make their case public.
Smith tried to discourage such talk because of his 
conversation with Palmerston and because the M.P. felt that
Jardine, Matheson to Elliot, 27 May 1839 (In a 
bundle marked "original opium claims"). Foreign Office, 
Embassy and Consular Archives : China, Superintendent of 
Trade, Records, Public Record Office, Kew. F0677/5/214-6.
^°Palmerston to Melbourne, note, 26 August 1839, Lamb 
Papers, M859/6 Box 12/15.
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an open debate would hurt the Ministry. The episode
increased the political pressure on Melbourne's Government.
After Palmerston's conversations with the commercial 
and industrial communities that had vital interests in 
China, he laid out the Ministry's options to Melbourne in a 
matter-of-fact letter. He guided the Prime Minster from 
the least popular to the most acceptable policy. The 
Government could reject responsibility for Elliot's 
actions, but then what would become of the merchants? 
Alternatively, the Government could accept responsibility, 
but then would it ask Parliament for the money needed to 
pay for the opium or demand it from the Chinese? Once the 
Government made the demand for compensation, would it also 
seek to put the China trade on a more secure footing by 
demanding a treaty? Palmerston also suggested that the 
most effective means of carrying out such a policy would be 
to blockade the Chinese coastal trade in grain and salt.
He painted a rosy scenario : "No very large naval force 
would be required for these p u r p o s e s . I n  this note to 
Melbourne, Palmerston laid out his strategy for making the 
best out of Capt. Elliot's unauthorized action, thus 
averting another clash with the Radicals.
^^Smith to Palmerston, Belgrave Square, 18 September 
1839, F017/35/68-9.
^^Palmerston to Melbourne, note, 23 September 183 9, 
Lamb Papers, M859/6 Box 12/13.
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During the Parliamentary recess the Ministry also had 
to deal with several other issues besides the opium crisis. 
One of the more immediate domestic problems was the 
reorganization of the Cabinet in the face of Radical and 
conservative threats. Hoping that personnel changes would 
aid the passage of legislation, Melbourne allowed Russell 
and Lord Normanby to exchange their positions in the Home 
and Colonial Offices. Howick, son of Lord Grey, responded 
to the shift by resigning his position as Secretary of 
State for War. He thought Normanby's transfer to the Home 
Office represented a shift toward the Radicals. Howick's 
loss created the perception that conservative Whigs wanted 
to distance themselves from Melbourne's ailing Ministry. 
Melbourne called upon the extremely popular Thomas Macaulay 
to solidify the Cabinet's support in Commons. Recently 
elected as a representative for Manchester, his popularity 
rested on the controversial question of the ballot. In the 
past summer's debate on the issue Macaulay had stated his 
belief that Parliament should institute this mechanism for 
Parliamentary elections. His elevation to the War Office 
signaled a growing dependence on Radical support.His 
appointment did nothing to stop conservative accusations 
that the aristocratic Ministry was really a "Radical" wolf 
in sheep's clothing.
^^Newbould, Whiggery and Reform, 248-52.
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In the area of foreign policy, events in the Levant 
held center stage and pushed the China question to the 
side. The Melbourne Government had to decide on a strategy 
for dealing with Mehemet Ali's rebellion. Palmerston told 
Melbourne that "the Turkish Question is one of more 
extensive Interest & Importance to England than any other 
Question . . . and no administration would be able to stand
the Blame . . .  if by neglect or indifference" it allowed 
France and Russia to extend their influence unchecked. 
Palmerston received an unexpected break in September.
Baron Brunnow, Russian envoy to London, informed the 
British Foreign Secretary of Czar Nicholas's proposal to 
issue a joint declaration with Britain, Austria, Prussia 
and France. The declaration would state that the great 
powers saw the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as 
essential to the European balance. Mehemet All and his 
heirs could keep Egypt, but not Syria. The great powers 
would meet any further expansion with vigorous measures.
The Cabinet then met at Windsor Castle on 3 0 September 
to consider the Czar's proposal. Palmerston told the 
Cabinet that in return for a favorable British response, 
the Czar would allow the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to
^^Palmerston to Melbourne, 5 December 183 9, PP, 
GC/ME/329.
^^Hobhouse, 15 September 183 9, Diary,
Add.Mss.56561/139; Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 
647-652 .
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expire: the Russian threat to the Turkish straits would 
come to an end. Melbourne thought Mehemet All should be 
allowed to keep Syria, but Palmerston, Hobhouse and Russell 
protested. A strong Mehemet All would continue to threaten 
the stability of the Ottoman Empire and British trade 
routes. The Cabinet met late into the evening and finally 
reached a tentative decision. It agreed to the Czar's 
proposal in principle but wanted further discussions 
concerning its implementation.^*
After the previous day's grueling session, the Cabinet 
reconvened on 1 October 183 9 to decide on a China 
policy.Palmerston described recent events in China and 
explained his plans for disrupting the grain and salt 
trade. He believed that a "small squadron of one line of 
battle ship, two frigates & some small armed vessels with 
two or three steamers might blockade the whole coast of 
China from the river of Pekin [sic] down to the Canton 
c o a s t . H o b h o u s e  expressed concern that such an 
expedition would fail. He reminded the Cabinet of 
Staunton's objections to the use of force three years 
earlier. Staunton had argued that an expedition to extract
^*Hobhouse, 3 0 September 183 9, Diary,
Add.Mss.56551/140; Bourne, Palmerston, 581-3.
^^Hobhouse, 1 October 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.6561/144-6 ; 
Fay, Opium War, 192-95; Bourne, Palmerston, 589-90.
^^Hobhouse, 1 October 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.56561/144.
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commercial privileges would insult the British flag and 
alienate the Chinese government and people. The 
President of the Board of Control also read a letter from 
Lord Auckland stating that he had no forces available for 
hostilities with China. Melbourne then voiced his doubts 
about the success of Palmerston's proposed expedition.
The rest of the discussion centered on two issues--the 
Chinese government's use of force and Elliot's promise to 
pay for the opium. The circumstances of Elliot's 
capitulation to Lin's demands posed a dilemma for the 
Ministry. The Government felt obligated to compensate the 
British merchants for their loss of property, the euphemism 
used to refer to the opium, but the question of the source 
of funds remained unresolved. Melbourne instantly opposed 
using public funds to pay for the drug. The Chancellor of 
the Exchequer did not have the money, and the House of 
Commons would not consent to appropriate the necessary 
resources. Henry Labouchere, President of the Board of 
Trade, suggested that the East India Company pay.
Palmerston and Thomas Macaulay, who argued "with his usual 
volubility and eagerness," thought the Chinese should pay. 
The Cabinet members finally agreed; they decided that the
taunt on, Remarks on the British Relations with
China, 28.
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Chinese themselves should come up with the m o n e y . T h i s  
decision meant war.
It would have been difficult for the Cabinet to rebut 
Macaulay's enthusiastic argument. Melbourne had brought 
the representative from Manchester into the Cabinet in 
order to bolster the popularity of the Government.
Rejecting his reasoning would have diminished Macaulay's 
influence among other Radical M.P.s, defeating the purpose 
of bringing him into the Cabinet. Radical M.P.s were the 
most vocal proponents of a more aggressive policy towards 
C h i n a . T h e i r  constituencies in Manchester, Liverpool 
and Glasgow believed that an unprotected China trade 
remained limited; a protected China trade would provide the 
largest market in the world. Some British manufacturers 
and merchants eagerly anticipated an opportunity to sell 
their goods in China after the war.
By the end of the 1 October meeting the Cabinet had 
decided to send a squadron to China and agreed that
^°Hobhouse, 1 October 183 9, Diary, Add.Mss.55561/145; 
Fay, Opium War, 193.
^^Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: 
Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and 
Imperialism, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), 152-4.
"Trade with China," Manchester Guardian, 9 October 
1839, p.2; "The Dispute with China," Manchester Guardian, 
16 October 1839, p.2; "Differences with China," Manchester 
Guardian, 30 November 1839, p.2; "Relations with China," 
Manchester Guardian, 23 November 183 9, p. 2; Greenberg, 
British Trade, 193-5.
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Palmerston should draw up instructions for the campaign. 
Before the meeting broke up, Hobhouse leaned over and told 
Macaulay
his two first Cabinets had done some work--i.e. 
resolved upon a war with the master of Syria &
Egypt backed by France--and also on a war with 
the master of one third of the human race. He 
laughed & said he had no doubt about our Chinese 
policy buh was not so certain as to our 
Egyptian.
Hobhouse's original diary entry differs slightly from 
the account he wrote in his memoirs, Recollections of a 
Long Life. He replaced the vague phrase, "his two first 
Cabinets had done some work," with a more specific 
statement, "that charges made against us of idleness could 
hardly be sustained; for at the first Cabinet which he 
[Macaulay] had attended we had resolved upon war . . ..
The change suggests that, at least upon reflection,
Hobhouse considered the charges of idleness made by the 
conservatives a significant factor in the Ministry's 
decision to go wage war.
Two members of the Cabinet--Melbourne and Chancellor 
of the Exchequer Francis Baring--remained unsure of the
Hobhouse, 1 October 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.56551/145- 
5; I would like to thank J. Conway, Superintendent, 
Students' Room [Manuscript Collection, British Library], 
for verifying the accuracy of this quotation.
^^Lord Broughton (John Cam Hobhouse), Recollections of 
a Long Life. With Additional extracts from his private 
dairies. Edited, by his Daughter Lady Dorchester. Vol. 5. 
1834-1840 (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1911), 229.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
182
decision after the meeting broke up. Melbourne still was 
unconvinced that a small force could do the job and wanted 
to defer to the "judgement of Lord Auckland.Baring, 
although his family's firm--Baring Brothers & Co.--provided 
the financial backing for most of the opium trade,had 
little sympathy for the commercial interests involved in 
the opium c r i s i s . H e  did not believe that the 
Government should take responsibility for Elliot's pledge, 
but he did think the matter would be a "bother in the H of 
C.
Lord Holland, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
was indifferent to and ignorant of the whole affair. He 
usually led the opposition within the Cabinet to 
Palmerston's foreign policy, especially in regard to 
France. All Holland knew about affairs in China was that 
Lord Minto's cousin needed relief. Having missed the 
Cabinet meeting, he was willing to leave the decision in 
the hands of his colleaguesHolland was more worried
^^Hobhouse, October 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.56561/148.
^^Cheong, Mandarins and Merchants, 226.
^^Francis Baring to Melbourne, 24 October 183 9, Lamb 
Papers, M859/6/ Box l/38d.
^^Francis Baring to Palmerston, 1839, PP, GC/BA/264.
^^Lord Holland. Political Journal. Holland House 
Papers. Manuscript Collection. British Library, London. 
Add.Mss. 51872/1159.
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about a rupture with France over Palmerston's proposed 
Egyptian policy, than events in China.
Palmerston took his time forming the instructions for 
his subordinates in China and India. He did not inform 
Elliot of the decision for war until 18 October^^ and 
waited until early November to send preliminary 
instructions to Lord Auckland to make preparations for 
hostilities. Palmerston's slow reaction would bring 
criticism from the Opposition, but the commercial interests 
involved agreed with the delay. They had no reason to 
believe that the 183 9/1840 trading season would not open as 
usual, and they did not want the conflict to begin until 
the season was over in March, hoping the violence would end 
in September.Such considerations suggest neither a 
knee jerk reaction nor a policy planned well in advance.
When Hobhouse informed the Chairs of the East India 
Company of the Cabinet's decision to wage war, they "did 
not give any positive o p i n i o n . T h i s  apprehensive 
reaction is hardly what one would expect from a group 
dependent upon opium for survival. Hobhouse did raise 
their spirits when he told them that the British 
Government, not the Company, would pay for the expedition.
''^Palmerston to Elliot, Private, 18 October 1839, PP, 
GC/EL/27/1.
''^Palmerston to Hobhouse, Foreign Office, Letter 
Books, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/225.
^^Hobhouse, 4 November 1839, Diary, Add.Mss.56561/155,
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The decision to go to war with China represented a 
drastic change in Palmerston's Far Eastern policy. Since 
the creation of the office of Chief Superintendent of 
Trade, Palmerston had instructed the Crown's 
representatives to avoid war and to protect the status quo. 
The Foreign Secretary now claimed to seek redress for the 
Chinese quarantine's insult to the British merchants and to 
protect future trading privileges in China. Palmerston 
explained his reasons for his about-face in a letter to the 
Emperor of China dated 2 0 February 184 0. He claimed that 
he was not questioning the Emperor's right to prohibit 
opium nor the right to enforce that prohibition. He did 
challenge, however, the methods used by the Emperor's 
officials. The Foreign Secretary accused the Chinese of 
uneven enforcement of a law that had long remained a "dead 
letter" by suddenly threatening "innocent" foreigners with 
violence. Palmerston ignored the fact that China had begun 
the crackdown three full years earlier and had begun by 
punishing its own subjects. Furthermore, every foreign 
merchant house in Canton, with the exception of one 
American firm, brought opium to C h i n a . T h e  letter 
defends Elliot's actions, claiming that Elliot had "to 
rescue" the merchants from a "barbarous fate," a statement 
which was far from the truth. Finally, the letter ended
‘'^Report, 1840, 34.
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with a list of demands that included payment for property-- 
opium--lost during the March 1839 crisis and protection of 
future trading rights. If the Emperor of China refused 
these demands, the expeditionary force had the authority to 
exact them by force.Palmerston clearly intended to use 
this military show of force to gain commercial privileges, 
the same type of endeavor which he had questioned just one 
year earlier in regard to France's blockade of Buenos 
Aires.
The domestic political crisis helped to alter his 
policy. During the previous three years Palmerston had 
made it clear to Elliot that he was in no way to offend the 
C h i n e s e . N o w  the situation had changed. Merchants 
banged on the Foreign and Treasury Office doors demanding 
compensation for the lost opium, while opposition to the 
opium trade mounted from across the political spectrum.^* 
After the Ministry made its decision not to pay for the
'^^ Morse, International Relations, 521-26.
^^Gerald Graham, China Station, 49, 73.
Foreign and Domestic Intelligence : The East," 
Northern Star (Leeds), 17 August 1839; "The Opium Trade v. 
British Manufacturers," Leeds Mercury, 26 October 183 9, 
p .4 ; "China," Leeds Mercury, 2 November 1839, p.4; "Foreign 
and Colonial Affairs : China," The Charter (London), 3 
November 1839, p.642; "Opium Script," Northern Star 
(Leeds), 16 November 1839, p.4; "The Opium Smugglers,"
Leeds Mercury, 16 November 1839, p.4; "The China Question,"
Leeds Mercury, 16 November 1839, p.7; "The Opium Trade,"
Leeds Mercury, 23 November 183 9, p.7.
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opium, both the Foreign and Treasury Offices answered the
merchants' demands with the same response.
H.M. Govt, have no funds at their disposal out of 
which any compensation could be made to the 
owners of the opium which was surrendered to 
Capt. Elliot, in conformity with his public 
notice dated Canton March 27, 183 9. . . . [T]he
sanction of Parliament would be necessary before 
any such claims against H.M. Govt., founded upon 
Capt. Elliot's notice, could be recognized and 
paid . . . .  [F]urther, it is not the intention
of H.M. Govt, to submit^^to Parliament for the 
payment of such claims.
The Melbourne Ministry refused to take responsibility for
Elliot's pledge, because the "Chief of the Commission" had
no authority to make such a pledge. The dispersal of funds
required an act of Parliament, but to get money from it
seemed impossible. Facing a defiant House of Commons, and
needing all the support the Ministry could get, it finally
decided to act in heat of domestic criticism.
In regard to foreign policy the Parliamentary recess
gave the Ministry a little breathing room. In a letter to
Lord Palmerston, Lord Minto, First Lord of the Admiralty,
wrote
The great success of Auckland will drive the 
Tories to despair, and Brougham will [be] ready 
to kill himself in earnest. I think they have 
now no foreign allies to rest their hopes upon 
except Commissioner Lin & the Emperor of China--
initialed "P" to Magniac, Smith & Co., Draft, 
Foreign Office, 19 November 1839, F017/35/131-2 ; see also 
Treasury to Opium claimants. Copy, Treasury Chamber, 11 
November 1839, FO17/36/107-8.
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who may serve them for the opening of
Parliament.
Palmerston’s vilification of Commissioner Lin would help to 
blunt the conservative charges of incompetence. The 
Foreign Secretary felt confident enough to tell Russell not 
to worry if Minto exceeded his voted estimate at the 
Admiralty. "Parliament would not object to make good the 
deficiency, considering that the Slave Trade, Buenos Ayres, 
China and the Levant all require naval Exertions.
Domestic politics was another matter. The Chartist 
violence continued to flare up around the country. 
Gentlemen's Magazine described how local magistrates 
resorted to force in order to put down armed protests. In 
raids on the houses of leading Chartists, police seized 
muskets with bayonets and bullets, along with papers and 
correspondence. "Thousands" of Chartists demonstrated in 
Stockport, Manchester and Bolton.
The most serious uprising in the winter of 183 9 
occurred in the seaport town of Newport, Wales, on 3-4 
November. The Morning Chronicle, a daily newspaper with 
Whig sympathies, reported that 10,000 armed men with guns.
^^Minto to Palmerston, private, 2 November 1839, PP, 
GC/MI/412.
^^Palmerston to Russell, Windsor, 17 October 183 9, 
Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/1316.
^°"Domestic Occurrences," Gentlemen's Magazine 12 
(September 1839): 301-1; "Domestic Occurrences," 
Gentlemen's Magazine, 13 (February 1840): 198-9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188
muskets, pikes and swords descended upon the town. The 
attack left at least twenty dead and fifty wounded. The 
paper considered the destruction as "penance" for the years 
of "despicable domination" before the Reform A c t T h e  
early newspaper reports have stood the test of time. John 
Frost, a former Newport corporation magistrate, led 7,000 
men, armed with pikes, pistols, guns and heavy bludgeons, 
from the mining and manufacturing regions of South Wales to 
the seaport town. The throng hoped to rescue several of 
their colleagues held by local officials. A severe rain 
storm delayed the group's advance and allowed the officials 
to prepare for an assault. When the Chartists reached the 
Westgate Hotel, the makeshift prison, they violently 
demanded the release of the prisoners. After a scuffle at 
the front door, members of the 45th Regiment, hidden inside 
the hotel, fired into the crowd. After a 25 minute battle, 
the military managed to disperse the Chartists. The battle 
left at least twenty persons dead and fifty wounded.
"The Chartist Riots at Newport," Morning Chronicle,
6 November 1839, 3; "London: Thursday, Nov. 7, 1839," 
Morning Chronicle, 1 November 1839, 2; "London: Friday,
Nov. 8, 1839," Morning Chronicle, 8 November 1839, 2.
Chartist Insurrection in Monmouthshire," Leeds 
Mercury, 9 November 183 9, p.4; "The Insurrection and Its 
Causes," The Northern Star (Leeds), 9 November 1839, p.4; 
"Alarming Intelligence," Northern Star (Leeds), 9 November 
1839, p.8; "The Welsh Insurrection," The Charter (London), 
10 November 1839, p.664; "The Riots in Wales," The Charter 
(London), 10 November 1839, p.657-9; "The Riots in Wales," 
The Charter (London), 17 November 1839, p.677; David Jones, 
The Last Rising: The Newport Insurrection of 1839 (Oxford:
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Once again, an official who the Melbourne Ministry had
appointed to ensure public order threatened life and
property. At least in Birmingham, the Ministry's
appointees had acted on the side of the Government. This
time, the Ministry choice for magistrate--John Frost--
actually led the rebellion. Melbourne thought that more
unexpected uprisings might occur. He considered the
situation a "little awkward after having taken merit for
our mode of dealing with C h a r t i s m . T h e  rebellion
further weakened the popularity of Melbourne and the Whigs.
At a dinner held for the Lord Mayor of London, the guests
drowned with hisses Lord Melbourne's toast. He had tried
to express his determination to suppress domestic unrest
with force, but the noise obliged the Prime Minister, along
with Normanby, Palmerston and Baring, back to their 
54seats.
The Ministry tried to strengthen its position during 
the Parliamentary recess, but the ground continued to erode 
from beneath its feet. For every crisis the Government 
addressed, two more emerged. To carry successfully the
Clarendon Press, 1985), 114-43, 144-54.
^^Melbourne to Russell, Windsor Castle, 6 November 
1839, Lord Melbourne's Papers, ed. Lloyd Sanders (London: 
Longmans, Green, 1889), 407-8.
5^ "The Lord Mayor's Dinner, and the Unpopular 
Ministers," Norther Star, 16 November 1839; "The Lord 
Mayor's Day," Norther Star, 16 November 1839, p.4.
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China policy across the "impossible tightrope," the 
Ministry refused to respond to specific questions about the 
use of force. During the preparation of the Queen's speech 
at the opening of Parliament in January, the Cabinet 
decided to say simply that the Government had done its 
duty. To say more might have pushed conservative Whigs 
toward the Opposition, but to say less might have upset the 
Radicals.
^^Hobhouse, 11 January 1849, Diary, Add.Mss.56562/32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 7 
"THE OPIUM AND THE CHINA QUESTION"*
With the beginning of the 184 0 session of Parliament 
the conservatives' assault on the Ministry started anew.
In a vote of no confidence at the end of January they 
brought together in one debate all of their accusations 
against the Whigs. The disruption of trade in China 
provided added fuel for their attack. The private decision 
did not end the public debate about Government acceptance 
of responsibility for Elliot's actions. On the contrary, 
the debate began in earnest. Pamphleteers and journalists 
wrote polemics on both sides of the issues, while 
politicians weighed the consequences of defending the 
Crown's officer in China against the repercussions of 
leaving the opium merchants to their fate. What emerges 
from this debate is a community divided. No mandate for 
war existed.
The conservatives believed the vulnerability of the 
Government called for a direct challenge. In December 1839 
they decided that the challenge should come at the
The title is taken from an article in Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine 47 (June 1840) : 717.
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beginning of the new session in January. On 28 January 
1840, Sir John Yard Buller, a distinguished country 
gentleman, rose from the conservative benches and 
introduced a motion of no-confidence in the House of 
Commons. He began by declaring that "distress and 
dissatisfaction" existed "throughout England." This state 
of unrest did not arise from extenuating circumstances, 
which could not be controlled. The unrest arose from the 
policies of Her Majesty's Ministers. The Ministry adopted 
a "system of agitation which had [been] nurtured and 
fostered for the sake of carrying their ov/n measures, 
pressing them upon the country, and exciting the masses of 
people for their own purposes. To argue his case,
Buller focused on the domestic situation, and proceeded to 
call the attention of the House to the Chartist riots, 
"hostility" to the Church of England, abuses of patronage, 
attempts to repeal the corn laws, and Whig support for the 
socialist Robert Owen.^
Mr. Alderman Thompson, representative of the Shipping 
Interests in Commons, then rose to second the motion of no- 
confidence. He was sure the House of Commons would make 
the right decision and stated his reasons for withholding
’sir John Yard Buller, "Confidence in the Ministry," 
House of Comimons, Hansard, 3d ser. , vol. 51 (28 January 
1840), col. 650.
^John Yard Buller, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28 
January 1840), cols. 650ff.
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confidence from the Ministry. Considering the Chartist 
unrest and the budget deficits, Thompson "found that there 
was cause of alarm and apprehension for the constitution of 
the country and the honour and prosperity of the nation. 
After expanding on Buller's themes, Thompson focused on the 
Ministry's colonial and foreign policy. He called the 
attention of the House to the French blockade of Mexico, 
the exclusion of British trade from Buenos Aires, the 
situation in China, and the Canadian and Jamaican 
rebellions.
Sir George Grey, Judge Advocate-General, rose first to 
defend the Ministry. He set the tone for the debate to 
follow by simply stating that the Opposition's motion gave 
him nothing to "grapple with. Grey felt that the motion 
was motivated by politics rather than policy. He asserted 
that the empire was not in a state of general unrest as 
claimed by the Opposition. He called upon the members of 
Commons to vote on principle. Grey asked if the House 
would rather have a Government committed to "progressive
^Alderman Thompson, "Confidence in the Ministry," 
House of Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28 January 
1840), col. 656.
^George Grey, "Confidence in the Ministry, House of 
Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28 January 1840), col. 
666 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
194
movement," or one committed to the suppression of "all 
future progress.
Once again, the conservatives blamed the Whigs' 
progressive principles of constant reform as the cause of 
the instability of the realm. More specifically, the 
conservatives blamed the Whigs' continuous attempts at 
extending the Reform Act of 1832 to the workers as the 
cause of the considerable unrest. The Whigs, on the other 
hand, denied that a general state of unrest existed and 
said that the unrest that did exist was prompted by the 
reactionary principles of the conservatives, who wanted to 
overturn the Great Reform Act. The Whigs held the reins of 
power. They were vulnerable to the charges that the 
Government was failing to respond to the extensive unrest, 
which was quite real.
All of the problems which Great Britain faced did not 
go unnoticed on the Ministry's side of Commons. Lord 
Howick, a former member of the Melbourne Ministry, probably 
delivered the most damaging speech in the no-confidence 
debate. Lord Howick, on the second night of the debate, 
rose admitting that the Ministry lacked the full confidence 
of the House of Commons and the country. As he spoke, 
cheers arose from the Opposition benches. Their cheers 
diminished, however, as Lord Howick stated that he would
^Grey, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 51 (28 January 1840),
col. 688.
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vote against the motion because he had even less confidence 
in the Opposition.*
After four long nights of debate the motion of no- 
confidence failed. The Ministry had only a twenty-one vote 
majority. Hobhouse wrote in his diary that the Ministry 
"had a majority of 300 to 287--much more than I had 
expected a day or two before. Russell told me we should 
have 14."^ The Radicals decided to vote with the Ministry 
on this particular occasion, but their continued support 
remained unreliable. The Ministry entered the debate over 
Elliot's pledge to pay for the opium in a slightly better 
position than it had at the close of the last session of 
Parliament. When the House of Commons finally took up the 
issue in April, however, the Ministry found itself back in 
its previous precarious state.*
The arguments for and against supporting Captain 
Elliot's pledge to pay for £2,000,000 worth of opium were 
wide-ranging. The argument used most often in support of 
Government responsibility rested on a simple fact--Elliot 
had acted in his official capacity. The Government must 
champion their representative's decision and bear the loss 
of the £2,000,000. By failing to pay for the opium, the
*Lord Howick, "House of Commons, January 30, 1840," 
Times, 31 January 1840, p.4.
^Hobhouse, 31 January 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.56562/53-4.
*Newbould, Whiggery, 256.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
196
Government was avoiding its responsibility.^ Supporters 
of Government action also justified their position by 
highlighting official complicity in the opium trade. When 
Parliament abolished the East India Company's trade 
monopoly in the Far East, the Government allowed the 
government of India to keep its monopoly for the production 
and sale of o p i u m . T h i s  lack of action sanctioned the 
India Company's collection of £2,000,000 in revenue from 
the exportation of the drug to China.^ Complementing the 
above arguments was the belief that the British Government 
needed to avenge the insults to an officer of the Crown and 
the British community in Canton. The outrageous 
behavior of the Chinese, which compounded the cruelty 
perpetrated against the "unavenged martyr," Lord Napier, 
demanded immediate action.
^Samuel Warren, The Opium Question {London: James 
Ridgway, 1840), 17-18. Volume 1139. Wellington Pamphlets. 
Deposited in Southampton University Library (Hereafter 
cited as WP).
’°H. Hamilton Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just 
One? (London: James Ridgway, 1840), 7. Volume 1139. WP.
^Alexander Graham, The Right, Obligation, & Interest 
of the Government of Great Britain to require Redress from 
the Government of China, For the Late Forced Surrender of 
British Owned Opium at Canton (London: Whittaker, 1840), 1. 
Volume 1138. WP.
^^Some Pros and Cons of the Opium Question: with a few 
Suggestions Regarding British Claims on China (London:
Smith Elder, 1840). Volume 1139. WP; "The Disputs With 
China, The Guardian (Manchester), 16 October 1839, p. 2.
^^Warren, The Opium Question, 25-6.
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Other writers saw the opium traders as the source of 
the unsettled state of affairs in China rather than as the 
victims of Chinese despotism. The British merchants in 
Canton had returned Chinese hospitality with acts of 
aggression. The Chinese government had attempted to put 
down the opium trade since 1836, but the British merchants 
failed to heed the warnings. They kept illegally importing 
the drug. Opponents to accepting responsibility for 
Elliot's pledge also argued on moral grounds. According to 
an anonymous author the issues were clear. The opium 
trade, and the war to protect it, was a "National Sin. 
George Thompson, a "celebrated anti-slavery advocate," 
spoke to an overflowing crowd in Leed's Music Hall for two 
hours on the horrors of the opium trade. While the pagan 
rulers of China and the Ottoman Empire suppressed the 
immoral trade the Christian rulers of Great Britain
Captain T.H. Bullock, The Chinese Vindicated, or 
Another View of the Opium Question: Being a Reply to a 
Pamphlet by Samuel Warren (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1840), 85. 
Volume 1139. WP; "War with China," The Charter (London), 19 
January 1840, p.8; "The Opium Trade.--War with China,"
Leeds Mercury, 22 February 1840, p.4.
Voice for China: An Answer to the Question, Is the 
War with China Just? To My Countrymen, the Government, and 
My Church. By One of Her Ministers, 2d (London: Nisbet, 
1840). passim. Volume 1139. WP; "The Opium Trade," Leeds 
Mercury, 8 February 1840, p.7.
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encouraged it. No true Christian could support a war that 
protected such an atrocity.
Surprisingly, economic reasoning motivated some 
authors to contest the Ministry's policies. For example, 
William Storrs Fry claimed that money spent by the Chinese 
on opium deprived British manufactures of a market. As the 
opium trade increased, British exports to China 
decreased.He also cited a petition by the Mayor of 
Leeds and 3127 inhabitants of that town. The petitioners 
asserted that the opium trade was the cause of British 
trade problems in China and was harmful to the 
manufacturing and mercantile classes in Britain. Fry 
concluded that the evidence necessitated an immediate end 
to the opium trade .
Chartist newspapers added their voices to the outcry 
against the Ministry's China policy. The movement objected 
to war in ge n e r a l . T h e  pending hostilities with China 
provided more proof of the abuse of political power for 
sectarian interests. The Chartists argued that corrupt
"The Opium Question," Northern Star (Leeds), 22 
February 1840, p. 1; "The Opium Trade : Public Meeting at 
Leeds," Leeds Mercury, 22 February 1840, p. 8.
’^ Fry, Facts and Evidence, 45-9.
®^Fry, Facts and Evidence, 54.
^^ Fry, Facts and Evidence, 5.
^°Northern Star (Leeds), 12 October 1839, p. 4.
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politicians, merchants and stock jobbers would reap the 
benefits of the war, while the laborers would bear the 
weight in taxes.Constitutional reform furnished the 
only solution to the p r o b l e m . T h e  nation could then 
pursue its true interest--"peaceful and unrestricted 
commerce, each nation taking from the other the produce 
raised with greater f a c i l i t y . T h e  Chartist papers also 
decried the loss of national honor caused by the opium 
crisis. For the Queen to keep the dignity of her crown, 
her Ministers should hang the opium merchants, "as hanging 
commissions are Whig fancies.Insulting the 
aristocratic honor of the Ministry, the Northern Star 
stated that the behavior of "Opium Elliot" and the Reformed 
Ministry proved them to be merely the tools of 
"Shopkeepers," sacrificing the national honor for the un- 
Christian pursuit of mammon.
Both proponents and opponents of the Government's 
China policy used international law to support their
"War with China," The Charter (London), 19 January 
1840, p. 8.
"The Opium War," Northern Star, (4 April 1840), p.
4 .
"War with China," The Charter (London) , 12 January 
1840, p. 888.
“^^"The Queen's Speech," The Charter (London), 26 
January 1839, p.9.
"The 'Shopkeepers:' Their 'Profit' and Our 'Loss,' 
Northern Star (Leeds), 18 January 1840, p. 4.
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d a i m s . Proponents stated that the Chinese government 
behaved in defiance of "all international laws recognized 
by civilized nations for the protection of life and 
property. It had no right to demand opium which the 
authorities themselves could not capture. The receiving 
ships anchored at Lintin remained outside the reach of the 
Chinese. Since Elliot turned over the opium housed at 
Lintin only after the Chinese held the foreign community as 
prisoners, the seizure was illegal.Opponents stressed 
that according to international law an individual must obey 
the laws of the state in which he resides. The Chinese 
forbad the importation of opium. British merchants in 
China had no choice but to comply with that state's wishes. 
The Government of Britain should not take responsibility 
for the illegal behavior of English subjects in China.
Both sets of arguments based on international law were, 
however, of questionable validity. International law 
depended upon the "general consent" among independent 
nations.China never consented to any set of common 
principles until after the war ended with its defeat.
^^Lindsay, Is The War with China a Just One?, 7.
^^Graham, The Right, Obligation, & Interest of the 
Government of Great Britain, 2, 10-11.
^^Bullock, The Chinese Vindicated, 64.
^^Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law: With a 
Sketch of the History of the Science (Philadelphia: Carey, 
Lea & Blanchard, 1836), 46.
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The authors of the above articles and pamphlets based 
their arguments on newspaper reports, private 
correspondence or personal knowledge of events in China.
At the end of January and throughout the month of February 
the Opposition turned up the pressure on the Ministry by 
demanding all official papers relating to C h i n a . T h e  
Ministry's plans to use force had been a secret decision.
It left the country in the dark about the expeditionary 
force. The debate remained focused on the general issues 
involved until Palmerston produced the Foreign Office 
despatches.
In March murmurs of discontent began to be heard, as
news of Lord Auckland's military preparations in India
leaked out. The Opposition demanded to know the details,
but the Government remained silent. Its silence, however,
left the Opposition free to speculate and accuse the
Ministry of hiding details from the British public. In an
editorial on 2 March, The Times wrote
It is in keeping with the whole genius and 
history of the MELBOURNE Cabinet, that they 
should first, from fear, look on while France was 
the oppressor of La Plata, and then plead their 
own connivance at that series of crimes as a 
defence of their consistency in the preparation 
of similar outrages upon China."
^Collis, Foreign Mud, 258.
Times (London), 2 March 1840, p.4
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The lack of official details gave the Opposition more time 
to put the Ministry's policy into context.
On 5 March Palmerston finally broke the Government's 
cloak of secrecy by producing the Correspondence Relating 
to China. This large Blue book did not quickly satisfy the 
Opposition, because it did not provide an immediate 
narrative of events. The document contained 458 pages of 
despatches with no table of contents or index. It 
presented the despatches in turgid, chronological order.
Any Member of Parliament seeking clarification of events 
had to be enthusiastic and have a lot of free time to 
complete a thorough analysis of events in China. 
Furthermore, The Times continued to accuse the Ministry of 
hiding information, because the manuscript did not include 
the Foreign Office's orders to Elliot since the crisis 
occurred.
The Times got the story right. Palmerston had covered 
his tracks well. Charles Webster, author of the most 
respected book on Palmerston's foreign policy, claimed 
that, when the Foreign Secretary personally edited the Blue 
books, he "meant to enlighten rather than mislead the 
p u b l i c . S u c h  a statement cannot be substantiated. 
Palmerston deleted almost all references to the conflict
^^Times (London), 14 March 1840, p.4.
^^Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1, 62.
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between Robinson and Elliot, Elliot's refusal to perform 
his duty and Elliot's renegade foreign policy.
Even with the deletions Palmerston provided the public 
with the source for debate, and the blue book quickly sold 
o u t A  new set of pamphlets and review articles, which 
focused on the details of Elliot's actions and his 
instructions, appeared as commentary for the mountain of 
despatches. The anonymous authors of two such pamphlets 
examined the same evidence and came to opposing 
conclusions.
In Review of the Management of Our Affairs In China 
the author states that because of the "lack of timely 
protection" by the British Government, the China trade 
might be lost fc r e v e r . The Government had left Elliot 
alone to follow his own policies, and he had involved 
himself needlessly with the Chinese authorities. This 
involvement clouded his decisions because he overestimated 
his own ability to negotiate with the C h i n e s e N o t h i n g  
could better illustrate Elliot's lack of foresight and
Digest of the Despatches on China (Including Those 
Received on the 27th March): A Connecting Narrative and 
Comments (London; James Ridgway, 1840), 1.
Review of the Management of Our Affairs in China, 
Since the Opening of the Trade in 1834; with an Analysis of 
the Government Despatches From the Assumption of Office by 
Capt. Elliot, on the 14th December, 1836, to the 22d of 
March, 1839 (London: Smith, Elder, 1840), 4.
^^Review of the Management of Our Affairs In China,
76 .
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overconfidence than his leaving Macao for Canton during the
heat of the opium crisis. He went with the intention of
demanding release of the foreign community, but he had to
surrender £2,000,000 worth of opium.
On went his uniform coat, and up went the 
national flag. The one was taken off by himself, 
but we do not hear who hauled down the other. It 
was probably trampled under the feet of the 
Chinese coolies, in whose peeping he was placed 
immediately after landing.
Leaving such a man as Elliot without instructions required
the Government to take responsibility for his actions.
The author was, however, willing to forgive the
Government's past transgressions because it had decided to
use force. He believed that the use of force would protect
the China trade from the Chinese government and demonstrate
to it that the time for conciliatory policy had come to an
end. The opponents of force should recognize this fact and
hail the new policy of the Government.^®
To fight, or not to fight was the question in the
spring of 1840. Pamphlet author did not believe the final
decision had been made. They still hoped they could
influence Parliament's decision. Hence, the author of A
Digest of the Despatches on China had a simple and
straight-forward message. He found fault neither with the
75 .
210 .
Review of the Management of Our Affairs In China,
®®J?eview of the Management of our Affairs in China,
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Government nor Elliot. The Government had no authority to 
put down the opium trade, and Elliot performed his duty by 
protecting British merchants. The anonymous writer 
acknowledged the moral evil of opium, but he believed that 
"moral evils are to be met by moral cures."
Commissioner Lin's material pursuit of the illicit traffic 
demanded a forceful response.
The parliamentary debate heated up on 12 March 184 0 
after the two main metropolitan newspapers. The Times and 
The Morning Chronicle, announced a British declaration of 
war on China. The Times ran the following sensational 
headline: "EXPRESS FROM INDIA: DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST 
CHINA." The Opposition demanded an explanation from the 
Government, which continued its evasive strategy. Russell 
stated that he knew of no declaration of war. The 
Government had instructed Lord Auckland to make "active 
preparations." Those preparations fueled the rumors of 
war. Peel, "supposing the declaration should prove to be 
true," insisted on knowing who would pay for the war. 
Palmerston responded by denying that the nation was at war, 
but said the Government of India would share the fiscal 
burden. Peel was not satisfied. He asked Palmerston if 
the House should expect a message from Her Majesty stating
Digest of the Despatches on China, 209.
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that hostilities were imminent. In an arrogant response, 
Palmerston stated that no message was forthcoming.
The next day The Morning Chronicle reversed its 
previous position. It now maintained that The Times had 
"magnified" the orders for preparations into a declaration 
of war. In all probability "not only will there be no 
declaration of war against China, but no war at all.
The Times, however, continued to blast the Ministry on a 
variety of issues relating to the expeditionary force. The 
newspaper could see no reason for the undeclared war. It 
would accomplish nothing and leave other British interests 
"ruinously exposed," because the Empire's defenses were 
already stretched too thinly. Furthermore, the Government 
refused to present its intentions to Parliament. Should 
not Parliament voice its opinion before the Government 
committed the nation to v/ar? Lord Palmerston followed a 
course "of doing nothing and saying nothing, at the same 
time when both declarations and actions had become a 
paramount duty.
The Ministry finally caved in to the pressure. On 29 
March, six months after the Foreign Office received 
Elliot's despatches and one year after the crisis began.
"War with China," House of Commons, Hansard, 3d 
ser., vol. 53 (13 March 1840), cols. 1155-57.
‘''^ Morning Chronicle (London), 13 March 1840, 2.
Times (London), 14 March 1840, p.5.
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Lord John Russell divulged the Government's objectives: 1) 
"to obtain reparations for the insults and injuries offered 
to her Majesty's superintendent, and Her Majesty's subjects 
by the Chinese government ;" 2) "to obtain for the
merchants trading with China an indemnification for the 
loss of their property;" 3) "to obtain security that the 
persons and property of those trading with China, should in 
future be protected from insult or i n j u r y . T h e  
Ministry responded too late. This feeble attempt to avoid 
a conservative challenge missed its mark. The 
conservatives were not concerned about war aims, but about 
war origins. They realized the political value of the 
Government's mishandling of the affair and were determined 
to make the best of it.
After reviewing the massive Correspondence Relating to 
China, the conservatives knew the blue book contained few 
materials relating to the Palmerston's China policy. Sir 
James Graham even confessed to Hobhouse that Elliot made a 
better superintendent than anticipated, "but he [Graham] 
nonetheless gave notice of a motion on China. The 
conservatives still believed that they would have a
^Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 52 
(19 March 1840), col. 1223.
^^Hobhouse, 19 March 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5562/95.
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majority. The Ministry did not know what to e x p e c t . O n  
7 April 1840 Graham moved that the House withdraw its 
confidence in the Ministry for its incompetent handling of 
Anglo-Chinese relations. He based his motion on the crisis 
that had developed in China and the government's failure to 
take action in response to it. Dismissing the opium 
question, Graham maintained that "it is the crime of the 
QUEEN'S Ministers in having entailed a needless and unjust 
war upon this country, through the difficult and helpless 
condition in which they left their own diplomatic 
a g e n t . T h e  illicit opium trade only made Elliot's 
impotence that much more deplorable.
Even after Palmerston's careful editing, Graham was 
able to use the Correspondence Relating to China v;ith great 
skill to substantiate this accusation. He called the 
attention of the House to the dismissal of Sir George Best 
Robinson. Graham wanted to know why Palmerston dismissed a 
man who followed a policy which produced two and a half 
years of peace. Graham answered his own question by 
stating that Robinson's policy clashed with the progressive 
philosophy of the present Ministry: Robinson had wanted to 
leave well enough alone. Immediately after the personnel
^^Hobhouse to Auckland, India House, 4 April 1840,
Letter Books, 010, Mss.Eur.F213/7/326.
^*Sir James Graham, "House of Commons, April 7, 1840: 
China," Times (London), 8 April, 1840, p.4.
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change, "Violence, discord--he might almost say agitation-- 
visted that peaceful region. Graham also cited 
Elliot's attempts to warn Palmerston about the dangers of 
the opium trade and Palmerston's failure to give Elliot the 
necessary powers needed to control the trade. Palmerston's 
vague instructions had left Elliot unprepared to handle any 
problems which might arise. Graham concluded that 
Palmerston's inaction--not the actions of the Chinese 
government--destroyed British trade relations with 
China.
Writing in his diary later that night, Hobhouse 
assessed these accusations. He believed that Elliot did 
possess the necessary powers to fulfill his duties. "As to 
instructions perhaps Palmerston's letters were not 
sufficiently full & d e f i n i t e . I f  Palmerston's 
staunchest supporter could come to such a conclusion, then 
the conservatives truly had a chance of winning over those 
members who were undecided.
The Ministry was not, however, willing to concede 
defeat easily. Secretary of State for War, Thomas 
Macaulay, rose to challenge Graham's motion. As he began
^ S^ir James Graham, "War with China," Hansard, 3d 
ser., vol. 53 (7 April 1840), cols. 684.
^^Graham, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 53 (7 April 1840),
cols. 691-4.
^^Hobhouse, 7 April 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5662/103.
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to speak, one could imagine drums beating, a chorus 
shouting "God Save the Queen," and the Union Jack flapping 
in the wind. Macaulay treated the present no-confidence 
motion with the same contempt that Sir George Grey had 
expressed toward the no-confidence motion in January. He 
started with the basic principle that the "flag should be 
the protection of an Englishman, however r e m o t e , a n d  
went on to defend Palmerston's instructions to Elliot. The 
instructions were sufficient, he insisted, considering the 
vast distance between England and China; the Government of 
India functioned quite well without detailed instructions. 
Macaulay asserted that no amount of power would have been 
sufficient for Elliot to stop the trafficking in opium.
The trade was a profitable endeavor and those involved 
would stop at nothing to make a profit. Macaulay also 
complained about the nature of the motion; it dealt with 
past policy. He asked if the Opposition could find any 
fault with the Ministry's present policy. Finally, the 
Secretary turned to the action taken by the Chinese. The 
Chinese, by imprisoning the whole foreign community, had 
insulted the dignity of Great Britain, and that insult 
demanded retribution. As Macaulay sat down, the House 
erupted into "Loud and continued cheering.
^°Thomas Macaulay, "House of Commons, April 7, 1840: 
China," Times (London), 8 April, 1840, p.5.
^^Macaulay, Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.5.
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Macaulay's argument did not sway the conservatives.
Sir William Follet rose to respond to Macaulay. Follet 
stated that an appeal to national sentiment missed the 
point. The charge against the Government was that it left 
the Superintendents in China without powers and advice 
despite their repeated calls for both. Did Palmerston 
answer any of Captain Elliot's pleas for powers or advice? 
Follet answered his own question with a resounding "No!"
An agent of the crown must have one or the other. The 
Government of India survived v.’ithout advice because it had 
sufficient power. The superintendents did not have this 
luxury. The Government must be held responsible for the 
consequences.
Mr. Sidney Herbert also directly challenged the 
Secretary of State for War. Herbert "did not complain of 
Her Majesty's Government for sending out an arm.ament, but 
he did complain of this--that their previous conduct had 
rendered such a proceeding necessary. "Hear, hear" was 
heard throughout the house. The Opposition had to attack 
the past policies of the Ministry, because "on the 
Opposition side of the House they had no knowledge of the
^^Sir William Follet, "House of Commons, April 7: 
China." Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.5.
^^Sidney Herbert, "House of Commons, April 7, 1840: 
China," Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.6.
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future policy of the present advisors of the Crown.
Once again, expressions of approval were heard from the
benches. If the nation did go to war, however, then the
Government would be "expending 6,000,0001. to recover
2,000,0001.; that we were sending good money after bad, and
that we were contending with an enemy whose cause for
quarrel was better than ours.
The young and promising William Gladstone forcefully
challenged the Government's policy on the second day of the
debate. Gladstone disputed Macaulay's appeal to national
sentiment. He acknowledged the "animating effects"
produced by the sight of the flag, but rhetorically asked
why it had such effects. He then answered himself:
It is because it has always been associated with 
the cause of justice, with opposition to 
oppression, with respect for national rights, 
with honourable commercial enterprize; but now, 
under the auspices of the noble lord, that flag 
is hoisted to protect an infamous contraband 
traffic.
Cheers came from the Opposition benches as Gladstone 
began with a bang, but he was not finished yet. He also 
disputed the Secretary's assertion that the Government 
lacked the ability to control the opium trade. He did so
^^Herbert, Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.6.
^^Herbert, Times (London), 8 April 1840, p.6.
“^^William Gladstone, "House of Commons, April 8, 1840: 
China--Adjourned Debate," Times (London), 9 April 1840, 
p . 5 .
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by pointing to the fact that the East India Company, under 
the jurisdiction of the Government, controlled the supply 
of opium. If the Government had wanted to address the 
problem created by the opium trade, then the Government 
should have cut off the supply. The Ministry chose to put 
Britain's commercial position at risk by failing to respond 
to Elliot's repeated warnings.Gladstone also insisted 
that Palmerston had neglected his duty by failing to inform 
the House of the increasing danger. Palmerston had behaved 
like an "Egyptian task master, commanding his officer ' to 
make bricks out of straw.' Gladstone concluded by 
stating that the insult to the flag had not been delivered 
by the Chinese, but by the Melbourne Ministry's tacit 
approval of the illegal opium trade.
Gladstone's valiant condemnation of British 
participation in the opium trade is much praised by 
historians. At the time, however, he went too far when he 
defended the Chinese actions. Responding to reports that 
the Chinese had poisoned the water wells in order to drive
Captain Elliot and the opium merchants away, Gladstone 
stated "of course they poisoned the w e l l s . T h e  
Ministerial benches "raised a yell of abhorrence . . .
^^Gladstone, Times (London), 9 April 1840, p.5. 
^®Gladstone, Times (London), 9 April 1840, p.5. 
^^Gladstone, Hansard, 3d ser., vol. 53 (8 April 1840),
col. 817.
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[while] . . . Peel & Stanley hung their h e a d s . S u c h
naive statements hurt rather than helped opponents to the 
Ministry's China policy.
On the third night of the debate the Ministry fought 
back with vigor. John Hobhouse stated that the 
Opposition's motion was a mere attempt at party politics 
and contained no substantial charges. He asked whether or 
not it was British policy to punish subjects who smuggled 
goods into Spain; should it be different in China? Let the 
Chinese stop the smugglers. As to the superintendent's 
want of powers, the President of the Board of Control 
responded with contempt. "It does not appear, he thought, 
that Captain Elliot imagined there was any deficiency in 
his powers. Hobhouse had chosen to ignore both the 
evidence presented by the Opposition and the despatches 
supplied by the Foreign Secretary.
Sir Robert Peel returned to the conservative case, 
concluding it with some simple observations. He pointed 
out that the arguments of Macaulay and Hobhouse made it 
clear that the Ministry had set the nation on a course for 
war. The war would not be cost-free. The Ministry must 
consider the responses of other countries, especially the
*°Hobhouse, 8 April 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5562/104 .
^^Sir John Hobhouse, "House of Commons, 9 April, 1840; 
China--Adjourned Debate," Times (London), 10 April 1840, 
p.4.
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United States. Would the Americans sit by as a war raged,
destroying their trade? Peel's simplicity did not serve
the conservative cause. Hobhouse thought that the speech
was not "one of his [Peel's] best."*^
After the leader of the Opposition's brief speech,
Palmerston rose in defence of his policy. He felt that he
had little to fear; he held the "trump card. His
strong, "swift" action intended to defend the British flag
in China was meant to secure British trade. Palmerston
clearly attempted to use national sentiment to his
advantage. The noble Lord spoke with an air of arrogance
as he brushed aside the accusations of the Opposition.
If the resolution of the right hon. baronet who 
had opened the debate were not so pointedly 
directed at the department which he [Palmerston] 
had the honour to fulfill he should not--and he 
wished to say it without meaning the slightest 
offence--think it necessary to address himself to 
a motion so feebly conceived and so feebly 
enforced as the one under discussion, more 
especially after the able manner in which the 
friends around him had refused the arguments of 
those on the opposite side.
Cheers arose from the ministerial benches, while laughter
flowed from the Opposition benches. As Palmerston spoke,
he gave little of substance to defend his position.
^^Hobhouse, 9 April 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5662/185. 
^Collis, Foreign Mud, 262.
'^ L^ord Palmerston, "House of Commons, April 9, 1840: 
China--Adjourned Debated," Times (London), 10 April 1840, 
p. 5.
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In rebuttal to Graham's charges, Palmerston defended 
his orders to Elliot as appropriate and Elliot's actions as 
honorable. He asked the Opposition what could have been 
done. If he had followed Gladstone's advice and moved 
against the opium trade, "the house would not have treated 
their [the Ministry's] proposal with serious levity [sic], 
but would absolutely laughed them out of c o u r t . H e  
claimed that he should be praised for doing nothing, 
because it was the only option. Palmerston concluded by 
declaring that he acted in accordance with the 
international consensus. The expeditionary force sent to 
insure British national honor would not bring retribution 
from the Americans or the French.
Graham tried to answer Palmerston's charges, but the 
members of the House had grown weary of debate. They were 
tired and wanted to go home. The M.P.s shouted until 
Graham sat down. The House divided after Palmerston's 
"glorious" speech, and once again the Ministry succeeded in 
holding on to its position. Their margin of victory, 
however, had dropped. The motion failed by only nine
^^Palrnerston, Times (London), 10 April 1840, p.5.
^^Palmerston, Times (London), 10 April, 1840, p .5; 
Palmerston had little to fear from the American government. 
It even refused its citizens request to join the British 
expedition in extracting commercial concessions from the 
Chinese. William J. Donahue, "The Caleb Cushing Mission," 
Modern Asian Studies 16 (1982): 194.
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votes.Hobhouse commented that the Ministry's 
"casualties were numerous . . . [and] . . .  we were 
fortunate in being able to keep our party together on this 
occasion."*^ The Opposition had presented a strong case 
against the Government. Palmerston's only defence was his 
claim that the Ministry was defending British honor against 
the barbarous actions of the Chinese. Apparently, this 
jingoistic rhetoric successfully, though narrowly, 
persuaded the British nation to wage war on China. In the 
process the Melbourne Ministry began the process of opening 
China to Western trade.
The Ministry's defeat of the 7 April 184 0 vote of No- 
Confidence was, in any case, a pyrrhic victory. After 
losing a series of by-elections in the early part of 1841, 
the Ministry faced another serious threat from the 
Opposition. This time, however, the Opposition had the 
upper hand. Lord Stanley, a leading member on the 
Opposition side of the House, brought forth the Irish 
Registration Bill. Stanley wanted to restrict Irish 
suffrage, but the Ministry tried to counter with a more 
liberal bill. When it came time to debate the issue. Lord 
Howick argued against the Ministry. Howick, by far the
"House of Commons, April 9, 1840 : China--Adjourned 
Debate," Times (London), 10 April 1840, p.6; Collis, 
Foreign Mud, 274.
^^Hobhouse, 9 April 1840, Diary, Add.Mss.5662/106.
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most prominent defector, was not the only one. The 
Ministry lost by ten votes.*’
The Ministry chose to remain in office and fought 
ahead, making the budget the issue upon which it would 
stand or fall. The Ministers hoped to gain support by 
turning to Free-Trade issues. Melbourne's Government 
argued that the country's financial difficulties would be 
solved by lowering tariffs on such items as corn and sugar. 
The reduction of duties on corn was highly controversial. 
The Ministry gambled that the conservatives would not 
challenge it on this issue. The Cabinet made the right 
assessment on corn, but failed to see the attack on the 
reduction of the sugar tariff. The Opposition assaulted 
the Government's budget on the single issue of sugar. This 
focus allowed the conservatives the luxury of not taking a 
stand on the Corn Laws. The Opposition argued that by 
reducing the sugar duty the Ministry threatened the newly 
freed black population of Jamaica. Jamaican free labor 
would be forced to compete with cheaper slave labor. When 
the votes were counted, the conservative margin of victory 
had increased to thirty-six.
The Ministry reluctantly decided to dissolve 
Parliament, but before doing so it wanted to force the
*’clark. Peel and the Conservative Party, 463-473. 
^°Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party, 478-479.
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conservatives to take a stand on the Corn Laws. After the 
Ministry announced their intention to make a motion to 
reduce the Corn Laws, the Opposition quickly decided to 
make a general motion of no confidence on 27 May 1841, thus 
avoiding a direct challenge on policy issues. The 
conservative Opposition pointed to the Ministry's two 
previous losses as proof of the lack of confidence in the 
Ministry. The Government, however, would not fall so 
easily. The Whigs tried in vain to make Peel, the leader 
of the Opposition, take a stand, but he refused to do so.
He merely stated that his views were already well known.
The issue before the House was not Peel's ability to 
govern, but the Melbourne Ministry's ability. The majority 
of the House agreed with Peel and the Ministry lost by one 
vote. Melbourne and his colleagues had failed to address 
the more serious issues of the day. Palmerston's rationale 
for war against the Chinese had faded into the background. 
After seven long years in Opposition, the Conservatives led 
by Sir Robert Peel formed a ministry.
Accordingly, the Melbourne Ministry was out of office 
when one of the most significant events of the nineteenth 
century took place--the Treaty of Nanking, 29 August 1842. 
The treaty ended hostilities between Great Britain and 
China and signaled the opening of China to the West.
Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party, 480-86.
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Palmerston did play a significant role in designing its 
content. After being accused of giving vague instructions 
and leaving an officer of the crown without powers, 
Palmerston took no chances. The Foreign Secretary sent 
clear and precise demands to Elliot and gave him 
plenipotentiary powers. Elliot decided to settle for less 
than Palmerston had demanded. Palmerston removed Elliot, 
stating "Throughout the whole course of your proceedings 
you seem to have considered that my instructions were waste 
paper, which you might treat with entire disregard, and 
that you were at full liberty to deal with the interest of 
your country according to your fancy.
Palmerston then sent out Sir Henry Pottinger to 
replace Elliot and to carry out his instructions.
Pottinger served Britain well. After a series of military 
victories, Pottinger extracted all of Palmerston's demands 
from the Chinese. The British made the Chinese surrender 
$21,000,000 to pay for both the seized opium and the 
expense of the war. Furthermore, the Chinese opened five 
ports--Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai--not 
only to British trade, but also to British residents and 
consuls. The British also demanded and got the elimination 
of the Co-hong and the establishment of regular duties.
^^Palmerston to Elliot, 21 April 1841 as quoted in 
Fay, Opium War, 3 09.
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Finally, the Chinese ceded the island of Hongkong to the 
British, and the island came under British jurisdiction.^ 
As stated above, the Melbourne Ministry fell before 
Pottinger signed this remarkable treaty. Palmerston's 
clear and concise instructions came too late to be of any 
good to the Ministry. The immediate concerns at home 
overshadowed the foreign war abroad. Any political leader 
contemplating a "splendid little war"^ '^  should remember 
the events surrounding the Opium War. War euphoria will 
soon recede, and the domestic tide will swell unless 
domestic needs are satisfied.
^Fay, Opium War, 362.
"11 has been a splendid little war; begun with the 
highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence 
and spirit, favored by that fortune which loves the brave." 
John Hay, U.S. Ambassador to England, writing to Colonel 
Theodore Roosevelt at the close of the Spanish-American 
War; As quoted in Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), 3.
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CONCLUSIONS:
HISTORIANS AND THE OPIUM WAR
War is never inevitable. Political leaders make 
conscious choices of when to fight and when to compromise. 
They do not, however, always base their decisions on clear, 
rational policies. More often than not, they fail to look 
past short-term goals. The immediate circumstances often 
overshadow larger historical forces such as economics or 
cultural differences. Historians, on the other hand, 
prefer to examine the long-term trends in their studies of 
the origins of war and often look for the sources of 
violent outbursts in inappropriate places, favoring 
historical forces over immediate conditions. To understand 
fully the motivation for war, historians must consider the 
immediate circumstances surrounding those making the 
decision to wage war, as well as the prevailing views 
within society.
Historians have used a variety of arguments to assert 
that the first Opium War was an inevitable consequence of 
Anglo-Chinese commercial contact. Earl Pritchard, for 
example, claimed that the British and the Chinese "thought
222
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and acted in a way almost directly opposed to one 
another. Unlike Britain's experience in Europe, China 
developed in relative isolation and refused to accept the 
British government's or merchants' demands to be treated as 
equals. After Lord Macartney (1791-1792) failed to 
establish a permanent British embassy in Peking, "the 
gauntlet was clearly thrown down for the future. As 
British merchants expanded their economic connections with 
the Chinese, the lack of any diplomatic relations, which 
might have peacefully settled conflicts between the two 
countries, made an armed contest unavoidable.^
Other historians, such as Michael Greenberg, have 
found the source of the inevitable tensions between the 
British and the Chinese in Britain's expanding modern 
economy. Greenberg contended that the country traders 
joined with British manufacturers to provide the primary 
impetus behind the campaign first, to eliminate the East 
India Company's China trade monopoly and second, to tear 
down Chinese restrictions on foreign trade--the Canton 
System. The removal of the East India Company's monopoly 
unleashed these dynamic agents of change. Working in
^Pritchard, Crucial Years, 110; see also Chang, 
Commissioner Lin, ix, 9-13.
^Pritchard, Crucial Years, 389.
^Owen, British Opium Policy, 168; Costin, Great 
Britain and China, 20; Chang, Commissioner Lin, 2; Graham, 
China Station, x.
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tandem, these merchants and manufacturers easily convinced
the British government to act violently on their behalf in
the first Opium War, shattering China’s stagnant world 
4view.
Historians have also used the British-run government 
in India's opium monopoly as evidence to argue for the 
inevitability of the Opium War. Tan Chung and J.Y. Wong 
found the desire to expand the China trade in India rather 
than Britain or Canton. The East India Company needed the 
expansion of the China trade--opium exports--in order to 
finance the Government of India. When Commissioner Lin 
cracked down on the opium trade, a response by the British 
Government was inevitable, because the Indian government
could not survive without the money derived from the sale
£  • 5of opium.
These economic and cultural factors certainly played a 
role in the British Cabinet's decision to wage war and can 
not be ignored. British economic dependency on the opium 
trade and the deep-seated cultural differences about the 
role of the merchant in society played important roles in 
the outbreak of hostilities in 1839 and 1840; the economic
^Greenberg, British Trade, 215; see also Chang, 
Coimissioner Lin, 13-14.
^Tan Chung, "The Britain-China-India Trade Triangle 
(1771-1840)," The Indian Economic and Social History Review 
11 (December 1974); 411-31; J.Y. Wong, "Monopoly in India 
and Equal Opportunities in China, 1830-33," South Asia 5 
(1982): 81-95 ; see also Chang, Coimissioner Lin, 215.
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variables and the cultural differences unquestionably laid 
the foundation for conflict. This does not mean that war 
was inevitable, or even likely before March 183 9. These 
historical realities only defined the "limits of the 
possible"--the border that separate "the possible from the 
impossible."* Previous historians of the Opium War have 
interpreted these borders within the context of an emerging 
modern, industrial state in which the middle class 
manipulated the political debate. If one redefines the 
limits of the possible and places the war within the 
context of a aristocratic society, then the likelihood of 
the Melbourne Ministry fighting a commercial war 
d e c r e a s e s T h e  March opium crisis should not have been a 
life or death issue for the Government. Those who pushed 
for the war--Radicals in Parliament, and northern merchants 
and manufacturers out of doors--were political and social 
minorities.* Interpretations that rest on economic and 
cultural explanations fail to explain fully the motivation 
behind the first Anglo-Chinese war by ignoring how these
*Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15th- 
18th Century, vol. 1, The Structures of Everyday Life: The 
Limits of the Possible, trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1979), 27.
^Jeremy Black, "British Foreign Policy in the 
Eighteenth Century : A Survey," Journal of British Studies 
26 (January 1987); 44-45.
*Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 40-42.
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minorities convinced the British Cabinet to expand 
violently British merchants' trading privileges in China.
Their failure is the result of an assumption made 
explicit by Morris Collis. In Foreign Mud (1947) Collis 
argued that the British Government and merchants sought an 
excuse for military intervention in China. The British 
wanted to compel the Chinese government to sign a "modern 
commercial treaty," as well as to allow an expansion of 
trade.^ The Chinese government's behavior prior to the 
arrival of Commissioner Lin had not warranted the use of 
force, but "Lin had played straight into his [Palmerston's] 
hands." The High Commissioner's "naive" actions provided a 
"godsend" that the Foreign Secretary used to justify his 
change in tactics.
This assumption has led historians to neglect the 
manuscript sources relevant to the discussion of the Opium 
War. Historians of the war's origins have focused almost 
exclusively on Foreign Office letters, while they have 
completely overlooked Melbourne's, Palmerston's and 
Hobhouse's private papers. Historical interpretations of 
the Cabinet's decision to fight a war half-way around the
’collis. Foreign Mud, 8; See also Costin, Great 
Britain and China, 20; Polachek, Inner Opium War, 102; 
Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 215.
^°Collis, Foreign Mud, 256-7.
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globe suffered as a result. For example, Chang Hsin-pao
wrote that
Within the frame work of the British 
constitution, Parliament has very little voice in 
foreign-pelicy decisions. The decision to wage 
war against China in 183 9 was made by Palmerston 
alone, under the influence of Smith, Jardine,
Elliot and a few others.
Tan Chung made a similar erroneous assertion : "the British
government could bypass Parliament in making decisions of
far-reaching consequences." Such statements conform
neither to the British constitution nor to the evidence
found in Hobhouse's diary. Palmerston had no authority to
start a war without consulting the Cabinet, and Parliament
did have a voice in the decision, especially when the
Ministry lacked the confidence of the country. If a
majority of the M.P.s disagreed with any Cabinet decision,
then they could remove both the Foreign Secretary and the
Cabinet.
Peter Fay is the only previous historian who came 
close to finding a political motivation for the Opium War,
”chang. Commissioner Lin, 194.
^^Chung, China and the Brave New World, 205.
^^Melbourne to Queen Victoria, South Street, 22 March 
183 9, "Cabinet Reports by the Prime Minister to the Crown, 
1837-1867" (Microfilmed by Harvester Press, 1973), Reel 1; 
Angus Hawkins, "'Parliamentary Government’ and Early 
Victorian Political Parties, c .1830-c.1880," English 
Historical Review 104 (July 1989): 641; On the relationship 
between domestic and foreign policy see Black, "British 
Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century," 38.
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but he quickly moved away. In one paragraph, he presented 
some of the most significant factors surrounding the 
Melbourne Ministry's decision to wage war--the Bedchamber 
Crisis, the budget deficit, and the Chartists riots--but he 
minimized their importance in the larger scheme of Anglo- 
Chinese trade relations--the opium trade. The Cabinet had 
to find the money to pay for the opium because "the lobby, 
the memorials, the piercing sounds of distress from 
Calcutta and Bombay all combined to persuade the Cabinet 
that they must. Citing Hobhouse's memoirs.
Recollections, Fay explained that since neither the British 
nor the Indian governments could pay for the opium, the 
Cabinet decided to force the Chinese to pay. He then 
promptly disregarded his own analysis and accepted 
Palmerston's explanation of the war. The British sent the 
force to China to extract a mere £2,0 00,000 from the 
Chinese, because of the immeasurable insult wrought by the 
Chinese. Palmerston wanted to make sure that no such 
threat to British trade would happened again.
The British press's reaction to the Opium War has also 
received little attention from historians. In the only 
article dealing with the subject Shijie Guan argued that 
the Chartist newspapers' attitudes toward the war "can
’^ Fay, Opium War, 193. 
^^ Fay, Opium War, 194.
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throw light on the nature of the Chartist movement, its 
class consciousness and feelings of international 
solidarity for the oppressed."'* Viewed in isolation, the 
articles Guan cited seem to support his thesis, but when 
put into context, they suggest another possible 
interpretation. No single economic "class" monopolized the 
opposition to the war in China or the disreputable and 
unchristain opium trade. Newspapers with little 
ideological common ground such as The Times, The Leeds 
Mercury, The Northern Star and The Charter all joined in 
denouncing the vain attempt to collect money for greedy 
opium smugglers by violently assaulting China's sovereignty 
and people. The uniqueness of the Chartists' opposition 
stems from their belief that the English political system, 
which excluded a large portion of the people, allowed a 
privileged few to command the resources of the state. 
Evidence from the Chartist newspapers thus supports Patrick 
Joyce's argument that class consciousness was less 
significant in shaping social identities in early 
industrial England than populism: populism’ points to a
set of discourses and identities which were extra-economic 
in character, and inclusive and universalising in their
'*Shijie Guan, "Chartism and the First Opium War," 
History Workshop Journal 24 (1987): 18
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social remit in contrast to the exclusive categories of 
class.
The neglect of the Cabinet's actual decision to wage 
war and the opposition to the conflict has led British 
imperial historians astray. Both Robinson and Gallagher, 
and Cain and Hopkins cited Palmerston's desire to force 
British manufactured goods on China as evidence for their 
own theories of "free trade imperialism" and "gentlemanly 
capitalism."’® Neither of these claims can be 
substantiated because they rest on the assumption that the 
use of force was a necessary component of Palmerston's 
foreign policy. Studies of Palmerston's policy in this 
period have shown that the Foreign Secretary's belligerent 
behavior in China marked a departure from his peaceful 
execution of foreign policy in the Levant, South America, 
and Mexico. Even when merchants and manufactures placed 
considerable pressure on the Government, he refused to 
solve overseas commercial problems with the use of 
force.Before the conservative Opposition made a
’Voyce, Visions of the People, 11.
’^ Gallagher and Robinson, "Imperialism of Free Trade," 
10; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 82, 100.
’^ Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, Vol. 2, 621- 
4, 785; Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 250-2; W.M. Mathew, 
"The Imperialism of Free Trade : Peru, 1820-70," Economic 
History Review 21 (December 1968) : 567; Morgan, "Anglo- 
French Confrontation and Cooperation in Spanish America," 
97-99; Platt, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some 
Reservations," 297.
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political issue of Palmerston's China policy, he also 
followed a peaceful course in the Far East. Once the 
debate entered Parliament he acted more like a shrewd 
politician reacting to an immediate political crisis than a 
high-minded statesman following a clear imperialist policy.
Cain's and Hopkins' focus on the metropolis does, 
however, provide a more appropriate context for studying 
the motivation that drove imperialism than Gallagher's and 
Robinson's concentration on the periphery.The Napier 
episode makes this point quite clear. Lord Napier's 
behavior had brought Britain and China to the brink of war, 
but the Foreign Office refused to be dragged into a fight 
that went against British policy. Only Her Majesty's 
Government had the authority to commit troops. Palmerston 
himself told Elliot that representatives of the Crown 
stationed abroad had no authority to make important 
decisions. Authority rested in London, not Canton.
While Cain's and Hopkins' argument parallels in some 
respects the one presented here, there are important 
differences. Between 1837 and 1842, the height of an 
economic depression and the Chartist crisis, they found an 
increase in imperialist activities directed by Lord 
Palmerston and claimed that he sought to avert a "social
Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism^ 12; Robinson, 
"Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism," 147-8; 
On the periphery thesis see also Fieldhouse, Economics and 
Empire, 8; Graham, China Station, x.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
232
breakdown" in Britain by finding "overseas solutions to 
domestic p r o b l e m s . T h e y  asserted that he wanted 
increased access to foreign markets in order to counter the 
Chartist unrest caused by the sharp rise in 
unemployment.^^ Neither Palmerston nor his colleagues in 
the British Cabinet adhered to such a grand scheme ; 
considering the vocal opposition Chartist newspapers 
expressed to overseas wars in general, and the Opium War in 
particular, there is no compelling reason why the Whigs 
should have had such an expectation. Moveover, Palmerston 
and the Chartists shared the belief that economic vitality 
depended more upon developing home rather than external 
m a r k e t s . T h e  political crisis in Parliament, not the 
desire to prevent a social breakdown, forced Palmerston to 
go against his beliefs and to side with the northern 
industrialists and merchants in violently opening China's 
market. Cain's and Hopkins' theory of gentlemanly 
capitalism thus fails to explain Palmerston's "burst of 
bellicosity" in 1839.
The overwhelming concentration on British imperialism 
has also hurt the interpretation of the Opium War by
Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 100; idem, 
"Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas," 
523; idem, "The Political Economy of British Expansion 
Overseas," 480.
^^Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 40.
^Semmel, Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, 219-21.
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neglecting the Chinese side of the story. As Martin Lynn 
has cautioned, the historian's focus on imperialism has 
exaggerated the importance of the Western presence 
overseas. Focusing on Africa as his primary example, Lynn 
states, "The Europeans were simply one factor in a complex 
mix of forces which an African ruler had to account of; 
they were neither the only nor the most deadly threat to 
the independence of his s t a t e . D i s t a n c e ,  fiscal 
policy, the ineffectiveness of the navy inland, the size of 
Africa and the desire of indigenous populations to 
manipulate the foreign presence for their own benefits 
restricted the ability of British merchants and Foreign 
Office agents to control events in Africa. Many of the 
above qualifications of European imperial power in Lynn's 
discussion of Africa also apply to China. In Discovering 
History in China, Paul Cohen points out that studying 
China's history from a paradigm based on the significance 
of the Western impact is misleading. Even considering all 
the trouble the Westerners caused in the treaty ports, the 
Chinese government faced the far greater problem of 
internal unrest. Westerners provided Chinese officials.
'^^ Martin Lynn, "The 'Imperialism of Free Trade ' and 
the Case of West Africa, c.1830-c.1870," The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 15 (October 1986) : 31.
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and later historians, with easy scapegoats for the 
unraveling of Chinese society.
The most recent work on the Anglo-Chinese conflict 
examines the subject from Chinese perspective, and its 
conclusions complement the arguments presented in this 
dissertation. In The Inner Opium War (1992), James 
Polachek shifted the focus from Canton to Peking. Polachek 
explicated the political wrangling over the opium question 
within the Emperor's Court. He tied the decision to 
suppress the detestable trade to an attempt by the Spring 
Purification Circle to seize power. His argument dismissed 
theories about traditional Chinese isolationism and 
aversion to western trade, looking instead at the immediate 
political circumstances around the decision.Both 
Polachek's book and my argument question the validity of 
viewing the first Opium War as clash of two cultures, and 
both doubt the primacy of economic motivations in causing 
the conflict. Minority factions in Peking and London used 
the political crises in their respective governments to 
their own advantage.
Umberto Eco's novel, Foucault's Pendulum, helps to 
explain the recurring deficiencies in the secondary sources
^^Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: 
American Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York; 
Columbia University Press, 1984), 9-55, 97-147.
'^^ Polachek, Inner Opium War, 134-5.
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that focus on the Opium War. While telling the story of 
various occult theorists and publishers, Ecco enlightens 
his reader with numerous excursions into areas such as 
causality and historiography. Two such excursions are 
relevant to the discussion at hand. First, for many people 
causality is simply: A causes B. Eco explains, however, 
"The belief that time is a linear, directed sequence 
running from A to B is a modern illusion. In fact it can 
also go from B to A, the effect producing the cause. 
Historians, by connecting events and ideas together, create 
the past as much as the past creates the future. In the 
historical literature on the Opium War, this reverse 
sequencing seems to have taken place. Since the effect of 
the Opium War was to open China, the cause must have been 
the desire to see China opened. Historians readily 
accepted justifications, or ex post facto explanations for 
the war, without questioning their validity. Second, when 
trying to "prove" a thesis, occult writers and historians 
alike effortlessly cite the work of experts to support 
their theses. As the field grows older, and more experts 
produce more works, "They confirm one another, therefore 
they ' re true . "
^^Umberto Eco, Foucault's Pendulum, trans. William 
Weaver (New York: Ballatine Books, 1988), 173.
28,-Eco, Foucault's Pendulum, 231.
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From the very beginning of the debate over the Opium 
War the political polemics discussed the war's origins in 
terms of economic or cultural conflict in the Far East.*
In late 183 9 and 1840 writers had no access to the secret 
documents between the Foreign Office and Captain Elliot. 
Anyone wishing to write on this subject had to rely on 
Palmerston's heavily edited Blue Book and on the public 
statements of Cabinet ministers in order to divine their 
motivations for waging war half way around the world. The 
story told by twentieth-century historians differs little 
from the scory told in the 1840s. Recent historians have 
used both the early narratives and the Blue Book as primary 
sources when in fact they are secondary sources. "They 
confirm one another, therefore they're true."
Shifting the focus from events in Canton to conditions 
in London challenges long-held assumptions about the 
reasons for the first Opium War. During the 183 0s Lord 
Palmerston and the Melbourne Ministry received repeated 
warnings from their agents at Canton that the situation 
there was deteriorating. The Ministry either chose to 
ignore these warnings or decided that their priorities lay 
elsewhere. Only when news of Elliot's actions in March 
183 9 reached Great Britain, and the Opposition held the 
Government accountable, did the Whigs decide to take
See Bibliography "Primary Sources: Printed" and 
Chapter 7 above.
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action. The Chartist riots, the three years of deficit 
budgets, Irish unrest, colonial rebellions in Canada and 
Jamaica, the first Afghan War and French threats to 
commerce in Mexico and Buenos Aires all weighed heavily on 
the minds of Cabinet members when they made policy 
decisions. As the crisis developed in China over opium, 
the Melbourne Ministry faced mounting pressure from the 
conservative Opposition and from Radicals sitting in the 
Ministerial benches. The Opposition accused the Ministry 
of encouraging unrest at home and of failing to protect 
British interests abroad; they charged that the Ministry 
lacked the ability to govern.
It is in the context of these immediate charges by the 
Opposition that the Ministry's decision to go to war must 
be viewed. Captain Elliot clearly had no authority to 
pledge payment for £2,000,000 worth of opium. If 
Palmerston had dismissed the Chief of the Commission, then 
the Foreign Secretary would have had to admit that his 
policy failed to achieve peaceful access to China's market; 
if the Cabinet decided to honor Elliot's pledge, it would 
have had to get the approval of Parliament. The domestic 
political crisis thus intensified the commercial crisis in 
the Far East and created the opportunity for the Radicals, 
whose constituents eagerly awaited the "opening" of China, 
to sway a cautious aristocratic government.
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The Ministry had few options. It had to change 
British policy by sending an expeditionary force to China 
in order to counter another conservative charge that Her 
Majesty's Government neglected the nation's commercial 
interests. Before the opium and Ministerial crises 
Palmerston stated his policy clearly to Captain Elliot: the 
Government would not take an active role in opening China 
to foreign trade. Free trade meant free trade. The 
Ministry would not replace one form of government 
intervention--the East India Company--with another-- 
military force. Merchants had to open markets on their 
own. Palmerston was not looking for an excuse to attack 
the Chinese in an effort to expand trade and could have 
continued the policy of quiescence had there been no crisis 
of confidence in the Melbourne Ministry. The Radicals took 
advantage of the Ministry's weakness, pressing for war to 
enlarge Britain's commercial relationship with China. The 
convergence of the economic crisis in China and the 
political crisis in London pressured the British Cabinet to 
reverse course. The Whigs finally sent the naval and 
military force that merchants and manufacturers had been 
demanding since the failure of the Napier mission. The 
force went to the Far East with the intent of demanding 
Chinese redress for the "Insult to the British Flag," and 
of guaranteeing future trading rights. The use of force 
was not the result of long-range planning. Rather, the
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Opium War was an unintended consequence of Palmerston's 
failed foreign policy.
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APPENDIX A
Viscount Powerscourt, "House of Commons Debate: January 
30, 1840," Times (London), 31 January 1840, p. 3.
"We have in the first place," continued the noble lord, 
"a Chartist conspiracy branching all over England and 
Scotland; we have, in the second, a Riband conspiracy with 
a secret organization and of an extensive nature, proved to 
exist in most parts of Ireland (cheers form the Opposition 
benches), and we have a system of perpetual agitation kept 
alive in that country, which, like the effects of 
unwholesome excitement on the human frame, must terminate 
in exhaustion and decay. (Cheers continued.) We have 
numerous colonies--some of them only discontented,--and 
what must our condition be when more discontent is 
considered comparative happiness! (hear, hear)--others in a 
state of subdued revolt--and others again the seat of a 
late military triumph, which those who are best acquainted 
with the country say will prove only a short-lived one. 
(Cheers from the Opposition benches.) Those colonies 
composed of petty states, partially independent of each 
other, were only waiting for a small disturbance to fall to 
pieces as so many beads would do when the string is cut
which confines them together. (A laugh.) We have a war in
India imminent, and a status quo liable to be disturbed by
the introduction of the sword of Russia or the bayonet of
France into the scales of diplomacy. We have a state of 
great financial difficulty before us at home (cheers from 
the Opposition benches), and to crown all this, we have a 
Government--it is difficult to deny it--which cannot pass a 
single measure through Parliament except by sufferance 
(cheers from the Opposition benches)--a Government not 
distinguished by the possession of a single talent, not 
illuminated by a single ray of genius (laughter and cries 
of "Oh!" from the Ministerial benches), and not even 
supported by the common attributes straightforward dogged 
and plodding mediocrity. (Cheers form the Opposition 
benches.) The only aptitude of its members is for dexterous 
maneuvering. (Cheers from the Opposition.) They have not 
the power to stem the torrent with manly fortitude, for all 
they aim at is to keep their heads above it, and to float 
listlessly along its tide. (Cheers from the Opposition 
benches.) Their last resource is in the favor of the 
Crown, whose illustrious wearer is so unacquainted with the 
state of affairs as to be incapable of knowing the danger
256
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State of affairs as to be incapable of knowing the danger 
of her position, and is kept so purposely in the dark by 
those who surround her as to be incapable of seeing what 
ought to be her [calm] and magnanimous course. (Hear, 
hear.) With all these dangers staring me in the face, I 
have no hesitation in saying that, whatever their fate may 
be now, in spite of their accommodating system of open 
questions and contradictory evasions, which render 
impossible even for their best friends to conjecture what 
the next day may bring forth, their doom is sealed.
(Cheers from the opposition.) They have weighed in the 
balance and have found wanting. The voice of the country 
is now pushing them from their stools (roars of laughter 
from the Ministerial benches), and will soon set in their 
places men whose principles are in accordance with those of 
the constitution, and whose talents are proportioned to the 
emergency of the times." (Great cheering from the 
Opposition benches.)
Viscount Powerscourt
Vote of No-confidence Debate
January 30, 184 0
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APPENDIX B
Lord Ellenborough. Question to the Prime Minster, 1 
August, 1839. Hansard Parliamentary Debates. 3d ser., vol. 
49, (1839), cols. 1052-55.
China-Opium Trade] Lord Ellenborough wished to put a 
question to the noble Viscount opposite, but, as he 
intended to make some remarks on the subject to which it 
referred, he should conclude with a motion. He wanted to 
draw the attention of her Majesty's Government to the 
information lately received from China. The case, as he 
understood it, was this : The Chinese government determined 
at length to put an end altogether the illicit trade in 
opium, and dispatched a commissioner with full powers of 
that purpose to Canton. On the arrival of the 
commissioner, he intimated to the British merchants that, 
with regard to the past, the Chinese government would not 
insist on prosecuting any one of anything he might have 
done against the law. But they desired for the future that 
the trade in opium should cease. They required further 
immediate delivery to the Chinese government all opium then 
in the possession of British merchants on the waters of 
China. They enforced this demand by forming a cordon round 
the British factories, and preventing the introduction of 
provisions. The British superintendent then went to 
Canton, and placed himself in the same circumstance of 
peril with the British merchants, his arrival had not the 
effect of
making any alteration in their condition. On the 
contrary, the blockade was yet more strictly enforced, 
and ultimately Captain Elliot, the superintendent, felt 
himself obliged, or imagined he was obliged, to request 
that the British merchants should deliver to him all the 
opium in their possession, for the purpose of being 
delivered by him to the Chinese government, he 
undertaking, on the part of the British Government, that 
all those merchants should be by the British Government 
identified. The quantity of opium so delivered, or agreed 
to be delivered, amounted to 20,000 chests. He (Lord 
Ellenborough) understood that the value was estimated--the 
estimate being by no means sufficient--at more than two 
millions sterling. Now, it would be a subject undoubtedly 
for serious consideration with her Majesty's Government, 
when they were acquainted with all the circumstances of the
258
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when they were acquainted with all the circumstances of the 
case, how far it might be incumbent on them to sanction the 
proceedings of Captain Elliot. Until that gentleman's case 
was fully before the public, it would be improper to form 
an opinion upon it. But he (Lord Ellenborough) must lay 
this down as a general principle, that any person, in civil 
situation, who is called upon to perform civil duties in 
the public service, is under as solemn an obligation to 
disregard every feeling for his own personal safety as any 
man in the military service. That which would not be 
justified in one holding a [civil] situation, when he 
undertook to act for [the] public but in what a position 
were we now practically placed by what had occurred? 
Whatever might be the conduct of her Majesty's Government, 
or whatever might be the success of any negotiation or 
intervention with a view of obtaining compensation for 
these losses from the Chinese government, he thought it was 
impossible not to come to this conclusion, that the trade 
in opium practically at an end. Now the revenue of India 
derived considerably more than a million sterling a year 
from the monopoly of that trade--he believed that the 
amount was 1,200,0001 a year and he apprehended, that from 
800,0001 to 900,0001 was delivered from the export of opium 
to the Chinese territories. The export of opium to China 
formed fully more than one-half of the whole export that 
export was the equivalent which this country gave to the 
Chinese empire for tea. Consider in what position the 
revenue of England would be placed by any great change in 
the tea trade. If a smaller quantity of tea should be 
imported, the revenue must suffer but incase of the 
cessation of the opium trade,the same quantity of tea must 
be had at a great additional expense, and, therefore tea 
would become much dearer. With respect to the opium trade, 
however, it would be difficult for any man to say one word 
against the grounds the Chinese government insist on its 
discontinuance. That government declared that it was 
contrary to its duty to permit this trade, which had been 
carried on to such an extent, and v/hich was destroying the 
morals and health of the people. He (Lord Ellenborough) 
really did not know what answer could be given by the 
British Government to the allegations of the somewhat long 
but sensible and able statement of the Chinese 
commissioners on that subject. These circumstances, and 
considering the great importance of anything affecting our 
financial condition, at a time when Parliament was 
considering the propriety of taking off a tax which would 
for some time diminish the revenues, he desired to ask the 
noble Viscount [whether] he could lay on the table of the 
House any dispatch which he might have received from the 
superintendent, giving an account of those transactions.
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In order to make his observation regular, he would beg to 
move for the production of any new dispatch.
Viscount Melbourne said, that no dispatch had been 
received. The facts might be as the noble Lord stated, but 
her Majesty's Government had received no account of them 
whatever. Therefore he should not make any observations on 
the subject until the Government was in position of full 
information.
Lord Ellenborough had taken the account from the 
newspaper, but there could be no reasonable doubt of its 
accuracy.
Subject dropped.
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